18 countries chose China as their economic and diplomatic partner: the results were not what was expected

rss · Infobae 2026-11-21T08:00:00Z es
The benefits do not seem to be flourishing. Neither visibly, nor beneath the surface. The 19 countries that maintained relations with Taiwan and, under pressure from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), switched to recognizing Beijing as their sole interlocutor are watching with concern as the promises go unfulfilled. They do not say so out loud due to pressure from local embassies, but they know that some of the numbers do not add up. On the contrary: since 2001, when the first change in diplomatic status occurred, the only beneficiary has been the regime led by Xi Jinping. The countries that established relations with China in recent years are: North Macedonia (2001), Liberia (2003), Dominica (2004), Grenada (2005), Senegal (2005), Chad (2006), Costa Rica (2007), Malawi (2008), Gambia (2013), São Tomé and Príncipe (2016), Panama (2017), Dominican Republic (2018), Burkina Faso (2018), El Salvador (2018), Solomon Islands (2019), Kiribati (2019), Nicaragua (2021), Honduras (2023), and Nauru (2024), according to reports from the Congressional Research Service and the think tank Atlantic Council. These countries received barely 1.1% of China's outbound investment and 2.4% of what Xi's regime allocates to the 64 countries that are part of the Belt and Road Initiative, a project from which more and more nations are distancing themselves. Diplomatic ruptures A presentation circulated in recent weeks among Asian governments about the countries that broke off relations with the island between 200…
Xi Jinping during the APEC Summit, November 20, 2026, in Shenzhen, China (Reuters)The benefits do not seem to be flourishing. Neither visibly nor beneath the surface. The 19 countries that maintained relations with Taiwan and, under pressure from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), switched to recognizing Beijing as their sole interlocutor are watching with concern as the promises go unfulfilled. They do not say so out loud due to pressure from local embassies, but they know that some of the numbers do not add up. On the contrary: since 2001, when the first change of diplomatic status occurred, the only beneficiary has been the regime led by Xi Jinping. The countries that established relations with China in recent years are: North Macedonia (2001), Liberia (2003), Dominica (2004), Grenada (2005), Senegal (2005), Chad (2006), Costa Rica (2007), Malawi (2008), Gambia (2013), São Tomé and Príncipe (2016), Panama (2017), Dominican Republic (2018), Burkina Faso (2018), El Salvador (2018), Solomon Islands (2019), Kiribati (2019), Nicaragua (2021), Honduras (2023), and Nauru (2024), according to reports from the Congressional Research Service and the Atlantic Council think tank. These countries received barely 1.1% of China's outbound investment and 2.4% of what Xi's regime allocates to the 64 countries that are part of the Belt and Road Initiative, a project from which more and more nations are distancing themselves. A presentation circulated in recent weeks among Asian governments about the countries that broke off relations with the island between 2000 and 2024 concluded that China's diplomatic expansion did not translate into the expected economic, trade, and investment benefits. The document covers 18 states—Nauru is excluded due to a lack of data for the sample—that established ties with Beijing after ceasing to recognize Taipei, and it argues that several of them face economic difficulties, greater import dependence, and disputes over projects financed with Chinese capital. The number of ruptures increased during Xi's tenure. During the administrations of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao there were eight diplomatic breaks, while since Xi came to power 10 have been counted. The document contrasts that dynamic with the diplomatic truce maintained by Hu and the then-Taiwanese president Ma Ying-jeou. Gambia's break (which did not immediately recognize Beijing), in 2013, appears as the first case to occur during that period of détente. The report states that nearly four out of every ten former allies of Taiwan are experiencing serious economic difficulties. Between the start of relations with China and 2024, the average annual growth of the 18 economies examined ranged between 0.2% and 5.5%, with an average of 3.3%. Seven countries recorded growth below the world average of 3.0% calculated for the period 2000-2024. The lowest rates corresponded to Solomon Islands, Dominica, Grenada, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Liberia, according to the figures included in the presentation. Inflation also showed uneven results. The annual average was 5.2%, while eight countries exceeded the world average of 3.6%. Malawi recorded the highest figure, with average inflation of 16%, followed by Liberia and São Tomé and Príncipe, both at 11%. In financial matters, exchange rate exposure appears as one of the main risks. The presentation calculates that, in 2024 and compared with the year of recognition of China's regime, the currencies of 12 of the 18 countries depreciated against the US dollar. The average depreciation was 59.3%, although the results show large differences: Malawi recorded a variation of −730% and Liberia, −222%. Four countries—Grenada, Panama, El Salvador, and Costa Rica—maintained regimes linked to the US dollar or showed no relevant changes in the indicator presented. North Macedonia was