The true scandal of the Nvidia saga

rss · Taipei Times 2026-11-22T16:37:42Z en
By Scott Lincicome / Bloomberg Opinion Add TT as Preferred Source Most coverage of Nvidia Corp lately has focused on the alleged affairs of former CEO Jensen Huang (黃仁勳), the connections between Nvidia and US President Donald Trump’s administration, and how these entanglements might have affected sales of advanced semiconductors to China and, by extension, US national security. All valid questions. Various reports said the family and former investment firm of US Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick — who intervened to facilitate exports of Nvidia’s advanced chips, against the views of other Trump officials — were heavily invested in the company and the Nvidia-powered Southeast Asian data centers that might have aided China’s artificial intelligence (AI) ambitions. Huang had a close relationship with Trump, who loaded up on Nvidia stock just a week before the administration loosened export rules on Nvidia’s H200 chips. By the end of August, Trump’s Nvidia stake may have exceeded US$60 million. Whether these dots connect remains to be seen, but the reasons for suspicion are obvious and understandable. Government regulators are supposed to be neutral arbiters, but personal and financial relationships with a specific firm — especially one so large and important as Nvidia — create conflicts that might alter their determinations. Influence runs both ways: Politically connected executives lobby for subsidies, lax enforcement or other state favors, while biased officials push firms to act for personal or political reasons instead of commercial ones. In Nvidia’s case, there is evidence that both things were happening. Curiously, there is another part of the Nvidia saga that raises similar problems, but has received far less attention: the US government’s cut of Nvidia’s China business. In August last year, the president announced that Nvidia and AMD would pay the government 15 percent of sales of certain AI chips to China — an arrangement Trump said was his idea. In December the same year, Trump announced a 25 percent cut of Nvidia’s H200 sales to China, which the government creatively implemented via a January proclamation that — to skirt a constitutional ban on export taxes — imposed a 25 percent tariff on chips imported from Taiwan and re-exported to China. Comparing federal estimates of duties paid on imports of the relevant chips with US re-exports of those same products to China, Hong Kong and Macau, it is possible to make an estimate of how much this scheme netted Uncle Sam: as much as US$333 million through September this year, which is neither chump change nor a fiscal gamechanger. It is hard to say if this money — and the arrangement more broadly — affected the administration’s decision to approve the Nvidia sales to China or to offer the company other special treatment, but that is (almost) beside the point. The deeper problem is that the arrangement adds inappropriate weight to one side of the regulatory scale, and here the bias is official US government policy. Regulators deciding whether an overseas chip sale threatens national security should not also be authorized to collect a commission on it. This policy problem is not limited to Nvidia and the export licensing scheme. Cato Institute’s government ownership dashboard showed that since June last year, the US government has initialed equity stake deals with 41 companies — 27 of which were seeded by the US Department of Commerce. At least two of the deals involve firms tied to the Trump administration: Commerce’s US$1.6 billion package for USA Rare Earth hinges on a US$1.5 billion private capital raise by Lutnick’s former firm Cantor Fitzgerald, while magnet maker Vulcan Elements, which has deals with the commerce department and the Pentagon, is linked to 1789 Capital, the venture firm associated with Donald Trump Jr. Regardless of the personal connections, these unprecedented equity schemes raise conflicts similar to those evident with Nvidia, because they give Washington a direct financial interest in target firms and thus distort corporate and government decisions. When Uncle Sam stops being a referee and starts being a player in the game, conflicts are inevitable. And new suspicions will arise every time the government interacts with a firm in its growing portfolio. Consider some recent examples. Months after the Pentagon took a US$1 billion stake in L3Harris’s missile business, the parent company won a US Federal Aviation Administration contract to upgrade the air traffic control network (oops). Two months later, the US Army selected Vulcan to supply rare earth magnets for its SkyFoundry drone program — the young firm’s 10th defense contract. And government-backed Intel just received a one-year waiver from the US Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) recent ban on foreign-made factory robots. These and other transactions are not necessarily improper or corrupt — other firms, for example, have also received FCC waivers — but the risk of biased decisionmaking is obvious, and congressional inquiries are expected and deserved. The only way to limit such problems is by terminating these relationships and re-establishing the high wall between the US public and private sectors, a separation that has undergirded US free enterprise for decades. To regain its regulatory neutrality, the government should immediately divest its corporate equity stakes and terminate similar schemes, including the US Steel “golden share,” the Nvidia and AMD revenue-sharing arrangements, and the government’s new push for codified “national champions” (including Nvidia). The US Congress should also tighten restrictions on investments by senior government officials, their families and their former firms, and it should require far more transparency about investment positions that remain lawful. However, the real fix lies in reducing the government’s influence over the economy. “When buying and selling are controlled by legislation, the first things to be bought and sold are legislators,” satirist P. J. O’Rourke once warned. Swap in executive discretion and dealmaking, and you have the Nvidia mess — and maybe other messes, too. None of this means no regulation; guarding national security is an appropriate government role. However, even there, such as with US export controls, there is a strong case for narrowing government involvement to only the most serious items, so as to maximize efficacy and minimize the measures’ economic and political downsides. All regulation, security-related or otherwise, should also be strictly necessary, objective and free of the loopholes that turn well-intended policies into vehicles for personal enrichment. Nvidia and US export controls might be in the spotlight today, but the Trump administration’s unprecedented corporatism all but ensures that even more trouble lurks behind the curtain. Scott Lincicome is an economist with the Cato Institute. He specializes in domestic policy and international trade. This column reflects the personal views of the author and does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.
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