"Perhaps we will see October 25 of this year as the beginning of the end of the global democratic recession"

Image source, Rod Searcey/Stanford UniversityImage caption, Larry Diamond has spent decades researching democracy around the world and has published several books on the subject. Author, Author's title, BBC News MundoPublication date 23 minutesReading time: 11 min Imagine that democracy advances in the world in waves that arrive at certain moments and recede after a fluctuation in the opposite direction. Now suppose we may be facing one of those historic moments when the current changes direction. That is what Larry Diamond proposes, a renowned American political sociologist at Stanford University who has researched democracy around the planet for decades. Diamond believes that this year, and especially on October 25, events occurred in Latin America and elsewhere that could mark the beginning of the end of the global "democratic recession" of the last two decades. "It is not usual for these things to happen on the same day," Diamond says in an interview with BBC Mundo. According to the expert, there have so far been three democratizing waves in the world. The first began with the revolutions in the United States and France in the 18th century and continued until the 1920s, when communism, fascism and Nazism emerged. The second wave began after World War II and weakened with events such as the military coups of the 1960s in South America. And the third began in 1974, when a military and popular movement overthrew a long dictatorship in Portugal, and lasted until 2006. Skip Most read and continue readingMost readEnd of Most read Diamond warns that it is still too early to state with certainty that the democratic backsliding that began then has ended, or that a new global democratizing wave is emerging. But he points out that there are reasons to think that this is possible. What follows is a summary of the telephone conversation with this senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and at Stanford's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, as well as founding co-editor of the Journal of Democracy, where he recently published an article on this topic: Image source, AFP via Getty Images How does this thing about global "waves of democratization" work? It is a period of world history in which the number of transitions toward a democratic form of government substantially exceeds transitions in the opposite direction. The most intangible aspect is the idea of momentum: a wave is a period in which democracy seems to be the destination. Its values expand, as does global support for and confidence in it. And people's aspirations, values and expectations move away from autocracy. The third wave of democratization is considered to have produced the largest number of democracies in the world. What happened then? According to my writings and analysis, the world entered a democratic recession around 2006. The number of countries that were democracies began to decline. Democracy practically stopped expanding and autocracy began to gain momentum. From 2006 until relatively recently, we saw an increasing pace of democratic backsliding, as in the global south, then in Central and Eastern Europe, and finally in the U.S., democracies were attacked by elected leaders. There were democratic collapses, such as the military coups in West Africa. But the most common has been a gradual strangulation of democratic checks and balances, of democratic civil society and of the rule of law. One experiences a progressive transition from democracy to electoral autocracy, or what has been called a competitive authoritarian regime. That is what happened in Hungary, Turkey, almost happened in Poland, and Trump has tried to do the same in the U.S. twice. I believe the line was crossed into competitive authoritarianism in India and Mexico, and Indonesia has gone a long way in that direction. So, until very recently the net balance has been negative, moving away from democracy. And now we see the real possibility that this pattern is changing. In fact, in your article you argue that October 2026 could be seen in the future as the beginning of the end of that democratic recession. Why? Because it is a date with much significance. On October 25 there were three very striking events. And it is not usual for these things to happen on the same day. In Serbia, the students who had protested with courage against the extreme corruption and growing autocracy of Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić achieved that day an impressive victory in the parliamentary elections with their list, which now has a majority and will form the government. As happened with Viktor Orban in Hungary a few months earlier, the defeat was so overwhelming that Vučić was forced to acknowledge it quickly. That same day, in Brazil it was the runoff of the presidential elections between President Lula da Silva and the right-wing populist Flávio Bolsonaro, son of former president Jair Bolsonaro, who is imprisoned for attempting to bring down democracy. And Lula, who had trailed in the first round, also won by a very clear margin. Image source, Getty ImagesImage caption, Diamond points to President Lula's electoral victory in Brazil as one of the decisive events for democracy on October 25. I think Lula, his party and his movement are complicated when it comes to