US-Israel: end of the special relationship, start of a normal one

rss · asiatimes 2026-11-17T07:47:38Z en
For half a century, Washington and Jerusalem have described their relationship in the language of liturgy. It is “unbreakable,” “ironclad,” a bond of “shared values” that transcends the passing quarrels of presidents and prime ministers. Ritual phrases are not analysis. They are what people recite when they would rather not think too hard about what they believe. The first week of November 2026 should end the recitation. On the morning of the midterm elections, Donald Trump told Fox News that he and Benjamin Netanyahu had agreed months earlier to stop the roughly $3.8 billion in annual US military aid after this year. America would still “help Israel if they need it,” he added, which is the kind of reassurance one offers a client, not an ally. By nightfall, voters had handed Congress to Democrats who want a tougher line on Iran, Gaza and settler violence in the West Bank. Michigan sent Abdul El-Sayed, who calls the devastation of Gaza a genocide, to the Senate. And Vice President JD Vance, explaining his party’s losses, listed changing “our relationship with Israel” among the ways Republicans could win voters back. Israel, meanwhile, had gone to the polls a week earlier and produced no clear result. Netanyahu has no obvious path to a majority. Gadi Eisenkot is trying to assemble a coalition and presents himself as the man who can repair the damage. The short answer: allies, yes; “special,” no So will the United States and Israel still be allies in 2036? Almost certainly, in the narrow sense of the word. Intelligence sharing, joint missile-defense programs, arms sales and the habit of consultation are too deeply rooted in both bureaucracies to vanish within a decade. But the question most people are really asking is a different one. Will the “special relationship” survive? The arrangement under which Washington underwrote Israel’s security with an open checkbook, a reliable veto at the UN Security Council and a bipartisan consensus that treated criticism as heresy. My answer is no. That relationship is already ending, and it is ending not with a rupture but with a renegotiation. What replaces it will look less like a marriage and more like what most of America’s partnerships actually are: transactional, conditional, and dependent on whether each side’s interests happen to line up at a given moment. For Israel, that will be uncomfortable. It may also be healthy. It was never automatic The mythology holds that America and Israel have always stood shoulder to shoulder. The history says otherwise. Truman recognized the new state but would not arm it. Eisenhower forced Israel out of Sinai in 1957 with the threat of sanctions. In 1973, Nixon and Kissinger resupplied the IDF, then stopped its advance and brokered a ceasefire designed to give Egypt a reason to switch sides in the Cold War. George H. W. Bush withheld loan guarantees in 1991 to stop settlement construction. The pattern is consistent. When American and Israeli interests diverged, Washington pursued its own and Israel was asked to defer. The “special relationship” was a product of a specific era: the Cold War, when Israel could be sold as a bulwark against Soviet clients, and the unipolar decades that followed, when the United States could afford to subsidize regional partners without counting the cost. I have argued for years that the “strategic asset” was always partly a myth. After 9/11 and the Iraq war, Israel looked more like a strategic burden, a source of regional resentment that American diplomats had to manage. The difference now is that this argument is no longer confined to realist think tanks. It is being made by the Vice President of the United States. The consensus is gone, on both sides of the aisle The deepest change is not in the White House – it is among American voters. The bipartisan consensus that made Israel a third rail of American politics no longer exists, and the numbers are brutal. In an NBC News poll taken in early 2026, 39% of voters viewed Israel negatively and 32% positively, a reversal from 2023. Only 13% of Democrats held a favorable view. Among Americans aged 18 to 34, just 13% were favorable and 63% unfavorable. For the first time, Americans overall were split almost evenly in their sympathies between Israelis and Palestinians. An AP-NORC survey in July found that 58% of Democrats think Washington is “too supportive” of Israel. That includes about half of Jewish Democrats. Israeli officials have long consoled themselves that Republicans and evangelicals would remain a firewall. But Republicans under 45 are noticeably cooler toward Israel than their parents. The “America First” right, the movement that put Trump and Vance in power, regards foreign aid of any kind with suspicion and the Iran war as exactly the kind of Middle Eastern entanglement it was elected to avoid. When the progressive left and the nationalist right converge on the same skepticism, a coalition is forming. Within ten years, the people who are now in their twenties and thirties will run the committees, staff the National Security Council and write the checks. The alliance of 2036 will reflect their views, not those of the generation that remembers 1967. Follow the money, as it shrinks Trump’s announcement turned out to be more theater than policy. According to Yedioth Ahronoth, the two governments are finalizing a new memorandum of understanding. The current ten-year deal would