How Arab Parties Can Rescue Israeli Democracy

rss · Foreign Affairs 2026-11-19T09:00:00Z en
The only way to end the Netanyahu era.
As the Israeli opposition leader Gadi Eisenkot struggles to assemble a governing coalition following last month’s elections, Israel finds itself in a familiar political predicament. The parties opposed to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his far-right coalition command a clear majority in the Knesset, with 67 of its 120 seats. Yet the four Jewish-led parties in Eisenkot’s camp hold just 48 seats, leaving them unable to form a government on their own. The impasse echoes the prolonged political deadlock between 2019 and 2021, when Netanyahu’s supporters and his opponents remained locked in competing parliamentary blocs, and four consecutive elections failed to produce a stable governing majority. But one thing is different this time. Israel’s Arab-led parties, the Joint List and Raam, are stronger than ever. Powered by extraordinary turnout among Arab citizens of Israel, they won a record 19 seats in the Knesset: 11 for the Joint List and eight for Raam. This political mobilization is important in itself, demonstrating Arab voters’ overwhelming desire for change and their recognition of the importance of participating in elections. But its significance goes far beyond the number of seats they have won. Together, the Arab parties now have the potential to be a decisive force in an anti-Netanyahu coalition, providing the parliamentary backing needed to form a government. The proof of this power has already been shown: on November 17, Arab support was crucial in the vote to replace the Likud speaker of the Knesset with a speaker from Eisenkot’s party. Now they have a historic opportunity to put the country on a different path. As the first and former leader of the Joint List, I know how much is at stake. In 2019, I helped lead a groundbreaking effort to give Arab-led parties a direct voice in the Israeli political system. We took an enormous political risk by endorsing Benny Gantz, then a former chief of staff of the Israeli military and Netanyahu’s principal rival, as a candidate to form a government. We did so despite our profound political and ideological differences with him. Although that effort ultimately fell short, with Gantz choosing to pursue a “unity government” with Netanyahu instead, it established an important precedent: by showing a willingness to work with Jewish political forces with whom they had deep disagreements, parties representing the Arab public had a real chance to prevent a Netanyahu-led far-right government from holding power. Today, after nearly four years of disastrous leadership by Netanyahu and his far-right allies, that possibility has become far more urgent. It will take political courage on both sides. Eisenkot must be able to offer something to the Arab-led parties, and the Arab-led parties will need to be comfortable offering support to a government that they may not agree with on many issues. But the remarkable Arab turnout and the sizable Israeli majority that is now against Netanyahu have pointed to a way forward. Not only Israel’s future but also its place in the region and the world may depend on the willingness of its leaders to engage with the country’s Palestinian minority. Ultimately, such a partnership will be essential to building the trust between Jews and Arabs that is a prerequisite to achieving any real progress toward a viable Israeli-Palestinian peace. This is the real choice now facing Israel: whether Israelis are prepared to replace the politics of supremacy and exclusion with a politics of equality. DEFIANT COOPERATIONThe factors that drove record numbers of Palestinian citizens of Israel to the polls in October have been years in the making. Although the country’s Arab citizens make up more than 20 percent of the Israeli electorate and have long made vital contributions to Israeli society as doctors, lawyers, engineers, high-tech professionals, and in many other fields, the Israeli right has for decades demonized them as enemies: a fifth column and a threat to the state. In recent years, this hostility has increasingly manifested itself in harassment and open racism at universities and workplaces, in the media, in the parliament, and in everyday life. Yet it would be a mistake to assume that Arab exclusion has been driven only by Netanyahu and the radical right. Zionist parties of the center and the left have also contributed, by keeping a distance from Arab voters or simply ignoring them. The belief that Jewish citizens should ultimately determine the country’s political direction while Arab citizens must remain within whatever limits have been set for them runs deep in Israeli politics. Netanyahu understood early on how to turn this contradiction into a political strategy. Since the 1990s, he has repeatedly used the same formula: inciting his supporters against Arab citizens, delegitimizing Arab representatives in parliament, and convincing Jewish Israelis that a government that relies on Arab political support would somehow be illegitimate. These tactics proved to be among Netanyahu’s most effective political tools, especially given that Arab-led parties have long been some of his biggest foes. He