The future is a problem for Javier Milei's government. Either because they seek to control it with weapons that expose their political weakness, for example, the dispute over the suspension of the PASO primaries, or because they try to predict it, but the passage of time disproves their forecasts: yesterday, Economy Minister Luis Caputo acknowledged that Argentina's best eighteen months, which, according to his promise, were supposed to begin last April, in fact have not begun. For Caputo and the ruling party, the fault lies with the other: both external risk, wars and rising international interest rates, and the internal risk of a Kirchnerist comeback. From the Casa Rosada, the self-perception is that the economic plan is free of responsibility and that the model will earn its approval at the ballot box. There is a decline in the Milei government's image and wage and consumption indicators that don't add up, but publicly they insist on a certainty about the future: "Kirchnerism is the past," Caputo said yesterday. With barely two months to go before the electoral year begins, the Government is making clear which is the political toolbox it has to wait out until the political storm clears. The ammunition is of two types. On one side, the political anchor, the PASO. On the other, the fiscal anchor, as always; the consolidation of reserves; and glimpses of a pro-SME plan that runs through ARCA, late and limited tweaks. Economy Minister Luis Caputo SRALa pending revolution is the Milei watchword. During his visit to Buenos Aires, Pope Leo XIV dropped hints about political cordiality: he was concerned with linking democracy and its strengthening to "the care of words." But Milei does not seem to take notice. It was an option: that the transversality the Pope achieved with a highly intelligent discursive strategy be adopted by Milei. Leaving behind, or at least moderating, the verbal rage to inaugurate a public choreography that could benefit him: attempting to strategically capture the spirit of the times and a social demand for hope broader than Milei himself. Faced with electoral uncertainty, every political resource is worth gold: there is nothing to waste. Despite the difficulties of the economic plan, Milei has results to show. The containment of inflation, even if it comes at the cost of piercing the floor, without a doubt. With that and more rational communication with the electorate, he could make a difference. The wild deregulation of political speech served Milei well in 2023. It is not clear it serves him as much now to retain the more independent voters. "Toto" and the untamable futuresOn an electoral path that shortens with each passing day, promising results that fail to arrive leaves the Government with little margin to straighten its course. In that dynamic, the inevitable effect is the creation of greater uncertainty. The future is always uncertain, but the lack of certainties is aggravated when the source announcing failed futures is the Economy Minister himself. Not a political official who has greater room for maneuver: he can make promises to try to build hope and, when the economy does not respond, take the hit without consequences for the management's economic engine. But when the very person responsible for the economic course is the one who sees his future calculations refuted, uncertainty loses its containment dikes. The problem was already observed months ago by the former IMF negotiator during Mauricio Macri's government, Alejandro Werner. He knows Caputo well. And he knows the Argentine dynamic. The former IMF director for the Western Hemisphere, Alejandro WernerWerner analyzed Luis Caputo's two-headed role, responsible for the economic plan and, at the same time, the Government's political-economic spokesperson, and the risks it entails: "I would feel better with an economic leadership that is more prudent," he argued. "Prudence has to come from the central banker and the Economy Minister, and the politicians should oversell what they do," he explained. "Given my professional history with Argentina, and having shared the frustrations of President Macri's government, I believe that entering an electoral year one has to be more prudent," he said. His warning came just last April, when the streak of prosperity Caputo promised was supposed to begin, and which is slow to arrive. That futurology was not prudent. The problem is this: every promise of economic results that goes unfulfilled is the yardstick against which the Government's success is measured. The same thing happened with Milei and his prediction of a decided drop in inflation starting last August: "it's going to start with 0," but it did not happen. August inflation was 1.7 percent. In the analytical wing of the economic team there is concern about that type of statement. Off-the-record conversations confirm it. They consider them unnecessary and risky: they create expectations that it is never clear will be met. In other words, they put pressure on the economic management. PASO, all or nothingYesterday, the Economy Minister also threw himself fully into the political battle over the PASO. With the same strategy, he jumped onto the political playing field proper and promised electoral victories in 2027. "If people get scared, then they vote for Milei; if the economy grows, they also do. So I really don't see the scenario in which a majority of people vote Kirchnerism," Caputo said in a radio interview with Eduardo Feinman. It is