How fighting weakens Washington’s reputation—and backing down may strengthen it.
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In mid-February, after the United States failed to get Iran to renounce its nuclear ambitions, U. S. President Donald Trump issued an ultimatum. The Iranian leadership had to make “a meaningful deal” with Washington. “Otherwise,” he said, “bad things happen.” Barely eight days later, the United States and Israel began the war against Iran that continues today. That war has been criticized on many grounds, but analysts have often overlooked the basic assumption about U. S. credibility that it has tested. There is a long-held understanding that the United States’ willingness to use force to stand up for its interests is essential to deterring future adversaries—and convincing them to give in to the kind of sweeping demands the Trump administration made of Tehran. As Elbridge Colby, U. S. undersecretary of defense for policy, said in the early stages of the conflict, “I think both our friends and potential foes are seeing the prowess of the joint force and that also contributes to deterrence.”Going back to the early years of the Cold War, the concept of credibility—a state’s perceived capabilities and its willingness to use them even at high cost—has played a central role in the decisions that led to and sustained many of the United States’ largest military campaigns. The need to bolster U. S. credibility was a key force driving Washington’s strategy in Korea and Vietnam in the mid-twentieth century, and it played an important role in Iraq and Afghanistan during the so-called war on terror. American strategists today continue to assess foreign policy decisions based on how they might strengthen or weaken the country’s reputation. But as the results of the Iran campaign have shown, a decision to use force does not always strengthen deterrence. After nearly ten months of war, and the expenditure of billions of dollars of munitions, the United States appears little closer to achieving its objectives of definitively ending Iran’s nuclear threat and ability to project power across the region, let alone securing regime change in Tehran. Meanwhile, the war has badly depleted U. S. military resources that could be used elsewhere and has further eroded the American public’s willingness to support military interventions. Rather than sending a strong signal of U. S. resolve, the Iran war risks conveying the opposite message. Vice President JD Vance argued that the reason the Republicans lost the midterm elections was the Iran war, and government officials in Tehran have gloated that “Americans said no to war.”In fact, the conventional wisdom that standing firm in a military conflict enhances a state’s credibility misses something important. As the U. S. wars in Vietnam and Iraq showed, a prolonged military campaign may leave the country more cautious about using force, and less willing to bear the costs, in the years that follow. Adversaries notice this. Given that prior efforts by the Trump administration to compromise with Tehran were criticized as “appeasement” by figures like former U. S. Vice President Mike Pence, Trump may be tempted to continue or even expand the Iran campaign. But by taxing U. S. capabilities and deepening war-weariness among the American public, escalation in Iran could instead lead Beijing and Moscow to question Washington’s appetite for future interventions. Policymakers should be far more skeptical about using military force for the sake of demonstrating U. S. resolve, and they should be less averse to backing down. The Cold War competition with the Soviet Union convinced the United States to intervene in costly proxy wars that consumed enormous human and military resources for questionable gain, and now the strategic competition with China and Russia may do the same. These kinds of conflicts are precisely the ones that are likely to harm, rather than help, U. S. credibility. Instead of obsessing about its reputation for resolve, which it cannot control, Washington must refocus its attention on maintaining the military strength and capabilities it needs to deter its major adversaries. Sometimes the best way to preserve both the capability and the willingness to act in the future is to walk away from conflict in the present. SHOW OF FORCEFor decades, policymakers and scholars have treated a country’s credibility as the dark matter of international politics—a hard-to-measure attribute that is nonetheless enormously important for maintaining deterrence. In the 1960s, nuclear deterrence theorist and Nobel Prize winner Thomas Schelling went so far as to say that acquiring a reputation for resolve is “one of the few things worth fighting over.” In keeping with this, it has long been assumed that whereas standing firm communicates to adversaries and allies alike that a country is willing to run risks and bear costs to uphold its interests, backing down or seeking to compromise conveys the opposite. As a result, many U. S. leaders and strategists have drawn on the logic of credibility to justify the most hawkish policies toward adversaries: making maximalist demands, using force, and remaining in wars long past the point where their costs exceeded their benefits. Vietnam was a case in point. When debating whether to send the first group of U. S. troops to Vietnam in 1965, U. S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk told President Lyndon Johnson, “If the Communist world finds out we will not pursue our commitments to the end, I don’t know where they will stay their hand.” Later, as the United States became bogged down in the war, Assistant Secretary of Defense John McNaughton went further, arguing in a formerly top-secret memo that the primary reason for continuing the Vietnam War was to maintain America’s “reputation as a guarantor” and “avoid a humiliating U. S. defeat.” According to this logic, 58,000 U. S. soldiers and likely over a million Vietnamese people were killed not because the outcome of the war was itself crucial to U. S. interests, but because Washington worried how others—especially the Soviets—would perceive it if it withdrew. Since the Cold War, the same justifications have been