didn’t need to convince everyone to support his Likud party or its various coalition partners. He only needed to convince enough people, including Jewish Israelis who opposed him, that working with Arab-led parties was dangerous and unacceptable. Netanyahu’s strategy also helped suppress Arab turnout. Since the Arab-led parties had little chance of changing the status quo, Arab voters had little incentive to vote: for many years, a significantly lower proportion of Arab citizens went to the polls than did their Jewish counterparts. Israel’s Arab-led parties are stronger than ever. That began to change in 2015 with the creation of the Joint List, which for the first time brought together four parties representing the Arab public on a single electoral ticket and which became the third-largest faction in the Knesset. By embracing a broader vision for our society, grounded in Jewish-Arab solidarity and opposition to the racism of the right, the Joint List demonstrated that Palestinian citizens of Israel could play a new and more influential role in the country’s political system. Then, under my leadership in 2019, the Joint List decided to back Gantz’s bid to unseat Netanyahu. The decision was highly controversial, both within the Arab electorate and across Israeli society. Many Arab voters were deeply ambivalent about supporting a potential government led by a former army chief whose political positions, particularly on the status of Palestinian citizens of Israel and the occupation, differed sharply from their own. Nevertheless, we were prepared to take that political risk because we understood that defeating Netanyahu was more important. In practice, our willingness to cooperate with the Zionist opposition was not, in fact, reciprocated. The Jewish opposition parties wanted our votes but could not bring themselves to accept us as equal political partners. And, ultimately, Gantz decided to form a government with Netanyahu instead. Nevertheless, the experience showed that Jewish-Arab political cooperation could open up new horizons for a large segment of the public. Since then, every time that Arab-led parties have recommended or supported the effort of a Jewish candidate to form a government, or whenever the Israeli center-left has depended on their support, additional segments of Israeli society have become more open to this kind of cooperation. In 2021–22, an Arab party, Raam, joined the short-lived government led by Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid. I had serious reservations about the model of partnership that emerged, which seemed to rest on the expectation that Arab political representatives would limit their involvement to civilian and domestic matters, while refraining from addressing political and national questions, particularly the occupation and the Palestinian issue. I reject this distinction. We are part of the Palestinian people, and our identity and political concerns cannot be separated from our citizenship in Israel. But these kinds of slow and painful steps are how political change often happens in national struggles. It does not always begin with a moral or democratic awakening. Sometimes, it begins with pragmatic necessity. When there is no other option, people begin to reconsider what had once been seen as impossible. In the current election, that dynamic has become even more important. After the unending crisis of the past four years, many Israeli voters, including both Arabs and Jews as well as the leaders of most of the Zionist opposition parties, have concluded that getting rid of the Netanyahu government is more necessary than ever. THE TURNOUT REMEDYIn recent past elections, voter turnout among Palestinian citizens of Israel has generally remained between 50 and 60 percent. What explains the unprecedented 20-percentage-point surge in turnout in the October election? Three developments stand out: the war of annihilation in Gaza and the killing of tens of thousands of Palestinians; the daily racism and hostility that Arab citizens now face in the streets, in public spaces, and in virtually every aspect of their lives; and the crime that has spiraled out of control in Arab communities under the national security minister, Itamar Ben-Gvir, whose policies have allowed it to flourish, and the relentless settler violence against Palestinians in the West Bank enabled by Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich. All the grief and frustration accumulated over these years were brought to the ballot box. But there was another crucial factor as well. In the run-up to the election, Arab citizens, following the nearly even polls between Eisenkot and Netanyahu, could see in black and white just how much the outcome would depend on them. Voting this time would be more than a political choice. It was for many a personal responsibility and a way of taking control of their own future. That is why hundreds of thousands of Palestinian citizens of Israel made their way to the polls, defying years of efforts to silence them and undermine their political agency. Many understood that the future direction of the country might be quite literally in their hands. I saw elderly people, like my friend Jumah from Jisr al-Zarqa, taking to the streets and campaigning for the