The battle for the PASO: the electoral chess match that will define the future of Milei and Bullrich

Patricia Bullrich and Javier Milei Politics has its paradoxes. A government that came to power promising to end the privileges of the traditional political establishment now needs to negotiate with much of that very establishment to change the rules by which the next president will be elected. It is a complex problem for Milei and for his sister, since —in this case— the concept of "traditional political establishment" does not refer only to provincial governors, deputies and senators, but also includes his most powerful political ally —Patricia Bullrich— whose résumé shows nearly 50 years of uninterrupted political craft. Martín Menem's latest statements have once again placed the PASO primaries at the center of the political agenda. In a clear message to the leader of the officialist bloc in the Senate, the president of the Chamber of Deputies called for moving forward with consideration of the initiative in the upper chamber and stated that the Government aims to secure a legislative definition within the next two weeks. "I believe we will be able to suspend the PASO, God willing. I don't think Argentina needs them," he said. This is the same Martín Menem who, barely two weeks earlier —on October 30— during a talk organized by the Fundación Universitaria del Río de la Plata (FURP), stated that "the only candidate of La Libertad Avanza is Javier Milei" and that there is no room for an internal party contest. He maintained that the president's leadership is "unique and unrepeatable" and that there is unanimity in the party on this matter. Menem is pressuring the Senate, relying on an economic argument: "There is no sense in taxpayers paying for the parties' internal primaries." But behind that economic argument lies a far more important discussion. The elimination of the PASO is not merely an administrative reform or a way to save public resources. It is a decision that could profoundly reshape the 2027 electoral landscape. And there lies Javier Milei's true political objective. Martín Menem and Patricia Bullrich The President has a concrete incentive for peronism to arrive at the next presidential elections without an institutional tool that would allow it to order its internal differences. The PASO, with all their limitations, were a mechanism for resolving disputes among different sectors of a coalition, measuring leaderships, and building a common candidacy. Eliminating that possibility means removing from the opposition an electoral negotiation stage that could prove decisive. Peronism is going through a political fragmentation that cannot be resolved merely by the will of its leaders. Sectors linked to Kirchnerism, Massism, Kicillofism, governors seeking to build their own alternative, leaders of federal peronism, and figures attempting to recover a broader and more competitive identity all coexist. The question is what would happen if all those sectors had to reach an agreement before the general election, without an open primary to settle their differences. The elimination of the PASO could favor precisely that scenario: peronism failing to build a unified candidacy and ending up presenting two or more electoral offers. For Milei, the fragmentation of his main adversary could be an extraordinary advantage. He does not necessarily need all the opposition sectors to disappear; it may be enough that they fail to reach agreement. In a presidential election, the dispersion of the opposition vote can substantially alter the outcome. That is why the discussion over the PASO has a strategic dimension that far exceeds the cost of organizing an election. But there is a second dimension to this discussion that explains much of the tension within the ruling coalition. Patricia Bullrich would also have political reasons for the PASO to continue. There is one fact that deserves special attention: while the leaders who answer politically to Bullrich —among them deputies, senators, and figures of her space— affirm that the senator agrees with suspending or eliminating the primaries, she has left some room for doubt. She has maintained that, if the PASO were abolished, an alternative electoral system should be discussed so that parties can resolve the selection of candidates transparently, without centralized or hand-picked appointments. That difference between what her spokespeople convey and what she chooses to communicate is no minor detail. Bullrich appeared alongside the legislators who answer to her politically The situation is striking. If Bullrich agrees with the elimination or suspension of the PASO, as those who represent her politically claim, why does the leadership of the ruling coalition need to pressure her publicly to speed up its consideration? The answer may lie in the political incentives each of the protagonists has. Bullrich has an objective of her own: to preserve the possibility of contesting the leadership of La Libertad Avanza if Milei arrives weakened at the 2027 election. Her bet does not necessarily consist of breaking with the President or building a candidacy outside the space. On the contrary, it may be far more convenient for her to apply pressure from within, preserve her political identity, and present herself as a superior alternative if the libertarian project loses strength. In that scenario, the PASO offer her a fundamental tool. The senator could