used to push the country into, and to sustain, many other conflicts. This was especially true during the so-called Forever Wars the United States was drawn into after the 9/11 attacks. On the night of 9/11, U. S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said, “We need to bomb something else [other than the relatively weak Taliban] to prove that we’re, you know, big and strong and not going to be pushed around by these kinds of attacks.” The logic of credibility not only played a role in Washington launching the Iraq war in 2003 but also locked it into the conflict, even as the costs rose and the raison d’être for the war—weapons of mass destruction—turned out to be false. As President George W. Bush said in 2006, “If we were to leave before the mission is complete, it would hurt U. S. credibility.”Conversely, strategists have been quick to criticize U. S. leaders who backed down. During the Syrian civil war, many were concerned about the reputational damage to the United States when President Barack Obama declined to respond to the Syrian government’s use of sarin gas to attack a rebel-held suburb of Damascus, thereby violating a red line that Obama had previously declared. In 2021, many foreign policy hawks reprimanded President Joe Biden for withdrawing from Afghanistan and for waiving some U. S. sanctions on Russia’s Nord Stream 2 pipeline project. At the time, Michael McCaul, the top Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said, “U. S. credibility from Kyiv to Taipei cannot withstand another blow of this nature.” More recently, Trump himself has been accused of backing down against China on tariffs, which some have decried as another example of “Trump always chickens out,” or “TACO.” In each of these cases, critics argued that Washington’s failure to act has compromised the perception that the United States is willing to run risks and bear costs to achieve its objectives. USE IT AND LOSE ITDespite the persistent assumption that U. S. credibility requires using force and refusing to back down, that thinking has been repeatedly challenged over the past decade. For one thing, experience has shown that a country’s past behavior may be a poor indicator of its present-day resolve. In April, for example, The New York Times reported that Trump believed that Iran was unlikely to attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz based on its past actions—such as its failure to mount a robust response to the U. S. and Israeli bombing of its nuclear facilities in the 12-day war in 2025. In reality, however, Iran has been far less restrained than expected in the current conflict and moved quickly not only to close the strait but also to attack U. S. allies and U. S. military bases across the region. In other words, Tehran’s failure to stand firm in 2025 had little bearing on its resolve in the present war. A state can gain a reputation for aggression that undermines long-term deterrence. In any case, it is far from clear that a country’s reputation for resolve is something that it can control by its actions alone. As Keren Yarhi-Milo has explained in Foreign Affairs, “credibility is in the eye of the beholder.” Even if a state acts decisively to signal strength, an adversary may not interpret that action as reason to reconsider its behavior. For example, despite Washington’s intention to communicate high resolve by bearing tremendous costs in the Vietnam War, the North Vietnamese Communist Party Central Committee concluded in 1965 that “the domestic situation in the United States, however, will not allow them to fully utilize their economic and military power in their war of aggression.” In other words, Hanoi ignored the intended signal from Washington and refused to back down. Other pitfalls are associated with demonstrating resolve by standing firm and fighting. At the extreme, a state that leans too much on military strength can gain a reputation for aggression in ways that undermine long-term deterrence. Napoleonic France and Nazi Germany both had strong reputations for resolve, but their offensive actions ultimately provoked other countries rather than deterring them. There is certainly a risk that U. S. actions under the second Trump administration—such as decapitating the Iranian government and threatening to annex Canada, Gaza, and Greenland—could similarly backfire. For example, there is growing evidence that U. S. allies and partners in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia are rethinking their reliance on the United States and are seeking other sources of security. Far from conceding to Trump’s demands, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney has described a “rupture” in relations between Washington and Ottawa and advocated for middle powers to band together to protect their sovereignty. Even if using force bolsters a country’s reputation for resolve, it may harm the country’s broader credibility. For instance, Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine and its willingness to absorb hundreds of thousands of casualties since then has sent a strong signal about its resolve. Yet its dramatic underperformance on the battlefield against a far smaller and less well-equipped army has likely diminished the international perception of its military effectiveness. The war in Iran could similarly tarnish the United States’ military reputation. Since February, Washington has depleted at least half of its precision-strike missiles and advanced air defense interceptor missiles. It will likely take years to replenish these stockpiles given slow manufacturing times for so-called exquisite platforms. In the meantime, the United States has fewer advanced systems to draw on if China makes a move against Taiwan or if Russia attacks Poland or Estonia. For both Russia’s and the United States’ military campaigns, then, the net effect has been to reduce rather than enhance the countries’ reputation for military capability in the eyes of their respective adversaries. DRY POWDER, MORE POWERQuite apart from the negative consequences that often come with decisions to use force, there is an even more fundamental problem with conventional thinking about credibility. In practice, backing down can