Joint List. Many of them had lived through the 1948 nakba, or “catastrophe,” which accompanied Israel’s establishment and involved terrible massacres, the destruction of hundreds of Palestinian villages and towns, and the displacement of around 750,000 Palestinians. I saw young people debating politics in the cafes and restaurants of my beloved Haifa, persuading their friends to vote. I saw women and men from Nazareth, Umm al-Fahm, Sakhnin, Rahat, Akko, Kafr Yasif, Majd al-Krum, and countless other towns and villages united by a shared sense of purpose. I saw political consciousness become a living, collective force. For a moment, the boundaries between generations and communities seemed to disappear. The result marks a remarkable advance of the process of Arab participation in the Israeli political system that began in 2019. In this election, Arab citizens of Israel turned out in record numbers, dramatically narrowing the historical turnout gap with Jewish voters. And that has made another political reality increasingly clear: Israel’s liberal and centrist camp cannot form a government without the parties that represent the Arab public. If it excludes them, as well as the ultra-Orthodox and the far right, it will not reach the 61 seats needed. This is the demographic reality. Israeli Jews who oppose Netanyahu must decide whom they are willing to build a political future with. DEMOCRACY OR DENIALThe debate about what Eisenkot should do and whether he should ask for Arab support is now unfolding beyond the Knesset, in people’s homes, cafés, in universities, and on the street. It is a deeply controversial question, and many Israelis disagree strenuously about it. Yet for the Arab-led parties, gaining sufficient importance to be able to provoke these conversations is an achievement. The fact that this debate is even taking place shows how the political process has caused Israelis to consider possibilities that until recently seemed unimaginable. In the end, Eisenkot may have few other options if he wants to replace Netanyahu, as he has promised. In most cases, political parties support coalitions to advance positive changes and achieve concrete goals. But there are moments when political cooperation is necessary for a different reason: to prevent something far worse. The most immediate and overriding objective today is to bring an end to the far-right Netanyahu government. That is a priority on which both the Zionist opposition and the Arab-led parties can agree. Beyond this shared basic goal, the Arab-led parties should use their political influence to work on two levels. First, they must seek tangible improvements in their constituents’ lives: combating organized crime in Arab communities, securing budgets, addressing the housing crisis, ending the brutal treatment of Palestinians living under occupation in the West Bank, and pushing for a permanent cease-fire and the reconstruction of Gaza. These are fundamental issues of human dignity and civilian life. On a broader level, they should continue to push for real progress on Israeli-Palestinian peace that is ultimately based on two states coexisting, side by side. Thirty years from now, people will ask how Jewish supremacy became so normalized. I do not expect the current Israeli political establishment to embrace these positions, but that does not mean that the Arab parties should not raise them at every opportunity. At the same time, the Arab parties can use their newfound political clout to build alliances between Jews and Arabs around shared political and strategic goals. The resulting partnerships must be about more than parliamentary arrangements; it must also create the foundations for a different future. That will require Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel to engage with one another on the basis of equality, rather than mere political convenience. Thus far, Eisenkot has given few indications that he is prepared to go down this path. Since the election, it has been encouraging to see him condemn Netanyahu for fueling what he described as a “racist and violent” campaign against Israel’s Arab citizens. Yet many of the mainstream Zionist parties in Eisenkot’s camp have vowed not to work with the Arab parties. Still, Eisenkot must consider what that would mean. Thirty years from now, people will ask how Jewish supremacy became so normalized that even politicians who called themselves democrats accepted the exclusion of one-fifth of their fellow citizens. They will ask why Israel’s opposition could recognize the danger posed by Netanyahu’s government but not confront the assumptions that made his politics possible. There is an irony in the fact that, in a country that seeks to keep political hegemony exclusively in Jewish hands, the Palestinian minority, after decades of struggle for political recognition and equal rights, has emerged as one of the most significant forces shaping the country’s political future. We have come to understand that we must be courageous and cooperate with the Zionist parties of the center and left in order to oust Netanyahu, Ben-Gvir, and Smotrich. The question now is: Do these parties, which call themselves democratic and liberal, have the same courage?
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