The United States, China and Russia emerged from their historic Shenzhen summit with a declaration for peace but no settlement for Ukraine or Iran, no binding nuclear reductions and no mechanism for resolving their most consequential strategic disputes.
A day earlier, Moscow hosted a political gathering drawing participants from across the Global South to advocate for a more equitable international order.
Together, the two events exposed multipolarity’s central contradiction: major powers want to preserve their privileges, while countries demanding greater influence remain divided over what should replace the existing order.
The November 19 summit brought together Chinese President Xi Jinping, US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin for unprecedented trilateral talks.
Their joint Declaration toward Peace pledged cooperation on nuclear risks, United Nations reform, energy supplies and the immunity of state officials. The White House later restated the four commitments, underscoring the agreement’s narrow scope.
Shenzhen’s peace promises meet geopolitical reality
The declaration showed that Washington, Beijing and Moscow could identify common interests despite their strategic rivalry. Its omissions, however, were equally telling.
The leaders reaffirmed that nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, committing to dialogue on nuclear-risk reduction and non-proliferation. This represented diplomatic engagement rather than a binding arms-control agreement.
The New START treaty’s expiration on February 5, 2026, removed the last bilateral treaty limits on American and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals.
Washington wants Beijing involved in future arms-control arrangements, while China remains reluctant to accept comparable obligations because its arsenal is substantially smaller than those of the United States and Russia.
Ukraine exposed another divide. Moscow continues to seek a settlement accommodating its security demands, while Kyiv and European governments insist that Ukraine’s sovereignty cannot be negotiated without its participation.
As Reuters reported, European foreign ministers warned against discussing Europe’s future security architecture with Russia before a Ukrainian ceasefire.
Ukraine was reportedly discussed during bilateral exchanges, but the final declaration contained no conflict-specific commitments specific to Ukraine or Iran.
The declaration’s treatment of international justice was equally revealing. It emphasized state-official immunities while warning that the International Criminal Court and similar institutions should not abuse their jurisdiction.
The provision was particularly notable given the ICC’s outstanding arrest warrant against Putin concerning alleged war crimes involving the unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children, although the declaration did not address the case directly.
Economic disagreements also went unresolved. Despite expectations of progress, the summit produced no announcement extending the US–China trade truce, which expires on January 10, 2027.
The lack of a further extension mattered amid ongoing tariff disputes, semiconductor restrictions and competition over advanced technologies. It did not mean the existing truce had ended, but illustrated the limits of diplomacy in overcoming economic rivalry.
Each side took something from the meeting. For Beijing, hosting the talks reinforced China’s diplomatic centrality. Moscow gained international visibility despite Western efforts to isolate it over Ukraine. Washington maintained direct engagement and open channels with two major strategic competitors.
Yet the talks produced few concrete breakthroughs, underscoring the gap between diplomatic symbolism and real conflict resolution.
Moscow’s alternative vision of global power
The Moscow gathering the previous day showed the political appeal of a more representative international order, though its participants did not collectively speak for their national governments.
Where the Shenzhen summit brought together three permanent UN Security Council members, the Moscow gathering sought to rally countries frustrated by their limited influence over international institutions.
Russia’s ruling United Russia party hosted the Global South conference, presided over by former President Dmitry Medvedev and reportedly attended by approximately 300 representatives from 72 countries, including China, India, Iran, Turkey, Indonesia, Vietnam and countries across Africa and Latin America.
The gathering was part of Russia’s Movement for the Freedom of Nations, which advocates sovereignty, opposes unilateral sanctions and resists what Moscow describes as neocolonial practices.
According to United Russia’s account, discussions addressed economic cooperation, international representation and initiatives concerning the historical legacy of colonialism.
For Moscow, such platforms expand diplomatic networks and challenge Western efforts to limit Russian influence. Yet participation should not be confused with geopolitical alignment.
China’s deep economic ties with Western markets, India’s simultaneous partnerships with Moscow and Washington, and Turkey’s NATO membership show the limits of political convergence.
These countries may favor a more representative international system without supporting a unified geopolitical alliance.
The conference produced political initiatives rather than binding economic or security agreements among participating governments. Its significance lies in the demand for diplomatic alternatives, even as participants pursue competing national interests.
The limits of multipolarity
Shenzhen and Moscow reveal different visions of international influence. The great powers seek to manage strategic rivalries through direct negotiations, while emerging economies demand a voice in decisions affecting their security and prosperity.
Sanctions, technology restrictions, energy supplies and financial arrangements increasingly shape developing countries’ economic choices, often leaving them vulnerable to decisions made elsewhere.
For middle powers, diplomatic diversification offers flexibility, but strategic autonomy also requires economic resilience, credible institutions and sustainable commercial partnerships.
Coordinated negotiating positions among developing countries and greater representation in multilateral institutions could also strengthen their bargaining power, although regional disagreements complicate collective action.
Shenzhen showed that great powers can agree on the language of peace without accepting the compromises required to achieve it. Moscow revealed that countries seeking a more representative international order remain constrained by competing strategic interests.
A genuinely different world order will not be measured by how many powers sit at the negotiating table, but by whether those outside it can shape the decisions affecting their security, sovereignty and prosperity.
Saima Afzal is a researcher specializing in South Asian security, counterterrorism, and broader geopolitical dynamics across the Middle East, Afghanistan, and the Indo-Pacific. She is currently a research scholar at Justus Liebig University, Germany.