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A summit without substantive progress on nuclear arms control
By Eric Olander, American journalist and editor-in-chief of the China-Global South Project
The summit was not serious diplomacy; it was purely performative. Trump is a weak president who lacks the political influence at home to achieve a meaningful outcome. Nobody believes Putin is serious about making a single concession on Ukraine, or on any other issue, in a context like this, and Xi was ambivalent about joining from the start, since it undermines the idea that China belongs to an elite group of hegemonic powers seeking to make decisions for others. China sees itself as a developing country that has long resisted this kind of bloc politics. So, in the end, this was much more about the image of power than about exercising it substantively.
It is clear that Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump enjoyed the scene more than Xi did, since this once again demonstrated that Europe's attempt to isolate Putin on the international stage has failed. Ironically, that was also US policy at one time, but not under Trump, who enjoys being at the center of attention as a way of recovering what little political standing he has at home after the beating he took from the Democrats in the midterm elections. Xi is clearly the one with the most to lose in quan…
A summit without substantive progress on nuclear arms control
By Eric Olander, American journalist and editor-in-chief of the China-Global South Project
The summit was not serious diplomacy, but purely performative. Trump is a weak president who lacks the political influence at home to achieve a meaningful outcome. Nobody believes Putin is serious about making a single concession on Ukraine, or on any other issue, in a context like this, and Xi was ambivalent about joining from the start, since it undermines the idea that China does not belong to an elite group of hegemonic powers seeking to make decisions for others. China sees itself as a developing country that has long resisted this kind of bloc politics. So, in the end, this was much more about the image of power than about exercising it substantively. It is clear that Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump enjoyed the scene more than Xi did, given that this once again demonstrated that Europe's attempt to isolate Putin on the international stage failed. Ironically, that was also US policy at one time, but not under Trump, who enjoys being at the center of attention as a way of recovering the little political standing he has at home after the beating he took from the Democrats in the midterm elections. Xi clearly has the most to lose in terms of the image of a meeting like this. China continues to identify itself as a developing country and a member of the Global South, championing a multipolar international order and principles of non-interference and multilateralism. Being seen as part of an exclusive club of powers that decide the future of other countries could alienate its partners and drag Beijing into international responsibilities it is reluctant to assume.
Chinese President Xi Jinping holds a summit between China, Russia and the United States with Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump in Shenzhen, Guangdong province, southern China, on November 19, 2026. Photo: Xinhua/Xie Huanchi
This meeting will not produce any substantive progress on nuclear arms control, largely because the incentives for all three parties to make concessions simply do not exist. The Chinese deeply distrust US efforts to limit their nuclear advances, just as with artificial intelligence, so any request from Washington for Beijing to open access to its nuclear facilities, reduce the number of warheads, or anything else normally considered standard in an arms control agreement would be flatly rejected by the Xi administration. This is even more true today, when Japan is considering adding nuclear submarines to its fleet, and Donald Trump reaffirmed the US security alliance with the Philippines before his arrival in Shenzhen. These are not the conditions most analysts would consider optimal for China to reverse any kind of nuclear weapons, AI, or other development.
A show for Xi in China's domestic politics
By Chun Yi Lee, academic at the University of Nottingham
This meeting of Putin, Xi and Trump is a big show for the Chinese leader domestically, because China, in many ways, has already been in recession for about three years. So it is important propaganda for Xi Jinping, but to stabilize and in some way restore his status within China, because he prefers not to show anything to the outside. In Putin's case, he was also seeking to establish his status at home, to show that he is on equal footing with Xi and also with Trump. In the case of the US leader, I don't think he was as anxious or desperate as Putin. However, it is important for Trump that the discussion and negotiation begin, and that he be on good terms with China and Russia, because in a sense the United States is embroiled in many controversies because of them.
Chinese President Xi Jinping meets with US President Donald Trump —who is in China to attend the 33rd APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Forum— in Shenzhen, Guangdong province, southern China, on November 19, 2026. Photo: Xinhua/Li Tao
Taiwan was not a key point in the discussion, since, unlike China, the other leaders do not have it as a priority, because they are talking about a global region and Taiwan is an internal matter and has always been relegated to the background, but it is always there. The image they sent is that of three strong countries that came together. And I think they wanted to signal many issues. Many of the messages about that, from our perspective, are not about multipolarity, but about the United States making peace or negotiating with adversaries. So for the United States it is not multipolarity, whereas for China it is a multipolarity in the sense that it is an emerging power. They are working with the strong power, which is the United States. The only perspective of multipolarity, I think, is for Putin, because for Russia they wanted this multipolarity to materialize for a long time. So, although there is a single image, there are three different interpretations. I don't think it was a Yalta 2.0, because the three leaders are not as strong as their predecessors. The powers are more fragmented.
