The shrewd "Pancho" Aricó used to say: "We come to power with the expectation of changing it, but it is usually power that changes us." That law has found a new case to corroborate its validity: Javier Milei. The libertarian government has focused in recent hours on achieving a single objective: modifying the electoral system to facilitate the President's reelection. With this purpose, two simultaneous legislative negotiations are underway. One concerns the rules that will govern the upcoming elections, and the other the national budget.
The latter is the window through which the agreements reached in the former are paid for. Changing the rules of the game to gain a circumstantial advantage and using public accounts as a variable in power deals. Nothing more traditional in Argentine politics. Nothing more natural than entrusting those maneuvers to Diego Santilli. From this whole process, one indisputable corollary can be inferred: the ruling party's main objective is to secure another term for the President. Even fiscal resources, which the libertarians hold sacred, are being placed at the service of that project of staying in power. Milei came to end the caste. But the caste is swallowing Milei.
Santilli had to give up one of the keys to his reform: he abandoned the plan to enable the "colectoras" system, whereby lists of national legislators from different parties can attach themselves to a single presidential candidacy. It is the strat…
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The shrewd "Pancho" Aricó used to say: "We come to power expecting to change it, but it is usually power that changes us." That law has found a new case to confirm its validity: Javier Milei. The libertarian government has focused in recent hours on a single objective: modifying the electoral system to facilitate the President's reelection. Two simultaneous legislative negotiations are underway for this purpose. One over the rules that will govern the next elections and the other over the national budget. The latter is the window where the deals struck in the former get paid. Changing the rules of the game to gain a situational advantage and using the public accounts as a variable in power arrangements. Nothing more traditional in Argentine politics. Nothing more natural than entrusting those maneuvers to Diego Santilli. From this whole process one indisputable corollary can be inferred: the ruling party's main objective is to secure another term for the President. Even fiscal resources, which the libertarians hold sacred, are being placed at the service of that project of staying in power. Milei came to end the caste. But the caste is swallowing Milei.
Santilli had to give up one of the keys to his reform: he abandoned the plan to enable the "colectoras" system, by which national legislative lists from different parties can attach themselves to the same presidential candidacy. It is the stratagem by which many feudal lords achieve extraordinary, and perhaps undeserved, levels of support in their provinces. The government's allies forced Santilli into an unusual act of consistency: the Pro, which would remain the Cabinet chief's party, had eliminated that trick during Mauricio Macri's presidency in the name of electoral transparency. Macri's clumsiness these past days was striking. Pressured by the governors of his party, especially Rogelio Frigerio and Ignacio Torres, he announced that Pro would endorse the reform. He did not wait for the colectoras to be dropped. He failed to claim credit for that improvement in the bill. Groom's head. The colectoras were going to serve a precise and, if you will, minor purpose: consoling the La Libertad Avanza leaders in districts where the party's national leadership offers governors the chance to attach their lists to the libertarian ticket. Now those apostles of anarcho-capitalism will lick their wounds before a national command that marginalizes them in favor of the caudillos who govern their districts.
With this decision, an internal debate was settled. Karina Milei wanted to privilege her party's lists to strengthen its presence in Congress. Her eternal contradictor, Santiago Caputo, "the Wizard of the Kremlin," preferred to make alliances with available governors so that Javier Milei could channel various party offers behind his candidacy. The "Wizard" won. It was obvious: the President's reelection is a far more important goal than consolidating the ruling party. The Casa Rosada gave up the colectoras just in time. Their restoration was becoming a scandal. By abandoning that claim, Milei and his people managed to move closer to a more valuable conquest: the suspension of the PASO primaries. It is a play with several targets. On one hand, it strips the opposition, especially the PJ, of an internal ordering rule. Now that party's presidential candidacy will have to emerge from an internal agreement. If that agreement proves impossible, the Peronists will be on the brink of rupture. The problem involves, above all, Axel Kicillof and Sergio Massa. Which of the two benefits from eliminating the mandatory primaries? If anyone, Massa, without a doubt. Today Kicillof doubles him in voting intention. And if there were—something that should not yet be ruled out—an agreement between the governor and Cristina Kirchner, who remains the great elector, Massa should wake from his dream of power. Without primaries, those with any fantasy of competing with the President in the non-Peronist field are also harmed. Those impulses are still hazy. They can be attributed to Patricia Bullrich and, with much less probability, to Macri. In other words: whoever wants to challenge Milei will have to leave the party.
