"The emergency exceeded the planned capabilities": The previously unknown report from the Boric government regarding reconstruction efforts in Valparaíso.

"Report on the Reconstruction Process Following the February 2nd and 3rd, 2024 Mega-Fire." This is the name of the document that the former government of Gabriel Boric delivered on March 6th through the Ministry of Social Development and Family, a document that has largely gone unnoticed, receiving little media attention. While the ministry initially announced its release on March 6th, the document was not immediately available on the website and was in the process of being uploaded. There was also no major announcement about it. The 235-page document provides a comprehensive assessment of the executive branch's efforts in the reconstruction process that took place in the Valparaíso region, particularly in Viña del Mar, Quilpué, and Villa Alemana, following the mega-fire of February 2024. Unlike reports from the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, which include figures and percentages of reconstruction, this document offers a more qualitative analysis of the errors and lessons learned from the process. This reconstruction has been described as "slow" by the current administration, led by Housing and Urban Development Minister Iván Poduje. However, this report from the previous administration includes both self-criticism and positive assessments of the work done by the government. The former Minister of Social Development, Javiera Toro, was responsible for delivering the report. The government's guiding principle was that "reconstruction should be a comprehensive process that restores living conditions, safety, and stability, while also addressing the factors that amplified the disaster." Accordingly, the plan was divided into seven areas, including housing, comprehensive well-being, the urban environment, and others. One of the initial conclusions is that "reconstruction is primarily a governance issue. Its progress depends on the quality of leadership, the clarity of roles, the resolution of critical issues, inter-sectoral coordination, and the traceability of information," adding that "the housing component presented the greatest complexities due to its dependence on land, permits, technical definitions, and institutional coordination." The new Minister of Housing and Urban Development, Iván Poduje. Initial Criticisms The report begins by stating that "the State should have deployed a large-scale response" and that "the magnitude of the damage, the diversity of territorial realities, and the need to act quickly presented complex challenges." When assessing the reconstruction efforts, the document states that "it took place in a politically and institutionally charged environment marked by high levels of distrust towards the State, coupled with an environment of intense public exposure and the circulation of fragmented information, amplified by the coincidence with electoral cycles." The former Minister of Housing and Urban Development, Carlos Montes. Mario Téllez / La Tercera MARIO TELLEZ It is added that "the relationship between communities and institutions was particularly exposed to interpretations of slowness, lack of coherence, or unrealistic expectations, which strained the legitimacy of the process." In this regard, it is concluded that "the emergency overwhelmed the planned capabilities, and that during the initial stages, inter-institutional coordination did not always allow for the orderly communication of messages, priorities, and clear lines of action." Another self-criticism focuses on the role of housing policy instruments, including various construction solutions. It is detailed that "the reconstruction ultimately encountered accumulated structural deficits that extend beyond the scope of the emergency" and that "the process was not linear or immediate, as the availability of subsidies had to be coordinated with previous processes of regularization, verification, and technical feasibility." In the following pages, there are negative mentions of various aspects. For example, it is noted that "the speed of the housing reconstruction process is less a reflection of the availability of instruments and more a result of the real complexity of making them operational under highly heterogeneous conditions... For many families, this meant going through a predominantly administrative process for months." Regarding communication, it is admitted that "the various services did not always succeed in explaining the entire reconstruction process," in addition to "difficulties in translating the technical and administrative complexity of the process into a public narrative." Regarding governance, it is stated that there was a "persistent tension" to be able to "sustain highly complex processes without relying on successive corrections." The mega-fire in Valparaíso. FOTO: DEDVI MISSENE Lessons Learned The report emphasizes that "the performance of reconstruction is measured not only by what is restored but also by what is achieved in terms of organization," and that "reconstruction is defined by governance, not by the sum of projects... The process showed that reconstruction accelerates or is hindered, primarily by the quality of its governance." It is also added that "when governance is diffuse, the system tends to fragment into parallel departments and urgent matters." It is further stated that "housing instruments must be prepared to operate in emergency situations with real and verifiable flexibility." Finally, it is concluded that "in a country repeatedly exposed to disasters, reconstruction must be sustained as a continuous public policy, integrating prevention, preparation, response, and recovery."