commitment to fully democratic values and practices. But that meant the defeat of a clearly right-wing authoritarian populist option. And, also that day, the leader of Venezuela's democratic opposition, María Corina Machado, managed to enter the country to mobilize and organize the people for a transition toward democracy. They were three very significant events. Do you include in that possible new trend the recent midterm elections in the U.S.? Yes. Obviously, the reversal of the democratic recession would not be achieved in a single day. I firmly believe that the elections in the U.S., in which Donald Trump received a resounding rebuke for his authoritarianism, corruption and violation of civil liberties and the rule of law, were an additional significant element, both practical and symbolic, of the possible end or reversal of the authoritarian wave in the world. After all, the U.S. remains the most influential democracy in the world. Do you believe the U.S. is still "the indispensable nation" for democratization? That was a term of Madeleine Albright's. I believe the U.S. is indispensable for the future of freedom in the world if you look at its size, its resources and the proportion of total aid it devotes to democracy. One lesson of the last ten years, since Donald Trump burst onto the electoral scene, is that the U.S. must approach the challenge of revitalizing democracy globally and mobilizing allied countries to achieve a responsible world order that affirms the values of freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law with a great deal of humility. The world is tired of hearing that the U.S. is "the indispensable nation," of American hypocrisy, and of not being able to trust that the U.S. will be faithful to its own founding values or act with some respect for the rule of law at the international level. Without a doubt, Europe, Canada and many of our allies in Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and elsewhere have lost a great deal of faith, trust and respect in the U.S. Therefore, we cannot simply return to the global democratic table and say: "Oh, we're sorry, that was just a little bump in the road; now we're back. And remember that the U.S. is the indispensable nation." We will have to somehow regain global trust and rebuild a democratic coalition that does not revolve around U.S. dominance, but is more collaborative and horizontal. It is interesting that two of the three events of October 25 that you point to as crucial occurred in Latin America. Could the region give a boost to democracy in the world? Well, it could if it moved in that direction. I am not optimistic in the short term, with one exception that I will mention later. Let's be honest: what did the government of Lula da Silva do to challenge the corrupt and scandalous decision of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro to announce fictitious results of the elections of July 28, 2024? Brazil could have joined the U.S. in leading an OAS effort to condemn that and demand a transition toward democracy. But the truth is that it did not do much. Image source, AFP via Getty ImagesImage caption, María Corina Machado's return to Venezuela is another of the October 25 events highlighted by Diamond. We need Brazil. Mexico is an authoritarian regime again. Brazil is the only country, apart from the U.S., that could lead a resurgence of democracy in the hemisphere. And I do not think that is Lula's priority, nor the way he views the region. Look at the advances of right-wing leaders like Milei in Argentina, Kast in Chile, Fujimori in Peru or De la Espriella in Colombia, who based his electoral campaign on one of the fiercest autocrats in the region, Nayib Bukele of El Salvador. Which of them is going to lead an effort to revitalize democracy in the Americas, not to say at the global level? The exception is this, and it is a ray of hope: there is a very good possibility that there will be a transition to democracy in Venezuela in the next 18 months, let's say, where parts of the Constitution are rewritten, the judiciary and the electoral tribunal are reformed, and free, fair and inclusive national elections are held —in which María Corina Machado could run— under negotiated rules. If that were to happen, it would have very clear global implications. Why? Because in the last two decades, since the Orange Revolution in Ukraine —and excepting the Revolution of Dignity about a decade later that revived democracy in that country— no authoritarian regime has made a transition to democracy. Bangladesh may be close, but it is not yet a full democracy. So a transition to democracy in Venezuela, after a generation of extremely authoritarian government, could have exciting and stimulating implications for the rest of the world. But we still do not know when or how the next elections will be held in Venezuela, nor what will happen in Brazil with a Congress more inclined to the right and opposed to Lula, nor how far the deep political polarization will go in several American countries, including the U.S. Isn't it too early to think that the antidemocratic trends have been reversed? Everything you have said is correct, except for one thing I would like to point out. Yes, it is too early to affirm that this moment truly represents the end of the global democratic recession or of the wave of backsliding, and the beginning of a new wave of democratic