A summit of countries with different goals and objectives
By Claire Chu, analyst at The Atlantic Council
The United States, China and Russia each have different goals and objectives at this moment. Washington wants to project strength, power and global leadership, and seeks to elevate Trump's foreign policy legacy by ending the war in Ukraine. Beijing has very little to gain by taking a more active stance on global conflicts and wants to maintain stable foreign relations to support sustained economic growth and drive industrial restructuring. Moscow, for its part, is seeking a financial lifeline to boost its war economy, whether through sanctions relief or the sale of oil and gas.
Chinese President Xi Jinping meets with US President Donald Trump —who is in China on the occasion of the 33rd APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Forum— in Shenzhen, Guangdong province, southern China, on November 19, 2026. Photo: Xinhua/Yan Yan
In this sense, Washington wants to increase the energy supply, something the trilateral declaration does address. But realistically, China and Russia cannot do much about the problem facing the United States, which revolves around transporting oil through the Strait of Hormuz. China is primarily an oil importer and is unlikely to expand its fuel exports beyond the Asia-Pacific region at this time. Russia's capacity to export refined petroleum products, which the communiqué specifically requests, is limited by the ongoing disruptions at refineries. For China and Russia, the spectacle and pomp of the summit help frame the trilateral relationship as an almost equal dynamic. Russia has the most to gain, as it seeks to break out of diplomatic isolation and normalize relations with the West. To move forward with trilateral negotiations on nuclear arms control and disarmament, China first has to agree to sit at the table and participate.
A meeting of an experimental nature
By Dmytro Yefremov, sinologist, academic at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla
The joint declaration issued after the summit is quite vague, largely because the meeting itself was of an experimental nature. The reference to the need for UN reform seems more like a diplomatic ritual than a serious political commitment. It is hard to imagine strengthening international security and stability without reforming the UN. However, none of the three countries has presented a clear, publicly articulated reform plan. More importantly, none of the three countries has a real interest in changing the structure of the UN Security Council by admitting new permanent members and granting them veto powers. What is even more revealing is that the declaration addresses several issues that are secondary or only loosely related to global peace and security.
US President Donald Trump arrives in Shenzhen, Guangdong province, southern China, on November 18, 2026, to attend the 33rd APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Forum. Photo: Xinhua/Yan Yan
Oil production and supply are issues that connect the three countries, albeit in very different ways. The United States is primarily on the supply side. Russia used to occupy a similar position, but Putin's war has severely damaged its oil refining capacity and its export revenues, which have been crucial for financing the Russian state. China, for its part, is on the demand side. It is especially sensitive to security developments in the Persian Gulf, but Beijing has spent years pursuing a long-term strategy to strengthen its energy security by diversifying its import sources and accumulating strategic reserves. I interpret the inclusion of this topic in the final declaration primarily as a Russian diplomatic maneuver. Moscow is trying to reach an agreement with Washington that would lead to new US pressure on Ukraine to stop attacking Russian oil infrastructure. Such an arrangement would help Russia stabilize its public finances and sustain its war effort. China has few reasons to oppose this Russian maneuver. I suspect the most difficult issue for China during the negotiations concerned nuclear risks and arms control, because it is actively expanding and modernizing its nuclear capabilities while maintaining considerable opacity around the program. Its goal is to reduce the numerical gap with the United States and Russia in the coming years, modernize its nuclear arsenal, and improve its delivery systems. Beijing's paramount priority is therefore to prevent other countries from interfering in this program or imposing restrictions that could slow its development.
Not a new Yalta
By Ivan Fechko, senior analyst at Prism UA
I don't think we can speak of a new "Yalta," that is, an agreement among great powers to divide up spheres of influence. For Ukraine, the essential thing is that any negotiation about its future include its participation and respect its sovereignty. Moreover, Russia is trying to expand the object of the negotiations, shifting the discussion from the end of its aggression against Ukraine toward a broader review of the European security architecture, partly reviving the demands it presented to NATO in late 2021.
Image by © Hulton-Deutsch Collection/CORBIS © Hulton-Deutsch Collection/CORBIS
Russia is trying to present Putin's participation in this summit as a diplomatic achievement, especially considering that he has spent several years facing significant isolation from many countries around the world and that there is an International Criminal Court arrest warrant against him. Although Putin had already visited China before, this time the context was different. However, his participation does not mean a complete international rehabilitation of Russia. Sanctions, legal responsibilities, and fundamental differences over Ukraine still exist. Nor should we forget that Russia is increasingly dependent on China, especially in economic terms.
On the other hand, Putin came to this meeting in a context that was also not entirely favorable for Moscow. The recent Ukrainian attacks on the Crimea bridge made clear that Russia still faces significant vulnerabilities. At the same time, while the diplomatic talks were taking place, Russian forces continued attacking Ukrainian cities, including Kyiv, and their civilian infrastructure. With the arrival of winter, attacks on the energy system seek to increase pressure on the Ukrainian population. I think it is important to distinguish between Trump's positive rhetoric and concrete results. The US president has a political interest in presenting his diplomatic initiatives as successful, but a long conversation or a good personal relationship with Putin does not guarantee changes in the Russian position.
Translated from es by z-ai/glm-5.3-flash