The greatest aversion to the PASO resides in the Ministry of Economy. Luis "Toto" Caputo assured until a few months ago that Peronism could never return to power. Now he trusts his own clairvoyance less. And rightly so, because several polls already identify "La Cautiva" as the figure with the best image in the country. The latest was from the prestigious international consultancy AtlasIntel. Faced with this outlook, the elder Caputo fears repeating last year's nightmare. That is, that an early election, like the one that took place in the province of Buenos Aires, shows an emboldened Peronism and that this perception triggers a run against the peso. Eliminating the PASO means, then, depriving the markets of that perfect poll that could prefigure in August what will happen in October. In other words: preventing Milei from experiencing what happened to Macri with the 2019 primaries. Even if those elections are not held, the specter of a revitalized PJ does not fully clear. It is very unlikely that the PASO will be eliminated for local offices in the province of Buenos Aires. And one may assume there will be several candidates for governor. Especially because the two main presidential contenders, Massa and Kicillof, are from Buenos Aires Province. One must therefore expect that in August there will be a contest in which the PJ of the country's largest province goes to the polls and reveals its level of acceptance. If that level turns out high, something similar to last September's election in that same district will have occurred: it produced an upheaval that reached the currency market and also the sovereign bond market. The danger of that financial-electoral storm remains on the horizon despite the elimination of the presidential-level primaries.
The Peronist threat, or the so-called "kuka risk," will gain more density from the libertarians' campaign strategy. Like Macri in 2019, Milei's laboratory speculates that victory is just around the corner simply by warning about the ordeal that the return of the PJ demon would mean. It is a double-edged weapon. Not only for its effects on financial sensibility. Also because that tactic harbors the risk of magnifying the adversary. It is very difficult for the ruling party to escape this widespread tendency toward polarization. A lazy method, which appeals to mobilizing hatred against something rather than taking on the much more difficult, sophisticated, and exciting task of promoting support for one's own project.
The persistence of the Buenos Aires PASO especially affects one leader: Santilli. He is, at least for now, the one in charge of defending the banner of La Libertad Avanza and the Pro in the province. Will he have to invent a challenger so that that preliminary race has a bit more tension? Santilli's fate is a mystery. Especially because Solari Parravicini, who spoke so much about the "gray man," left not a single psychography of the "red-faced man."
The modifications to the bill reach other aspects of the electoral system. Almost all have a regressive bent. For example, the free airtime for candidates in the media is reduced. And the collection of endorsements for lists becomes more demanding. The debate among candidates in the first round is also eliminated, leaving only the runoff debate, if there is a runoff. These are provisions that tend to consolidate the dominant parties at the expense of the smaller ones. There is one clause of the official proposal that is relevant for the parties: it allows for a slot on the single ballot to vote for a party's complete list. As if there were a "sábana" list inside the single ballot. A device to allow the presidential ticket to pull along the other categories. The new rules incorporate the clean-record criterion. No one with a second-instance criminal conviction may be a candidate. That is, a final judgment is not required to cancel the principle of presumption of innocence. It is a draconian rule, aimed at improving the moral quality of representatives, even at the cost of inaugurating a danger: that in many districts where the federal criminal courts are closely tied to the governor's figure, arbitrary persecutions may be launched to knock some candidate out of the race.