progress in the world. Perhaps we will look back and see this year and that day, October 25, as the beginning of all that. But it is too early to know that right now, just as no one could know on April 25, 1974, that the Carnation Revolution that overthrew a dictatorship in Portugal was going to trigger a global democratic wave. But the exception is that I am very optimistic about the U.S. I believe Trump has been so corrupt, so incompetent, has abused the democratic order and the rule of law so much, has been so incapable of fulfilling his promises to the American people and so hypocritical in presenting himself to the electorate, that I believe his MAGA movement is now entering its death throes. Image source, AFP via Getty ImagesImage caption, Diamond argues that the MAGA movement led by Trump "is entering its death throes" after the midterm elections in the U.S. This will take some time to resolve. But I do not believe we will see another MAGA president in the U.S. And I believe that, despite his new attempts to concentrate and abuse power, he will fail and in 2028 there will be a shift toward a much more reformist president committed to democracy in the U.S. Why do you say that Mexico has returned to an autocratic regime, when many Mexicans would think the opposite and support President Claudia Sheinbaum? First I would say that many Mexicans think like I do: that the country has ceased to be an authentic democracy. The test for determining whether a country is a democracy does not lie in whether the president has popular support. Following that logic, El Salvador would be a very democratic country right now, because Bukele is a very popular leader. But he is also an extremely authoritarian leader. So popularity alone is not an indicator of democracy. Let's look at what has happened under the mandate of the now hegemonic ruling party Morena: the rule of law has been eclipsed, the space for genuine political opposition has been reduced, and control of the judiciary has been taken through the pseudo-democratic mechanism of electing the country's judges. The Supreme Court and the Electoral Tribunal are no longer independent. Morena, as the ruling party, has developed that kind of hegemonic mentality of control of independent institutions and the state bureaucracy that the PRI had before the transition to democracy. If it looks like an autocracy and acts like an autocracy, it must be called an autocracy, even if it still retains some electoral and pluralistic elements. This year we saw historic —or at least decades-long— records in electoral turnout in the runoffs in Brazil and Colombia, in the midterm elections in the U.S. or in the elections in Serbia. Could this also be seen as part of a global resurgence of democracy? It is a complicated question. In the years before the Nazis came to power in Germany in 1933, there was also very high electoral turnout. In circumstances of extreme political polarization, when there is a lot at stake and it seems existential for the country, turnout increases. Now, if it increases in defense of democracy, that is very positive. Image source, AFP via Getty ImagesImage caption, The victory of the Student List in the Serbian elections is seen by Diamond as another significant event of October 25 for democracy. I believe that was an important factor in what happened in Hungary, Serbia, the U.S. and Brazil: there was a big increase in turnout. Much of that came from people who wanted to defend democracy and return to normality and the rule of law, as well as also seeking economic improvements and reforms. But increased turnout by itself can also be a sign of serious polarization, a double-edged sword. In principle, we certainly want higher electoral turnout, but one must be careful about how it is interpreted. How important are the upcoming elections in various European countries, such as Spain, France, Italy and Poland, for the future of global democracy? They are very, very important. And I believe the most important of all will be those in France, a very influential country in the European Union and in the French-speaking countries of the world. If a right-wing illiberal populist like Marine Le Pen, who has been so explicitly anti-immigrant and so sympathetic to Putin, were to come to power in France, that would challenge the momentum of global democracy, democratic norms, stability and the democratic commitment of the European Union. But we have to see how they would govern. We were very worried about Giorgia Meloni before she became Italian prime minister, so this could similarly imply regarding Ukraine, confronting Putin and European unity. And she has not done so badly. She has not been the disaster some predicted; she was very positive in supporting Ukraine. Marine Le Pen is not that, but we have to wait and see the results, how they govern when they come to power, what kind of coalition they form. The challenge of the populist right in Europe still has a lot of momentum. And there is still a great deal of discontent over the failure of the democratic political class —the center parties, both left and right— to respond to the needs of those who are struggling. So this story is not over. Download the new BBC World Service app. Choose BBC News Mundo and receive news alerts, documentaries and analysis, all in one place. Important: the new app is not available in the United Kingdom or the United States.