The next APEC summit, in Shenzhen on November 18 and 19, will be one of President Kast's first major international engagements in Asia. His meeting with Xi will allow an assessment of the prospects for a bilateral relationship that seems to have lost some of its dynamism. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1970, Chile and China have built a beneficial cooperation across governments of different political orientations. China is today our main trading partner and an important source of investment in strategic sectors. However, this trajectory now faces significant challenges. The first concerns Chinese investments in Chile. During the meeting between Xi and Boric, held at the 2024 APEC summit in Lima, the Chinese government expressed its expectation that Chile would guarantee a transparent, open, and non-discriminatory business environment. The statement was not anecdotal. In recent years, various projects by Chinese companies have faced regulatory, administrative, and political obstacles that have damaged Chile's reputation as an economy characterized by legal certainty. The answer does not lie in maintaining a paradigm of economic openness, now obsolete in the face of the new paradigm of economic security adopted by most countries, regardless of their size. In this regard, Chile is advancing in the design of an investment review mechanism for national security reasons, following the experience of OECD economies. An investment screening mechanism, with clear criteria, a regulated procedure, and limited political discretion, would allow the evaluation of sensitive transactions without resorting to informal decisions or arbitrary discrimination. Paradoxically, an instrument usually associated with the restrictions on Chinese investment promoted by the United States could help provide greater legal certainty to Chinese and Asian companies. The second challenge is the excessive concentration of our exports, a real ticking time bomb in a scenario of growing geoeconomic fragmentation. During the first half of 2026, China received 33.9% of Chilean shipments, while copper accounted for 50.1% of our total exports, according to SUBREI data. It goes without saying that this double concentration increases Chile's vulnerability to external pressures. Trade diversification should therefore become a priority of our foreign policy. Japan, South Korea, and the ASEAN economies offer particularly relevant opportunities due to their demand for raw materials. In particular, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Malaysia deserve much more sustained diplomatic attention, given that they are the emerging economies with the greatest growth potential in the short term. This is not about replacing the Chinese market, but about reducing our exposure to possible economic coercion measures that the great powers, the United States and China, have exercised and continue to exercise against middle powers, such as the EU and Canada. APEC constitutes a privileged space for advancing in this direction. Its main merit has been to maintain, since the end of the Cold War, pragmatic cooperation among economies with significant political and strategic rivalries. This capacity for dialogue acquires special value in an international context marked by the weakening of international law and traditional multilateral forums. The Latin American-Pacific vocation of Chilean foreign policy, in order to remain a state policy, will need to be endowed with content and real capabilities. One of the keys to its functioning is the culture of high public service—permanent, specialized, and meritocratic—that characterizes many of the Asian administrations participating in APEC. The continuity of technical teams makes it possible to build relationships of trust and reach agreements that go beyond trade negotiations. In contrast, the frequent rotation of officials and negotiating teams in some Latin American countries hinders the accumulation of experience and long-term relationships. In Shenzhen, the Chilean government should advance on two concrete objectives: offer guarantees of legal certainty to Asian investments and take advantage of APEC to deepen its relations with the emerging economies of Southeast Asia, as well as with Japan and South Korea. Both objectives require institutional continuity and a foreign policy that transcends changes of government. By Juan Enrique Serrano Moreno, Institute of International Studies, University of Chile & ICLAC. NEWSLETTEROpinionSaturday, AMTensions in ideas, opposing views, and clear analysis: elements to reveal the issues that divide opinions and will set the agenda. By signing up, you are accepting the Terms and Conditions and Privacy Policies of La Tercera.