run through 2028. After that, Israel would get roughly US$3.3 billion a year in direct military financing for just five years, about $16.5 billion in total, and then nothing. In other words, if the deal holds, the era of American military aid to Israel ends around 2033, three years before the horizon of this essay. Israeli negotiators reportedly want it signed before the new Democratic Congress takes office in January, which tells you how much they trust the politics on Capitol Hill. Netanyahu has dressed this up as Israel “coming of age,” and Ambassador Mike Huckabee describes the future arrangement as trade rather than aid. There is something to that. Israel is a rich country with a formidable defense industry, and weaning it off subsidies is overdue. But an alliance built on aid is an alliance in which the patron has a stake in the client’s survival. An alliance built on trade is one in which the customer can shop elsewhere and the seller can attach conditions. In 2026, a Senate resolution to block arms sales to Israel won 40 votes. In a Democratic Congress, the next one may pass. America’s attention is moving east Even if American public opinion were stable, the strategic logic would be pulling the two countries apart. The central challenge for US foreign policy over the next decade is China. Every carrier group parked in the Eastern Mediterranean, every interceptor fired over the Red Sea, is one not available in the Taiwan Strait. Strategists in both parties understand this, even when they do not say it aloud. The Iran war that began in February was supposed to prove the opposite: that Israel is a force multiplier, the regional hegemon that does the heavy lifting so America does not have to. Instead it exposed the gap between the two allies’ aims. Israel wanted regime change in Tehran. Washington wanted a deal, and Trump called a truce over Israeli objections. The partners fought the same war for different reasons, and it ended on American terms. That is the template for the next decade. Washington will want stability in the Gulf, cheap oil and a quiet region so it can focus on Asia. Its most important Middle Eastern partners will be Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar, which offer investment, energy and diplomatic leverage. Israel will be valued when it helps that agenda and pressured when it gets in the way. An American president who wants a Saudi defense pact and normalization will not hesitate to use Israel as a bargaining chip. This is what normal great powers do. The surprise is only that Israelis ever expected otherwise. Three ways 2036 could look The normal partnership (most likely). Aid has ended. Israel buys American weapons with its own money, co-produces missile defense, and shares intelligence on Iran and jihadist groups. Washington votes against Israel at the UN when it suits, conditions some arms sales on conduct in the West Bank, and does business with the Gulf states without asking Jerusalem first. Think of America’s relationship with Turkey on a good day, or with India: warm, useful, and unsentimental. The repaired alliance (possible). A centrist Israeli government under Eisenkot or a successor freezes settlement expansion, accepts some political horizon for the Palestinians, and joins a US-brokered regional architecture with Saudi Arabia. Democrats, relieved to have a partner they can defend, restore some warmth. Even here, the relationship is more conditional than in 2016, because the American electorate that would have to sustain it has changed. The estrangement (unlikely but no longer unthinkable). Israel annexes territory in the West Bank, or a new war in Gaza or Lebanon produces images that make American support politically toxic. A future president, of either party, suspends arms deliveries for an extended period. Israel hedges toward India, China and the Gulf. The two countries remain formally friendly, the way America remains formally friendly with many countries it no longer trusts. What no plausible scenario includes is a return to the special relationship of the 1990s and 2000s. The conditions that produced it are gone. Partner, not guarantor Netanyahu bet his country’s most important relationship on one American president and one American party. Both bets have now been called. Trump, it turns out, regards Israel the way he regards every other ally: as a line item to be renegotiated when the political market shifts. The Republican Party is no longer a reliable firewall. And the Democrats taking over Congress in January owe nothing to a prime minister who spent fifteen years treating them as an obstacle. Whoever governs in Jerusalem next should draw the conclusion that Israeli strategists have avoided for decades. The United States will remain a partner, and a valuable one. It will not be a guarantor. Israel’s long-term security will depend less on lobbying in Washington and more on its own choices: a defense posture it can sustain without subsidies, durable ties with its Arab neighbors, and a policy toward the Palestinians that its friends abroad can defend without embarrassment. Small states that depend on a single patron eventually discover that the patron’s priorities are its own. Israel is about to learn that lesson. It would be wiser to learn it by choice than by surprise. Leon Hadar is a journalist, blogger, analyst, author and consultant. This article first appeared on his Global Zeitgeist Substack. Become a subscriber here.

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