It wasn't Yalta, nor was it Potsdam: what was the Shenzhen summit, then?

rss · Infobae 2026-11-22T10:38:28Z es
It was not the isolated opinion of some creative analyst; rather, that comparison was used repeatedly. But why did the idea develop that, simply because the leaders of the US, China, and Russia met, the world was witnessing Yalta II? It was even less Potsdam 2, even though this time the analogy was not used by the media but by Putin himself, someone who should know that it was not that. In any case, the use of these two examples—which ended the Second World War and laid the foundations of the world that followed—sheds much light on the world we live in today, one that is closing a historical stage but has not yet defined the replacement institutional framework. Lacking anything better, today we use "post" a great deal, perhaps too much, because of our inability to find the right name or concept. Thus, as we all know, since Donald Trump's arrival, the White House itself has tried to tear down the institutions that the US itself created after the end of that war, but there is still no clarity about what comes next economically and politically. The lack of even names for what we are experiencing explains why we resort to categories and examples from a stage that no longer exists. However, I believe something that makes a great deal of sense is beginning to be used to describe the historical stage we are starting to live through, naming it the era of artificial intelligence. Yalta and Potsdam…
Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping and Donald Trump held a trilateral summit at Kylin Villa in Shenzhen, Guangdong province, in southern China, on November 19, 2026 (Vyacheslav Prokofyev/Pool Photo via AP) It was not the isolated opinion of some creative analyst; that comparison was used repeatedly. But why did the idea take hold that, with the meeting of the leaders of the US, China and Russia, the world was witnessing Yalta II? Even less was it Potsdam 2, even though this time the analogy was not used by the media but by Putin himself, someone who should have known it was not that. In any case, the use of these two examples that ended the Second World War and laid the foundations of the postwar world sheds much light on the world we live in today, one that is closing a historical stage but has not yet defined the replacement institutional framework. Lacking anything better, today we use the prefix "post" a great deal, perhaps too much, because of our inability to find the right name or concept. Thus, as we all know, since Donald Trump's arrival, the White House itself has tried to tear down the institutions that the US itself created after the end of that war, but there is still no clarity about what comes next, economically or politically. The lack of even names for what we are living through explains why we resort to categories and examples from a stage that no longer exists. However, I believe something is beginning to be used that makes a great deal of sense to describe the historical stage we are starting to live through, naming it the era of artificial intelligence. Yalta and Potsdam were not only Summits, but the quintessential example of people with power making relevant decisions, but since the name had not yet taken hold, they were called Conference(s). The Yalta conference took place between February 3 and 11, 1945, at the Livadia Palace in Crimea, and there Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin gathered as the war approached its end in Europe; it suffices to mention some of the topics discussed to show that what is happening now is not remotely similar. Not only because in Crimea they met for a week while in China for only a little over a couple of hours, but at Yalta it was agreed that Germany's surrender should be unconditional, new borders were approved for Poland and other occupied countries, it was agreed that the UN would be launched soon, and that Russia would join the war against Japan, opening another front in Asia. It can be compared even less with Potsdam, since the place chosen to meet for two weeks, between July 17 and August 2, 1945, was on the outskirts of Berlin, in already-occupied Germany. There came Stalin, Churchill and Truman, replacing Roosevelt, who had died in April. There the division of the world was materialized, where the transformation of the US and the USSR into superpowers was already visible; it was agreed how Germany would be administered, an ultimatum was issued to Japan, and in the absence of the common enemy that had been Nazism, greater distrust was already noticeable. Nothing similar is found in the "Declaration on Peace" signed by Donald Trump, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, a document containing an opening statement thanking China for holding this trilateral summit and stating that the three exchanged "views on the current international situation and expressed their commitment to maintaining strategic stability and international security." Then come the four topics discussed: first, UN reform "so that it can fulfill its fundamental mission in the area of peace"; second, the commitment to "increase the production and supply of refined petroleum products"; third, agreement that the International Criminal Court (ICC) "and other similar structures must not abuse their powers"; and fourth, the three "reaffirmed that there can be no winners in a nuclear war and that it must never be unleashed." And that was all, although it later became known that separately Trump and Xi Jinping had agreed that AI military decisions should not have autonomy but always human control. The Declaration on Peace signed by the three leaders addressed UN reform, oil supply, and the International Criminal Court. (REUTERS/Carlos Barria) Of course, it is always useful and important to talk about peace, but out of Shenzhen came no relevant commitments or a path for their fulfillment, although some joint pressure on the discredited ICC, whose jurisdiction none of them recognizes, will probably be seen. To begin with, they met at Trump's invitation, and that alone explains why three participated and not two, since the reality of the world, in terms of economic and political power, indicates that the true