Japan's election victory serves as a warning to Europe's complacency.

As Brussels rethinks economic security, Japan's more assertive strategic shift demonstrates that autonomy means building options, not pretending Europe can stand alone. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's election victory serves as a warning to Europe: a world with less trust rewards flexibility—not dependence. It signals a shift towards a more pragmatic approach: stop waiting for stability and plan for uncertainty. Europeans have spent years debating "strategic autonomy." Discussions have revolved around defense spending, industrial policy, and how far Europe should distance itself from—or remain aligned with—the United States. Recent events have made this a practical question: can Europe withstand pressure without resorting to drastic measures? The recent tariff agreement between Brussels and Washington shows that even between close allies, economic relations can become explicitly transactional. Leverage is used more readily. Trust, once assumed, must now be actively managed. This does not call the transatlantic alliance into question. However, it confirms what many in Europe have been slow to accept: that geopolitics now influences every significant decision. In this context, strategic autonomy is about having enough influence—and enough partners—to avoid being cornered. Europe is already trying to preserve this room for maneuver: by strengthening its industrial base, refining its economic security toolkit, and deepening ties beyond the United States. Among these partners, Japan stands out. Why Japan? The EU's Indo-Pacific strategy already recognizes the region's importance for trade, technology, and security. It is also where the rules that underpin global stability are increasingly being tested. Japan has been forced to adapt earlier and more visibly to the pressures of a multipolar world. Faced with Chinese rivalry, a shifting military balance, and economic coercion, Tokyo has learned to combine openness with safeguards. Europe should recognize that Japan has already confronted dilemmas that we are only now fully acknowledging: how to remain open without becoming vulnerable, and how to strengthen security ties without compromising a rules-based identity. The groundwork is already in place with Japan. The economic partnership agreement has been in force since 2019. The Digital Partnership was launched in 2022. The Security and Defence Partnership followed in 2024. And the Strategic Partnership Agreement is planned for 2025. Few relationships come with such a readily available set of tools. The challenge now lies in implementation. Consider economic security. Regulations written in Brussels alone will not alleviate bottlenecks in East Asia. That requires partners with industrial strength and shared interests to make resilience a collective effort—rather than a competitive one. The same logic applies to technology. Semiconductors, AI standards, and data flows are now instruments of power. The digital partnership with Japan is one of the few avenues where Europe can shape rules with a trusted partner before others do. This is where the broader strategic context is crucial. Japan anchors some of Asia's most significant trade structures, covering nearly a third of global GDP. This integration is progressing regardless of whether Europe chooses to engage with it seriously. Reducing vulnerability to bottlenecks will require more than just statements of intent. It requires structured supply-chain mapping, coordinated export control measures, and ensuring that resilience efforts reinforce—rather than fragment—open markets among trusted partners. The same logic applies to security. Japan is expanding its capabilities, deepening partnerships beyond the United States, and increasing defense spending. Tokyo is embedding itself in multilateral arrangements that reflect a more assertive posture. Europe has no ambition to become a Pacific military power, nor should it. But it should recognize that European security and Indo-Pacific stability are increasingly interconnected. Strategic autonomy is not achieved by distancing oneself from partners, nor is it conjured through speeches about sovereignty. It is built, quietly, by accumulating choices so that no single actor can dictate terms. Japan offers Europe a practical anchor in the Indo-Pacific. Treating this partnership as peripheral would be a mistake. Europe does not need a dramatic shift, but consistent, practical habits of cooperation that transform alignment into leverage.