the only case with a marked appreciation, of 16%. Goods trade shows a gap between China's weight as a buyer and as a supplier. In 2024, the Asian giant accounted for, on average, 5.1% of the exports of the 18 countries and 13.5% of their imports. China's share of imports increased in 16 nations since the establishment of diplomatic relations. Chad recorded an increase of 18 percentage points, while Malawi and Solomon Islands each added 13 points. Liberia and Gambia were the only exceptions, with a reduction in the Chinese share of their external purchases. The behavior of exports was more limited. China increased its share as a destination for sales in eight countries, reduced it in five, and kept a practically stable weight in the other five. Senegal recorded an increase of 10 percentage points and Chad, eight, while Solomon Islands reduced 15 points and Costa Rica, seven. The presentation attributes part of that imbalance to the influx of Chinese goods that it describes as dumping practices, a situation that is replicated not only with the countries that reversed their diplomatic positions, but with the rest of the countries with which Beijing trades. It also argues that several economies encountered obstacles in placing products in the Chinese market. Costa Rica appears among the highlighted cases. The document indicates that China buys a limited range of Costa Rican exports and that investment from that country remains at a reduced volume. In the Dominican Republic, the presentation mentions increased oversight of Chinese businesses in response to complaints of unfair competition. A repeated story. At the end of 2024, accumulated Chinese direct investment in the 18 former allies reached USD 2.3 billion, equivalent to 1.1% of the investments allocated to countries linked to the Belt and Road Initiative, according to the report. Panama concentrated the largest amount, with USD 895.5 million, mostly in an attempt to control the ports and the canal, an infrastructure that is strategic for the regime. It was followed by Chad, with USD 485.1 million; Liberia, with USD 361.6 million; and Senegal, with USD 261.4 million. The document notes negative balances in North Macedonia, the Dominican Republic, and El Salvador, which it interprets as a complete withdrawal of Chinese investments from those destinations. Works contracted by Chinese companies reached USD 24.5 billion. Chad concentrated more than USD 10.1 billion, followed by Senegal, with USD 6.241 billion, Liberia, with USD 2.554 billion, and Panama, with USD 1.621 billion. The report uses the value of contracted works as an indicator equivalent to official development assistance. Eight of the countries analyzed had no projects in that category. The confidential presentation accessed by Infobae was distributed weeks ago to Asian diplomats concerned about China's influence in Latin America and the rest of the planet. That report identifies difficulties in the execution of works, violations of local regulations, and environmental damage as the main sources of controversy in seven countries. Cases of corruption appear in five nations, while social protests, growing debt, and economic coercion measures are also mentioned. Panama figures as the main case of commercial pressure. The document states that China adopted reprisals stemming from a controversy related to the operation of the canal, including the detention of cargo vessels, interruption of investments, stricter inspections of imports, and higher sanitary requirements. In Honduras, Malawi, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Gambia, and São Tomé and Príncipe, the presentation records failures to fulfill economic assistance commitments. The material also incorporates cases that occurred in 2025, even though other sections set 2024 as the cutoff date. The text lists signs of discontent in Costa Rica, Malawi, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Solomon Islands, Honduras, Panama, and São Tomé and Príncipe. The reasons include results below expectations, deterioration of the trade balance, unfulfilled investment commitments, and security concerns. The combined potential that the countries of the Indo-Pacific have to confront the threat posed by Beijing is the best way out available to these countries given how weak the agreement with China turned out to be. The regime's expansion is not only a regional matter for those Asian nations, but transcends their own continental waters. And the role of Latin America enters that scenario. The CCP has advanced persistently in the region with a clear strategy of influence. The Chinese presence multiplied in sectors considered essential and, in some cases, came to control or participate in infrastructures whose importance far exceeds the business that gave rise to them. An analysis by CSIS released in 2025 identified the participation of Chinese companies in the construction or operation of dozens of active ports in Latin America and the Caribbean. Peru and its port in Chancay, and the conflict that originated in the Panama Canal, are clear examples. The potential competitors of the Chinese regime in the Indo-Pacific (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, India, Australia, and the Philippines) have not yet learned to combine the strengths they already possess. Nor have they managed to establish ties with the countries suffering Beijing's deception. The good news: there is still time for all of them. X: @TotiPI

Translated from es by z-ai/glm-5.3-flash

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