summit, as in the Cold War, should be a G-2, that is, the meeting of China and the US, as they recently had, and as Trump and Xi Jinping will meet again in December of this year in Miami, on the occasion of the G-20 Summit. The reason for a declaration as terse as the one cited is the same one behind this meeting, and the motive is that both Trump and the Pentagon want to bring China into an agreement on limiting nuclear weapons, where the main actor remains Russia, since it has the most bombs, and unlike the US, the Kremlin has subjected its nuclear arsenal to a deep modernization. Of course, limiting nuclear weapons is a matter of the greatest importance, but it is the only reason this meeting was held, and in the future it is not clear that there will be another, unless it is on this topic. Nothing more came out of Shenzhen because it was not a Summit like those held during the Cold War; on the contrary, there was no preparation, only a communiqué. Moreover, it was a meeting facilitated by the fact that the three have a good opinion of one another. The relationship between them is easy, as illustrated by the gestures Xi Jinping made toward Trump, as he has also made toward Putin, a person who rarely expresses emotion and from whom gestures like the embrace he gave Trump had never been seen. They also resemble one another in that all three put their country first, before any other; all three are extremely nationalist and proud of their cultures, all three capable of embellishing history so that it matches their political narrative, convinced that they represent civilizations more than countries. Donald Trump and Xi Jinping agreed on preserving human control over military decisions linked to artificial intelligence (REUTERS/Carlos Barria) Xi Jinping's conviction is that for more than a millennium, until the arrival of the colonial empires, China was richer and more powerful than the West. Putin's is that the collapse of the USSR was so fast that there was no time to agree on a territorial settlement, which is a source of instability since what collapsed was an empire, just as happened in Latin America after independence from Spain, or in the Middle East after the disappearance of the Ottoman empire. Trump's is that the US is the most prosperous and successful country the world has known and that to maintain its status as a superpower it must overcome the Chinese challenge. However, although they share personal characteristics, there is a fundamental difference that separates them in analysis and that must not be forgotten, consisting of something as important as the political system, since the US is a democratic republic, today very polarized, but with a system of liberties and checks and balances that differentiates it from autocratic systems like Russia and China, however much both have evolved economically toward capitalism, albeit state capitalism, and in Russia's case, that of friends, through the oligarchs. Putin and Xi Jinping do politics, in the sense that there is power, conflict and authority, but it is not competitive politics, demonstrated by the way they not only exercise power but also increase it. Putin has done so despite the Ukraine war, and Xi Jinping is doing so, focused on obtaining even more power, in the course of this new Communist Party Congress that culminates next year, while Trump comes from a resounding electoral defeat. The point that makes it difficult for anything permanent to come out of this meeting, and that makes this recent Summit not easily repeatable, is that China, not Russia, is the only and true rival of the US, but for the group of two, both China and the US are being reluctant to accept what the US and the USSR accepted naturally last century: the duties that came with having so much power. Behind the reason why the US is so well received in Asia, as Trump was in Manila, operates the same reasoning for which the US was invited to remain in Europe after 1945; then, it was fear of the USSR, just as today in Asia it is fear of China. It is for all this that the US and China should assume the G-2 without qualms, since issues like more or less regulation for AI could be resolved more easily, or ideally the situation experienced these days at NVIDIA, the company that makes the most important chips for the new technology, could have been avoided. Also, if a G-2 functioned, the name of a new UN Secretary-General would already be known. After the Second World War ended, institutions emerged that accounted for a new reality that also included the Cold War. Some disappeared, like the Warsaw Pact; others survive with difficulty, like the UN and NATO, but institutions that account for the new reality will hardly appear without a prior agreement between China and the US, just as in the Cold War the USSR and the US were capable of evolving toward détente. Russia is not in that league, except on the issue of atomic weapons, which, incidentally, has transformed it into its element of deterrence — its only element of deterrence, I would add. In fact, it has clearly repeated that it would consider using it in the current Ukraine war if it faced the possibility of defeat, a threat that Europe, unlike the US, seems to have believed, judging by the verbal harshness emanating today from Paris, London and Berlin. The US had asked China to submit to controls similar to those that existed during the Cold War, with Beijing arguing that if there were new ones, Russia and the US should do it first. However, one of the limitation treaties between the two expired during Trump's first administration, and on February 5, 2026, New START expired, the last bilateral treaty that not only established limits but also legally bound the strategic nuclear arsenals of both countries, signed in 2010 by Barack Obama and Dmitri Medvedev. In fact, some of the no-notice inspections were no longer being carried out, the result of Russia's "cancellation" policy established by the Biden administration after the invasion of Ukraine, but which entailed a net loss for the US, since it put a weakened Russia in the dependent position it has today in its alliance with China, which can only be directed against the US, as has in fact happened — an unnatural alliance, since both as an empire and