Trump needs a win in Shenzhen, and Xi knows it

rss · asiatimes 2026-11-18T06:07:57Z en
Bruised by midterm losses and shadowed by a Chinese spy scandal in Silicon Valley, Donald Trump heads to Shenzhen on Thursday (November 19) for a three-way summit with Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin. The meeting has echoes of 20th-century great-power dealmaking, and allies from Kyiv to Tokyo are wondering whether they are on the menu. The timing is awkward. Days ago, Jensen Huang resigned as Nvidia CEO after admitting to an affair with a suspected Chinese spy. The fallout spotlights Trump’s decision to let Nvidia sell top-end AI chips to China, and Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick’s failure to limit Beijing’s access to US semiconductors. Lutnick is accused of slow-walking export curbs in ways that benefited businesses linked to his family’s firm, Cantor Fitzgerald. US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent already appears to be distancing himself from him. Democrats and China hawks in the Republican Party want answers, and at least one political scalp. Trump’s main goal is keeping a China trade deal alive, starting with extending the tariff ceasefire that expires January 10. That is now harder than it sounds. Since the April 2025 “Liberation Day” tariffs, Xi has mastered making Trump wait, and the best he’s usually gotten is a vague promise to talk later. Delay suits Beijing and hurts Trump. US inflation is rising, growth is underwhelming and polls suggest voters see tariffs as a stealth tax, a factor in the Democratic majorities won in the House and Senate on November 3. To justify the pain, Trump needs a “grand bargain” he can sell as a win. Xi knows this and holds most of the cards, including dominance over rare-earth minerals. This week’s Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Shenzhen is a unique opportunity to extend the US–China tariff truce. Yet “it’s unlikely to be a significant market catalyst, as domestic political constraints limit the scope for major concessions or substantive new announcements,” said Carlos Casanova, economist at Union Bancaire Privée. A face-saving gesture, such as a big Boeing order or soybean purchases, could let Trump claim victory while Beijing claims its own, with the underlying dynamics unchanged. Casanova doubts the summit will move markets, since domestic politics limit the scope for big concessions. A durable framework could lift Chinese and regional assets, but “markets may instead be vulnerable to disappointment,” he said. Even if Trump keeps the Huang scandal off the table, the longer-term damage may be significant. It remains unestablished whether Alice Huang (no relation to Nvidia’s Huang) was a spy, or whether their dalliance compromised national security. Alice Huang is a former executive at the Singapore-based cloud computing firm Megaspeed, which is at the center of allegations that Nvidia’s top AI chips have been flowing to China. Yet “the political damage may already have been done,” said Diana Choyleva, an analyst at Enodo Economics, a London-based, independent macroeconomic, political and geopolitical forecasting firm. “The scandal has weakened Washington’s strongest voices for relaxing semiconductor export controls just as Congress is moving to tighten them. Nvidia is now in a much weaker position to lobby against them, and with Democrats taking control of Congress in January 2027, pressure for tougher restrictions is unlikely to subside,” she said. Xi, meanwhile, “always regarded the US-China truce as temporary, and it now has another reason to doubt its durability,” Choyleva said. “Tighter chip restrictions would leave Beijing feeling vindicated in its pursuit of technological self-reliance, and its controls over rare earth exports give it a powerful means of retaliation.” At a minimum, Choyleva said, the Nvidia scandal illustrates the inexorable forces driving what Enodo Economics calls the “Great Decoupling.” Even if Huang is fully exonerated, those forces will remain, and his downfall risks accelerating them. Eurasia Group analyst Dominic Chu said that the Nvidia scandal has empowered China hawks in Washington. “We had flagged that the Megaspeed scandal would weaken Nvidia’s ability to slow new export controls in Congress even if Huang kept his job,” Chu noted. Huang’s resignation, Chu added, “complicates the situation further, removing the industry’s most effective lobbyist and Nvidia’s direct line to Trump.” Huang’s exit now puts congressional negotiators on both sides of the aisle in a precarious position; they would now have to be seen defending Nvidia to strip the three Congressional chip bills this year. Then there’s the economic fallout. Analysts at Deutsche Bank warn that the risk that the AI boom will go bust is now an underlying threat to the dollar’s role as a global safe haven and a key invoicing currency for the oil trade, as well as the stability of US Treasuries and stocks. “We argue that the petrodollar is rather quickly being superseded by the chip-dollar,” said Deutsche strategist Mallika Sachdeva. “A dollar driven by chips, AI and private capital connections should be inherently riskier.” Sachdeva notes that foreign inflows into US equities top US$1 trillion a year, making them a key force supporting US deficit funding, particularly from Asia, home to many of the biggest holders of US Treasury securities. Since