The discussion of electoral rules is the occasion on which the political class appears most fervent. It is the moment when leaders fiercely dispute their most immediate interests. It is also the instance in which a recurring illusion appears in full: the assumption that through engineering the vote can be pushed in one direction, as if it were a physical force. In other words, the chimera of thinking that legal tricks can compensate for the low quality of representation. Or, in the case of ruling parties, the poor quality of government. It should come as no surprise, then, that the handling of the bill on the voting system has exposed some fissures. Above all, in the libertarian bloc in the Senate. There, in coded form, the battle between Miss Milei and Patricia Bullrich is waged. It is a tension that may reappear over another of the great fights unfolding today in public life: the composition of the Council of the Magistracy. The La Libertad Avanza bloc must propose two representatives. Karina Milei proposes two Salteños: Nadia Márquez, closely tied to evangelicalism, and Gonzalo Guzmán Coraita. Bullrich, on the other hand, backs the Fuegian Belén Montes de Oca. So far the only two representatives settled are those of the Radical bloc: Maximiliano Abad and Eduardo Vischi as alternate.
Around the Council's representatives another conflagration may open. Which is the largest bloc, the first minority, to which two seats correspond? La Libertad Avanza and the PJ each have 21 senators. But fifteen days ago the Riojan Fernando Rejal rejoined the Peronist bloc, which he had left in 2025. That means that bloc can now claim the greater representation. The bloc intends to designate Eduardo "Wado" De Pedro and Florencia López. It is understandable that in a political environment that has become extremely judicialized, the composition of the body that appoints and removes judges is crucial. That is why a duel has also opened in the academic sector. Diego Molea will represent university rectors, as head of the University of Lomas de Zamora. But he ran into difficulties designating the faculty representative: Emiliano Yacobitti, the future rector of the UBA, crossed his path. Yacobitti went to the courts. His claim reached the courtroom of María Romilda Servini de Cubría. But that judge decided to take leave, apparently disheartened by the case against her over the alleged delivery of a baby during the dictatorship. Ariel Lijo substituted for her court. Molea celebrated: Lijo had been brought by him to dispense his legal wisdom among the law students at Lomas. He promoted that addition to the faculty with great enthusiasm. But Molea failed to gauge one detail: the close relationship between Yacobitti and Lijo. It would have sufficed for him to look at the guest list of the last benefit dinner for the Hospital de Clínicas, promoted by the incoming rector: Lijo was an enthusiastic attendee, along with his friend the sinister Antonio Stiuso and the anxious Sergio Massa. A connoisseur of this web of relationships explained: "Ariel and Yaco have a lot of Miami together. They're like Don Johnson and Philip Michael Thomas." "Miami Vice," almost white and black. Conclusion: Lijo took the case and is about to rule in Yacobitti's favor.
Lijo competes with Massa in anxiety over his candidacy. His is for the Supreme Court. He meets with senators. Consults governors. Reveals conversations that, perhaps, never took place. For example, one in which Milei swore to him, in person, that he will support him again. The other candidate, Mariano Borinsky, seems more confident, since he at least has material proof: a chat with the President, which he displays all the time. Lijo's problem is that, given his weakness, he is the most likely to be replaced by a woman. Lorenzetti denies being interested in this race. But except for him, everyone believes he backs the Salteña Mariana Catalano. She has a weighty adversary. The "Wizard" Caputo speculates about bringing to the Court María Ibarzábal, the secretary of Legal and Technical Affairs. He calls her "minister in law." All to mortify Juan Bautista Mahiques, who seeks the Attorney General's office, but depends on the Court candidates securing two-thirds of the Senate. He cannot run alone. Mahiques believes he deserves to head the prosecutors. With a troubling disdain for judges and prosecutors, he boasts of having closed the cases that troubled the Mileis. The $LIBRA case and the one that had Manuel Adorni on the ropes. Someone should warn the brothers that no case is closed with a dismissal. Everything can be reopened. That is Comodoro Py for you. The wheel of the libertarian infighting never stops turning. The "Wizard's" candidate for the Court, Ibarzábal, has an insurmountable limit. The usual one. Miss Milei.