actually be more helpful to a country’s reputation for resolve than fighting. This becomes especially clear in looking at the long-term effects of engaging in military interventions. Although the United States was victorious in World War I, the conflict produced a lingering war-weariness among the U. S. public and key policymakers. In the years after the Armistice, Americans expressed strong support for the idea that the United States should stay out of any future European war, a sentiment that was ultimately codified in the Neutrality Acts of the 1930s. Only after Japan attacked Pearl Harbor in December 1941, more than two years after war began in Europe, did the United States enter World War II. Fighting in World War I sent a signal of strong resolve to adversaries, but Americans’ war-weariness and resurgent isolationism in the years that followed conveyed that the United States would be less resolved to fight. This dynamic has been even more apparent in the aftermath of major U. S. wars since then. Following the Vietnam War, President Jimmy Carter declared that “young Americans should never again be sent to die in battle unless our own nation is endangered.” Consider how this kind of thinking affected adversaries’ view of the United States: In deciding to invade Kuwait in 1990, Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein assumed that the United States was intensely casualty averse and might not intervene or would back down quickly. General Wafiq al-Samarrai, Iraq’s head of military intelligence during the Gulf War, said in a 1996 interview that Saddam “thought that America’s involvement in Vietnam had badly damaged its willingness to use military power.” Although the Vietnam War was primarily fought to buttress the United States’ reputation for resolve, it had the opposite effect in practice. And again, during and after the U. S. war in Iraq, Americans became skeptical of costly military interventions. As a result, recent administrations have been especially hesitant to commit ground troops in combat operations. Iran is undoubtedly aware of this so-called Iraq syndrome, which may embolden Tehran to act more aggressively without having to fear a large-scale American ground operation. There is also experimental evidence that backing down may strengthen a country’s long-term reputation for resolve. In a survey I conducted in 2021 with 100 British parliamentarians, respondents were randomly divided into two groups. The first group read about a situation in which a hypothetical country backed down from a prior conflict. The second group read about a hypothetical country that stood firm in a prior conflict but displayed the same signs of war-weariness or “syndromes” that emerged in the United States after the Vietnam and Iraq wars. Both groups were then asked to estimate the likelihood that the country in question would stand firm or back down in a current dispute with the United Kingdom. On average, parliamentarians believed that the country that backed down in the prior dispute would have greater resolve in the current dispute. In other words, if fighting leads to war-weariness, then backing down can actually be better for a state’s future credibility. IRAN SYNDROMEAs the U. S. campaign in Iran has demonstrated, choosing to fight to maintain a reputation for resolve is an incredibly risky gamble and may backfire. To avoid repeating the same mistake, U. S. policymakers and strategists need to rethink the relationship between credibility and fighting. First, the United States should avoid fighting altogether when the primary objective is shoring up reputation rather than defending a core national issue. If a conflict directly involves key security and economic interests, as did the U. S. Revolutionary War and World War II, then fighting can be a logical choice, assuming the United States has sufficient military capabilities to win the war at reasonable cost. But if the primary argument for the war relates to future credibility, as in Vietnam, then policymakers should be wary. Second, if Washington determines that an adversary must be confronted with military force, then it must focus on limited, achievable objectives. Wars that drag on because they have much larger aims, or are prolonged simply for reputational reasons, may erode the country’s credibility by draining munitions and making Americans more reluctant to fight in the future. The two U. S. interventions against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq illustrate this point well. In the limited 1991 Gulf War, the United States quickly expelled Iraqi forces from Kuwait at low cost and before war-weariness could set in among the U. S. public. But the U. S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, in which Washington pursued the far more expansive goal of regime change, continued for years at high cost and made many U. S. policymakers and ordinary citizens alike less supportive of using force in the future. Finally, policymakers should focus less on the U. S. reputation for resolve, which they cannot control, and more on the country’s military capabilities, which they can. To deter Beijing and Moscow, Washington needs to convince both adversaries that it has the ability to prosecute a modern great-power war. The problem is that, although the United States continues to have the most advanced military capabilities and weapons systems in the world, they are limited in quantity, extremely expensive, and take a long time to replace. In the course of just a few months of fighting against Iran, the United States depleted huge percentages of its advanced and expensive stockpiles of offensive and defensive missiles. This alarming shortfall raises new questions about whether the United States could sustain a longer war of attrition of the type Russia and Ukraine are fighting. Washington urgently needs to replenish its stockpiles and rethink its dependence on a small number of exquisite systems. It also needs to avoid costly conflicts that distract it from the principal threats it faces from China and Russia. Rather than making U. S. credibility stronger in the eyes of the world, continuing the war in Iran could well undermine it, just as fighting in Vietnam and Iraq did.