May 2025, just after Trump opened the tariff spigot on Asia, the US dollar has jumped about 3% on a trade-weighted basis. “Equity flows have not just been supporting the US dollar but have provided financing to the companies driving the AI buildout and chips boom itself,” Sachdeva said. “The fact that the US dollar has become more dependent on foreign equity inflows than US Treasuries should make it inherently more volatile and exposed.” One of those developments highlights the “Chinafication” dynamic the Trump era is unleashing on the US. Case in point: Trump’s plan to name Nvidia as one of more than two dozen AI “national champions” to position referred firms to pursue increased overseas investment. Candidates reportedly include Amazon, Anthropic, Microsoft and OpenAI. The “national champion” plan builds on a 2025 executive order promoting American technology abroad with fast-track licensing and government financing. Critics say the approach is lifted from the Chinese Politburo’s playbook. The list of parallels to China is long and growing longer: government stakes in companies like Intel, a “golden share” in Nippon Steel’s US Steel deal, a demand for 25% of Nvidia’s China chip sales, pressure on the media, murkier economic data and weakened courts. Last year, Trump moved to fire the Bureau of Labor Statistics commissioner for allegedly “RIGGED” jobs numbers, and called on Goldman Sachs CEO David Solomon to fire the bank’s chief economist for calling tariffs “inflationary.” Washington once urged Asia to curb cronyism, and now Trump is proving America is now making cronyism great again. No US institution is more respected globally than the US Federal Reserve, which Kevin Warsh has led since May. Its credibility helps keep the dollar stable even as government debt tops $40 trillion and the US no longer holds a single AAA credit rating, though Washington still sells 10-year debt at yields around 5%. Last year, then-Fed chair Jerome Powell pushed back on Trump’s threats to fire or indict him, saying the dispute was about whether rates would be set “based on evidence and economic conditions” or directed by “political pressure or intimidation.” The reference was to former Fed chair Paul Volcker, who reined in US inflation that ran rampant under his predecessor Arthur Burns in the 1970s. A wave of congressional leaders, Republicans included, rallied to Powell’s defense, which may explain why markets haven’t panicked, at least not yet. Behind the scenes, though, pressure continues. Fed Governor Stephen Miran, on leave from his White House economist job, had argued for 150 basis points of cuts in January, a call out of step with inflation expectations that no doubt rattled bond vigilantes. Trump has also pushed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, shareholder-owned, government-sponsored enterprises chartered by Congress to keep the US housing market stable, to buy $200 billion in mortgage-backed securities, a task normally reserved for the Fed during a credit crisis. Mohamed El-Erian of Allianz has called it the “people’s QE.” To be sure, the yuan isn’t displacing the dollar as the world’s safe haven currency any time soon, largely because the People’s Bank of China can’t set rates freely. Anyone confused about why Trump would remake the Fed in that image can ask Argentina, Russia, Turkey or Venezuela how central bank meddling worked out. All this raises the stakes as Trump sits down with Xi in Shenzhen. Because this trilateral summit was scheduled on short notice, the optics and precedent will matter more than any concrete deliverables, Andrew Peek, an analyst at the Atlantic Council, argued. The US president will certainly raise Iran. Even without an agreement, the optics of Xi and Putin discussing Iran with Trump will likely cause unease in Tehran and suspicion of its “allies” in Moscow and Beijing. “This is especially because Xi has similar interests to the US, including opening the Strait of Hormuz, which would lower energy prices, and preventing Iran from possessing a nuclear weapon,” Peek added. “China would be amenable to these discussions because it wants to be the dispenser of security in the Middle East; that is, Beijing would like states seeking security to look East,” he said. In that sense, the Shenzhen summit is about far more than tariffs, chips or Iran. It is a snapshot of a world where economic interdependence is giving way to strategic rivalry, and where the lines between state power and private enterprise are blurring on both sides of the Pacific. In Manila, on the way to Shenzhen, Trump did his best to secure the odd trade and security commitments – to suggest he means business at APEC. Yet Trump’s stop at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit was more bluster than substance. Targeted diplomatic and trade deliverables aren’t much of a payoff for Americans tired of tariffs and inflation. Trump may leave Shenzhen with a headline-grabbing concession and Xi with another tactical victory. Yet neither outcome would alter the deeper trajectory. The forces driving the US and China apart are becoming stronger, not weaker, and the Nvidia scandal will only accelerate them. The real question is no longer whether US-China decoupling will continue, but how much economic and geopolitical turbulence will attend the separation. Follow William Pesek on X at @WilliamPesek

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