Three diminished leaders produced symbolism without substance, but their ideological alignment is historic.
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The moment that the trilateral summit in Shenzhen, China, was planned, commentators began comparing it to the 1945 Yalta Conference. Unsurprisingly, this narrative was particularly fueled by Moscow, where the British-Soviet-U. S. “Big Three” summit stands for the codification of Soviet control over half of Europe. Pyotr Tolstoy, the head of the foreign affairs committee in the Russian parliament, called the summit a “new Yalta.” Ultranationalist ideologue Alexander Dugin found the meeting “deeply symbolic,” while the Kremlin boasted that “the significance and symbolism of this meeting are hard to overestimate.”
The Kremlin was right about the symbolism, not least because this week’s summit produced little else. The joint “Declaration Toward Peace” adopted by U. S. President Donald Trump, Chinese President Xi Jinping, and Russian President Vladimir Putin says practically nothing. It pledges United Nations reform without specifics, future fuel shipments without volumes or deadlines, and a dialogue on nuclear risks without a clear path forward. Its most pointed passage is a warning to the International Criminal Court not to abuse its jurisdiction.
The moment that the trilateral summit in Shenzhen, China, was planned, commentators began comparing it to the 1945 Yalta Conference. Unsurprisingly, this narrative was particularly fueled by Moscow, where the British-Soviet-U. S. “Big Three” summit stands for the codification of Soviet control over half of Europe. Pyotr Tolstoy, the head of the foreign affairs committee in the Russian parliament, called the summit a “new Yalta.” Ultranationalist ideologue Alexander Dugin found the meeting “deeply symbolic,” while the Kremlin boasted that “the significance and symbolism of this meeting are hard to overestimate.”
The Kremlin was right about the symbolism, not least because this week’s summit produced little else. The joint “Declaration Toward Peace” adopted by U. S. President Donald Trump, Chinese President Xi Jinping, and Russian President Vladimir Putin says practically nothing. It pledges United Nations reform without specifics, future fuel shipments without volumes or deadlines, and a dialogue on nuclear risks without a clear path forward. Its most pointed passage is a warning to the International Criminal Court not to abuse its jurisdiction.
Nothing about this is surprising. The vagueness on arms control reflects China’s lack of interest in it amid a rapid build-out of its nuclear forces. Ukraine is not mentioned, because Russia has made it repeatedly clear that it is not ready for peace in Europe on anything but its maximalist demands. Iran, too, was absent from the agenda, given Russian and Chinese support for Iran and the embarrassing cul-de-sac that the war represents for Trump.
But substance was hardly the point. The mere image of the three leaders sitting together made the summit significant—and made capitals from Taipei to Kyiv to Tokyo nervous that the three might strike a private understanding over their heads.
To understand what yesterday’s summit really meant, Yalta is indeed a useful comparison—but mainly for the differences that it reveals.
The first is the diminished stature of today’s threesome. The Big Three met as the victors of a war that had left much of Europe and Asia in ruins. What they decided at Yalta—and at the Potsdam Conference a few months later—drew lines that would last for more than four decades. The three leaders who met in Shenzhen are weak, each in his own way, and each of them needed a photo-op to project a strength that he does not fully possess.
China was not invited to Yalta because it was on the menu: U. S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin agreed on Soviet rights over the Manchurian railways and ports of Dairen and Port Arthur without consulting the Republic of China’s leader, Chiang Kai-shek.
Eighty-one years later, a different China was the host. The location was carefully chosen: In 1980, when it became China’s first special economic zone, Shenzhen was a small town across the border from Hong Kong, whereas today it is one of the world’s leading technology and manufacturing hubs. But the rise that Shenzhen embodies is losing pace. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) expects Chinese economic growth to slow to 4.5 percent this year and 4 percent in 2027 as weak domestic demand and a real estate crisis weigh on the economy. Demographic decline will shrink the country’s population by 786 million by 2100. The flashy summit was also a way to distract the world from the change in China’s trajectory.
For Putin, the gain of face was even greater, given that by any material measure, Russia plays in a much smaller league. The IMF projects the U. S. GDP at $32.6 trillion in 2026 and China’s at $21.5 trillion. Russia’s is just about $2.7 trillion, roughly the size of Italy’s. Military spending tells the same story. In 2025, the United States spent $954 billion, China an estimated $336 billion, and Russia $190 billion. European NATO members together spent $559 billion, almost three times as much as Russia.
Putin’s seat in Shenzhen was therefore the dividend of nearly two decades of growing, calculated aggressiveness. Georgia, Crimea, Syria, the 2014 and 2022 invasions of Ukraine, and the current hybrid attacks across Europe are a sequence of moves resting on the same bet. Moscow has converted Europe’s passivity into status, compensating for what it lacks in economic and military weight with a willingness to use force that none of its rivals share.
The bet paid off because Europe preferred to ignore the implications. Germany shrugged off Russia’s 2014 invasion of Crimea and the Donbas and moved forward with Nord Stream 2, thereby entrenching the continent’s energy dependence on Moscow. Since 2022, Europe has financed Ukraine’s defense without ever resolving to push for Kyiv’s victory. And Washington bears its share in encouraging Putin, from former President Barack Obama’s impotent red line in Syria in 2013 to Trump granting Moscow sanctions relief and a seat among the great powers before any settlement of Russia’s war.
