Asia’s better answer to the Nvidia shock

rss · asiatimes 2026-11-16T02:33:23Z en
When a chief executive resigns, the story usually stays on the business pages. Jensen Huang’s departure from Nvidia on November 12 has not. It has unsettled governments and boardrooms from Seoul to Kuala Lumpur. The scandal will run its course in committee rooms and perhaps in court. The more awkward discovery for Asia is how much of its AI future was riding on one man’s goodwill and travel schedule. Look at what was hanging on him. South Korea is now fretting over joint projects with Nvidia valued at about US$510 billion. In Japan, 44 companies, Sony, SoftBank and Honda among them, joined a physical-AI consortium after his visit in July. Malaysia has approved 385.7 billion ringgit, roughly US$95 billion, of data-center investment since 2021, for an industry that runs largely on Nvidia chips. A Korean editorial put the problem plainly: Huang “is, in effect, Nvidia itself.” In Singapore, a newspaper columnist doubted the region would find another Nvidia boss prepared to take its case to Washington. That is an odd thing to say about a company worth close to $4 trillion, whose shares fell as much as 13% on the news. It is odder still as a description of the base on which several countries have built national strategies. Asia’s exposure is physical. Taiwan makes the chips and South Korea the memory. Southeast Asia hosts a growing share of the servers. Japan, China and India are among the biggest markets. Yet the decisions that mattered most –which chips are sold, to whom and on what terms – sat with one American company and, in practice, with its founder. The Megaspeed affair shows where that leads. The Singapore-based firm has reportedly bought more than $4.8 billion of Nvidia chips since June 2024, and US officials suspect it of helping route restricted hardware to China. Nvidia has said its own checks found no diversion. Whoever is right, the first line of export enforcement was the seller, and the seller had every commercial reason to keep selling. Some caution is due. The spying allegations are unproven. Singapore’s home affairs ministry says Alice Huang, the former Megaspeed executive at the center of the story, was never investigated for espionage, and police found too little evidence to prosecute her over server declarations. Beijing calls the claims “groundless speculation.” But policy is not waiting for the facts. In Washington, lawmakers from both parties want to close the gap that lets Chinese firms rent computing power in overseas data centers when they cannot buy the chips. New licensing rules could reportedly reach Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore. Malaysia is weighing a law to monitor how its data centers use high-performance chips. Chinese investors, meanwhile, talk about replacing foreign chips with domestic ones as a matter of survival. Each of these moves makes sense on its own. Added together, they push the industry toward two walled-off systems, and the economies in the middle will pay for the wall. Korean memory makers, Taiwanese foundries and Malaysian data-center hosts all do best in a single market that rewards scale. A split one rewards picking a side. Washington frames the choice as engagement or decoupling. Asia does not have to order from that menu. There is a third option, which I would call verified interdependence: access to advanced computing in exchange for proof of how it is used. In practice, that means a shared registry of where advanced chips are installed, who operates them and who rents time on them, backed by end-use certificates and outside audits. The idea is already in the air. A Singapore analyst has argued that proof of where every chip sits and whom it serves is becoming part of the product. One regional tech site has called for a “know your compute customer” discipline. The need is obvious enough: Singapore disclosed last year that 22% of Nvidia’s chip sales were booked to entities there, while only 1% of the chips reportedly physically arrived. Finance has been here before. Strict know-your-customer and anti-money-laundering rules did not kill Singapore as a banking center. They became part of why money goes there. And after the 1997 crisis, the ASEAN countries, China, Japan and South Korea built a currency-swap safety net and later a surveillance office to watch one another’s books. The region knows how to build dull, useful institutions after a shock. The obvious objection is that neither Washington nor Beijing will accept a registry it does not control. At first, they may not. But the scheme does not need their blessing to start. Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia host the servers, and they are the ones facing new American licensing rules. If they agree on common audit standards and recognize one another’s checks, they can offer Washington something a blanket restriction cannot, which is actual visibility. They would also give Chinese customers who rent capacity lawfully a way to show it. Start in ASEAN, bring in the chip-making economies of Northeast Asia, then take it to APEC. The timing helps. APEC leaders meet in Shenzhen on November 18–19, and Donald Trump and Xi Jinping are expected to talk on the sidelines. Chips will be discussed, whether or not they are on the agenda. Asian governments should put a proposal on the table before the two giants settle the matter between themselves. There is a corporate lesson too, though it is not Asia’s to enforce. One American analyst has asked whether systemically important AI firms should face guardrails like those on the largest banks. Huang had about 60 direct reports and reportedly did not believe in succession planning. Nvidia has only now appointed its first board chair while Huang reportedly weighs a comeback as CEO. Asian governments cannot regulate Nvidia. They can regulate their own exposure to it. A “sovereign AI” plan that depends on one foreign vendor’s roadmap is a dependency with a flag on it. Finance ministries should treat that concentration the way a bank supervisor treats too much lending to a single borrower. Oil, aviation and banking all had their age of personal empires before the rules arrived. AI is getting there the hard way. Asia lost a strong AI advocate in Huang. It should not go looking for another one. The test of what it builds next is whether the system keeps working when the person at the top falls. Y. Tony Yang is an endowed professor at George Washington University in Washington, DC.
Highlight