under communism, they had always been adversaries. Putin's Russia is not in the league of the US and China, except with regard to nuclear weapons (REUTERS/Maxim Shemetov) The urgency of the US is explained not only because it has an aging atomic arsenal, but also because the previous scheme was the product of the vanished Cold War. For this meeting it was China that asked that it be without an agenda, even though Xi performs better in highly scripted ones, but Trump's insistence was that nuclear weapons be discussed, where the Chinese position remains that first the US and Russia must reduce their numerically larger arsenals. The final agreement is reflected in the communiqué, short and precise, where topics like Ukraine and Iran do not have the place a meeting of this type would demand. In essence, if China agreed to participate, it is because it is inevitable that sooner or later, for all purposes, it will assume its current power. It is what a senior US official summarized anonymously by saying "it is time for China to step forward and sit at the adults' table," since it rings false for it to keep presenting itself as if it were a third-world country. Today, Xi Jinping is focused on continuing to accumulate more power so that the next Party Congress not only ratifies him but elevates to positions in the Politburo those whom he is personally selecting by age so that in time his figure acquires a status similar to Mao's, always thinking of the date they have decided for China to dethrone the US as the leading superpower, which is October 1, 2049, the day marking the centenary of the People's Republic, and for which they are repeating one by one the steps the US took to displace Great Britain from that position last century. Since the last party congress, China is in full compliance with the fourth of the modernizations conceived by Deng Xiaoping, the military one (Defense, Armed Forces), after having achieved it in the other three: agriculture, industry, and science and technology. The pace is impressive as far as conventional armament is concerned, including aircraft carriers, where until a few decades ago they were still using Soviet blueprints, but today they are capable of sailing all the seas, up to fighter jets that aspire to compete with the F-35s, and with striking incursions into outer space as well as in electronic warfare and the incorporation of AI into the military. It is a China that does not yet inspire fear, for the simple reason that it has not needed or has not wanted to exercise its force far and outside its territory, since when it has done so it has been nearby, as was the Korean War, and for now it only threatens Asian territories like Taiwan, which it also considers its own. For his part, Xi has concentrated his purges on the military establishment using "anticorruption" as a pretext, seeking to have generals totally loyal to his person by the closing of the party congress in 2027. The effort China is making is evident in the way it increases both its nuclear arsenal and its capacity to launch it from land, sea and air. There must already be around 800 nuclear warheads, and in a couple of years, over a thousand. As is well known, Trump has invested time in establishing a good personal relationship with both autocrats, which includes showing the greatest possible respect, gestures that do not give him a good image in the West, and perhaps that is what Xi wanted to repay on this occasion, which attracted so much attention. It is a China that resists having a policy of containment applied to it, similar to the one used successfully against the USSR. In Beijing an irritation arises that is not always contained, it being evident that with force the idea appears that they are heirs of one of the most powerful empires in history, and where perhaps some future historian will see, with the perspective that time gives, that the Communist Party is merely a modern version of the mandarins who for centuries have administered the empire. It is, therefore, the China that has resisted the imposition of sanctions on its officials and has responded with its own sanctions on their US counterparts, and it has also sanctioned the US successfully on the rare earths issue, thus becoming the only country that has earned the right to negotiate tariffs on equal terms, something that has been going on for months and continues quietly, which is a good omen. We do not know what a new nuclear arms limitation agreement will contain. I suppose that establishing maximum quantities is today the floor and not the ceiling, and that equally important is now incorporating what the AI era brings with it in the form of transparency mechanisms, crisis situations, introduction of new technology, and prevention of incidents. Since the joint Declaration of the three countries speaks of "strategic stability," this necessarily includes an economic dimension, and therefore, in an era of the predominance of geopolitics, a return to conditions that give predictability to world trade will have to be sought. For a Trump who after his electoral defeat seems determined to try to survive the investigations against him, to emulate Obama in governing through vetoes for what remains of his term, for which his opposition would need 2/3 to override, seeking an agreement that would be his legacy in domestic policy, and perhaps this provides the surprise of joint legislation with the Democrats on immigration, and if progress is made on the issue of limiting atomic weapons, Trump would finally be offered not only his legacy in foreign policy but also the elusive Nobel Prize he has claimed so much, and which he could not obtain through ceasefire agreements, trusting that now the commission appointed by the Norwegian parliament will grant it to him, since in the past, on the issue of arms reduction, it has done so. It seems like fiction, but it is a probable scenario when it comes to Trump, since since he appeared in politics, his thing has always been to double the bet. Master's and PhD in Political Science (University of Essex), Law Degree (University of Barcelona), Lawyer (University of Chile), former presidential candidate (Chile, 2013)

Translated from es by z-ai/glm-5.3-flash

Knowledge Graph

Entities
Highlight