For Trump, the summit was a welcome respite from a string of setbacks. On Nov. 3, Democrats won control of both the House and the Senate, winning various Republican strongholds for the first time in generations. The botched attack on Iran contributed to this electoral punishment, not least through its impact on gas prices.
Add to this that Trump has never hidden his admiration for leaders who govern without democratic constraints. A seat at the table with two of them, with all the ceremony that came with it, was worth a great deal to a president facing a hostile Congress and having few foreign successes to show for the year.
“It’s a big win for us,” he told reporters as the meeting opened.
The strategic environment could hardly be more different from 1945. The leaders who met then were looking to consolidate the status quo that had emerged from the war, which they all found acceptable. By contrast, the three powers that met in Shenzhen are, each in its own way, fundamentally revisionist.
China has its sights on Taiwan and wresting technological leadership from the United States. Russia has its war in Europe and a relationship with Beijing that becomes more lopsided every year. The United States is renegotiating its alliances and trade policy while stuck in a quagmire in Iran. The U. S.-China trade truce expires in January, and the Nvidia scandal shows how far the technology rivalry now reaches. All three are navigating a strategic environment in flux, which each sees as an intermediate stop to improve its own position.
The third and deepest difference is vividly depicted by Europe’s absence. At Yalta, Europe sat among the victors. France, following four years under German occupation and the collaborationist Vichy regime, was of course not invited. For Poland and much of Central Europe, the conference is a reminder of a settlement imposed at its expense. But British Prime Minister Winston Churchill spoke for a European power that had fought the war since 1939—and the order that he helped design, from the postwar occupation of Germany to the creation of the United Nations, was one with freedom at its very core.
In Shenzhen, no European leader was in the room, the visible outcome of decades of strategic decline. The meeting took place on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, a forum of 21 Pacific Rim economies of which no European Union member state is a member.
In fact, each of the three leaders at the table is, in different ways, working against Europe. China does it through trade: In 2025, the EU ran a deficit of 359.8 billion euros with China; the largest category of imports was mechanical appliances, electrical machinery, and equipment, the industrial core that Europe is trying to protect.
Russia does it through force: Its war against Ukraine is in its fifth year, and its hybrid campaign of sabotage, drone incursions, disinformation, and intimidation now reaches deep into EU territory.
The United States does it through ideological disdain, made crystal clear by Vice President J. D. Vance’s speech at the 2025 Munich Security Conference and by a National Security Strategy that warned of Europe’s “civilizational erasure” and committed Washington to supporting “patriotic” (read: far-right) parties on the continent, on top of tariffs on European goods at levels unseen in the postwar trans-Atlantic relationship.
This genuinely anti-European stance was the only real common denominator in Shenzhen—a hostility fueled by Europe’s weakness, to be sure, but even more by a shared ideology of power. Yalta was a meeting of champions of different worldviews. Roosevelt and Churchill embodied the liberal democracies that were about to defeat Nazism. Stalin embodied a revolutionary state with a rival vision of political and economic order and ultimately of humanity itself. Within three years, this ideological divergence would harden into the Cold War. For all its ill effects on the nations caught on the Soviet side, Yalta is still an icon of pragmatism across an ideological divide.
Shenzhen was the exact opposite. The three leaders do not lack conflicting interests. Washington wants Beijing in a trilateral arms control framework that the Chinese Foreign Ministry calls “neither fair, reasonable nor realistic.” The United States is at war with Iran, and the disruption of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz hits China’s energy supplies. Russia and China are far from strategic allies, and diplomatic protocol in Shenzhen showed how unequal their relationship has become.
But on the question that divided the room at Yalta—namely, how power should be constrained and legitimized—the three leaders in Shenzhen are closer to one another than any of them is to almost every other leader across the world. All three think of sovereignty as the right of strong states to act without external constraint. All three read the world in terms of spheres of influence and privilege bilateral deals to multilateral rules.
Finally, all three regard checks and balances, independent courts, and a free press as nuisances and obstacles at home and abroad. It is telling that one of the four points of their declaration—and the only one that wasn’t lukewarm boilerplate—defends the immunity of state officials and warns the International Criminal Court against abusing its jurisdiction.
In this sense, all three are anti-Western in the deepest sense of the term. For Xi and Putin, rejecting the underlying idea of the West is long-standing doctrine, but the United States—the country that once defined and defended the West—now shares much of the same inclination.
This is how the world has changed since 1945. At Yalta, ideological opposites negotiated a balance of power. In Shenzhen, three leaders with a shared worldview but competing interests discussed the affairs of the world, producing symbolism rather than substance. The two superpowers and their Russian sidekick were in a bubble, with neither the West nor anyone else represented in the room.
For all the lack of substance, that may be the summit’s most important outcome: If what we saw this week portends a lasting realignment of the United States, this summit’s legacy could be far greater than the one to which it was so eagerly compared.