worth returning to those statements: a clear snapshot of the certainties the Government strives to push in weeks of tension. Caputo is no longer only an economic spokesperson but also a political one. It is understandable: to minimize the economic uncertainty that drives the flight to the dollar or agitates the markets, he needs a stable political horizon. The PASO and the memory of Macri's 2019, with an unexpected defeat in the primaries that led to the black Monday of August 12, weighs heavily on the Government: that defeat complicated Macri's governability. Macri ended up defeated by Alberto Fernández and Cristina Kirchner in the first round. Mauricio Macri and Luis Caputo during the meeting of G-20 finance ministers and central bank presidents, in Buenos Aires in July 2018PresidenciaFrom there comes the objective that guides Milei's management today: eliminate the PASO or, at the very least, suspend them for the 2027 presidential election. Kill the PASO at any cost, and the "cost" issue is meant literally: it will involve discretionary transactions to align the will of dialogue-prone governors and less dialogue-prone opponents, and their deputies and senators. The no-PASO-at-any-price objective is doubly challenging. On one hand, because politics smells power, and it also smells when power is somewhat weak: it is not clear that the Government will get the votes to do away with the PASO. If it fails, it will add a political defeat just when it needs successes and signals of strength. With that defeat, it could generate an atmosphere like 2025, when Congress began turning its back. On the other hand, the all-or-nothing focus the Government places on the PASO is in itself a show of weakness. When the power project does not converge with the demands of the people, the remaining option is to go all in on the rules that build power. A solid economic course that the ordinary citizen experiences in their day-to-day life does not need the tinkering with the architecture to win an election. When the rules of the game are politicized in an attempt to guarantee results, it is a sign of concern in a government.Who does the country risk belong to?That PASO-dependent strategy can be seen as a drowning man's grasp. In 2023, Milei's problem was not the PASO, which he won. He left Sergio Massa in second place and Patricia Bullrich in third. Milei's problem was the first round: Massa recovered ground and won with 36.6 percent of the vote. Milei came in second, with 29.9, and Bullrich, with 23.8 percent. Javier Milei last night at the Inter-American Council of Commerce and Production (CICyP)Video captureCaputo's political analysis of the PASO takes into account three arguments. First, a difference between 2015 and 2023. He refers to a memory of Kirchnerist government that was still not so bad when Macri took office versus a terrible memory, with the end of the Fernández administration and Massa's 213 percent inflation, which would still be present among voters. "That is very much present," he asserts. Second, a gradualist Macrist model that did not offer a clear break with Kirchnerist inertia. "The difference with the model was not as clear as it is today," is his conclusion: the voter would vote in favor of sustaining the new model. And third: "Nobody believes anymore that Kirchnerism could be better," he argues. In 2027, even if there are no PASO, Milei's main electoral challenge will once again be the first round. Economically, a lost PASO can generate turbulence. But the 2027 first round is the biggest challenge: the Milei who competes next year will not carry with him the competitive advantage he had in 2023. Today Milei is no longer the outsider without a governing record on his back: in 2027 there will also be a plebiscite on his government, which also carries pending bills. For its part, Kirchnerism is desperate to organize its power, and it is not managing it. Axel Kicillof has not quite made the leap and openly launched his candidacy. The most determined is Massa. A central argument moves him, which also has to do with the 2023 electoral process. In Massa's camp they see an encouraging fact: having won the first round in 2023 and lost the runoff but with 44.5 percent amid galloping inflation. Massa, who strove to present himself as the strongman of Alberto Fernández's government, managed to sustain a competitive electoral base despite the deep crisis he was leaving behind. The partnership with Cristina Kirchner is essential at that point. Axel Kicillof, Cristina Kirchner and Sergio Massa, in the days of the frustrated Frente de TodosThe Government is paradoxical about the Kuka risk: it assigns it no chances, as Caputo argues, but attributes to it responsibility for present and future uncertainty. In reality, electoral political fear is a two-sided coin. The fear of Kirchnerism's return has a flip side: the fear that the Milei-Caputo plan will fail to find a way through and arrive at the first round too compromised to sustain the electoral expectation. The Kuka risk is the flip side of the Milei risk. Nothing is decided yet. The Government should listen to itself and not imagine successful futures ahead of time. It should listen to one of its own, Economy Vice Minister José Luis Daza, who, amid so many failed predictions by Caputo and Milei, keeps the same pinned tweet since he came to power: "Economists are really, really bad at making forecasts. In general they don't pay the costs of being so bad (...). I am one of them."