Implications of PLA procurement

rss · Taipei Times 2026-11-19T16:37:40Z en
Robot dogs conducting reconnaissance, underwater robotic arms planting explosive devices and space-based robots hunting down satellites are all ambitions revealed by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) procurement documents, although they cannot be taken as evidence that those capabilities have already been developed and deployed. If Taiwan focuses solely on Chinese aircraft crossing the median line of the Taiwan Strait and warships circumnavigating the nation, it risks overlooking another threat: The PLA is gradually turning to robots to carry out high-risk missions, such as reconnaissance and sabotage, to reduce the risk of personnel casualties. Sam Bresnick, a research fellow at Georgetown’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology, published a report titled “The PLA’s Push for Military Robotics,” analyzing more than 2,000 open-source PLA procurement documents published between October 2022 and December last year. The report found that the PLA is not concentrating its efforts on a handful of high-profile weapons, but instead using small-scale projects to test the applications in the ground, maritime and space domains. As many of the contracts contain relatively small purchases, it concluded that they are primarily intended for research and development rather than mass deployment. What the PLA is currently seeking is for its units to explore new and innovative ways of conducting warfare. Do not be misled by promotional videos. Most procurement contracts still require human remote control, while autonomous capabilities are primarily limited to positioning, route planning and obstacle avoidance. These do not amount to the ability to launch attacks autonomously. Procurement of humanoid robots is far less extensive than that of quadruped robots. Militaries do not need to wait for robots to be capable of thinking like humans before putting them to use. Simply having robots scout ahead for soldiers at night or in hostile environments could fundamentally alter the cost calculus of offense and defense. Of particular concern to Taiwan are the procurement projects for which the least information is available. Bresnick’s report said that only fragmentary specifications exist for undersea and space-based systems, yet these already involve the sabotage of underwater targets and the capture of satellites. Although the documents do not confirm that such equipment has been deployed, the scarcity of information should not be taken as evidence of limited intent. Taiwan relies on undersea cables, ports and satellite services — if these become targets of covert attacks and interference, a crisis could begin long before the first shot is fired. The key to the artificial intelligence race lies in perception, navigation and coordination. The report repeatedly highlights sensors, navigation, control software, swarm coordination and cooperation between crewed and uncrewed systems. Commercial robots made by Chinese companies such as Unitree Robotics and DEEP Robotics have already caught the attention of military procurement agencies. Improvements in the endurance and object-recognition capabilities of civilian products could accelerate their military applications. China’s “military-civil fusion” strategy has made commercial products a starting point for military testing. Taiwan’s armed forces should incorporate ports, undersea cable landing sites, coastal obstacles and key urban thoroughfares into field tests of counter-drone systems and establish underwater monitoring, backup systems for critical communications and low-cost countermeasures. Testing must account for interference, loss of communications, misidentification and supply depletion. Procurement should allow for small-batch purchase and rapid upgrades, allowing personnel to feed lessons from failed tests back to designers. That would prevent a scenario in which equipment is acquired, but personnel must wait indefinitely for operational guidelines. The origins of software and components must be carefully vetted. If critical elements — positioning modules, data links, or maintenance and software updates — rely on untrusted suppliers, even a large fleet of uncrewed platforms could become visible to the adversary yet impossible to control. Defense industrial policy must incorporate cybersecurity, supply chain traceability and field verification into a unified acceptance process. Minister of National Defense Wellington Koo (顧立雄) told the Legislative Yuan that uncrewed vehicles must develop mobile intelligence and autonomous attack capabilities, emphasizing the need for a “non-red supply chain” and full disassembly inspection of entire systems. These requirements should serve as a starting point for the military’s approach to robotics. As China uses trial and error to gain battlefield experience, Taiwan must not only allow room for failure, but also ensure the adversary does not learn how to counter our capabilities before we have fully mastered them. Liao Ming-hui is an assistant research fellow at the Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research. Translated by Kyra Gustavsen

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