compete in an internal primary against Milei without leaving La Libertad Avanza or being placed in the position of someone who breaks with the Government. And there is a fact that particularly reinforces this possibility: Patricia Bullrich formally joined La Libertad Avanza on May 6, 2025, after leaving the PRO. That decision was much more than a gesture of support for the President. It was also a political decision that allowed her to consolidate her organic membership in the libertarian space. Patricia Bullrich joined La Libertad Avanza at an event with Karina Milei This is no minor detail. Bullrich decided to become part of the party from within. In doing so, she built her own political position within the party structure and can project a potential internal contest without having to ask the party leadership (Karina Milei) for authorization, and it also exempts her from the risk of having to present herself as an outside leader seeking to compete against the ruling coalition. For Bullrich, the difference between competing inside or outside the space is enormous. If she decided to take on Milei outside of a PASO, she would run a considerable political risk. The portion of the electorate that supports the change of economic and political model could interpret it as a rupture or a betrayal of the project that both helped build. But there is something even more important. Let us imagine a scenario in which Bullrich decides to compete outside La Libertad Avanza. The center, center-right, and right-wing votes that might back Milei would be split between two candidacies. That fragmentation would weaken the ruling coalition's electoral offer and could end up favoring an opposition (peronist) candidate in the general election. Bullrich knows she would have enormous difficulty explaining that outcome. A significant part of the electorate could hold her responsible for dividing the votes the ruling coalition needed to win and for contributing, even unintentionally, to a possible return of peronism to power. It is a political cost she would hardly be willing to bear. If, instead, the PASO continue, she would have a legitimate tool to compete against Milei or against any other libertarian candidate without breaking the political alliance or being exposed to that accusation. She could contest, win, or lose. If she wins, she becomes the space's candidate. If she loses, she can support the winner and preserve her political membership. That is why the primaries can be, for Bullrich, much more than an electoral mechanism: they can represent the possibility of building an alternative for power within the ruling coalition itself. And there appears a strategic point for Milei. The President may find in the elimination of the PASO an advantage against peronism, but at the same time he would be closing off a tool that one of his main figures might need to contest his own leadership. The discussion becomes even more complex when a third institutional actor appears: the National Electoral Chamber. On September 8, the Chamber issued Extraordinary Resolution 155, in which it warned about the need to define, with sufficient anticipation, the rules that will govern the 2027 national elections. (Roberto Almeida) The electoral judges were clear about the risks of modifying the rules during a single electoral process. They recalled that altering the stability of the legal order can "produce more harm than good," and they cited international recommendations establishing that reforms should be introduced between six and three months before the formal start of the electoral process. They even incorporated the criterion of the Venice Commission, which recommends that the fundamental elements of electoral law not be modified less than a year before an election. The operative part of the resolution is especially important. The Chamber decided to communicate to the National Congress the desirability that any reform of the electoral regime, of political parties, or of campaign financing observe those international standards of anticipation, in order to guarantee the predictability and integrity of the electoral process. It also made its pronouncement known to the Deputy Chief of Cabinet of the Interior and to the National Electoral Directorate. The Chamber did not take a position on the desirability of eliminating or suspending the PASO. In fact, it expressly clarified that it was not making any value judgment on the content of the legislative bills. But it left behind a very important institutional warning: the rules of the 2027 election cannot be defined at the last minute. The Electoral Justice needs time to organize the elections. The parties need to know under what rules they will compete. And citizens have the right to know in advance what the conditions of the election will be. In other words, the debate can no longer remain trapped exclusively in the political needs of Milei, Bullrich, or the governors. There is an institutional demand for predictability that the Government and Congress must address. And in that scenario the parliamentary problem appears. The Senate has 72 members. La Libertad Avanza has 21 senators and needs 37 affirmative votes to reach an absolute majority of its total membership. That is, it needs to obtain another 16 votes from outside its own bloc. The negotiation depends on Bullrich, who leads the officialist bloc and bears the responsibility of building the necessary agreements with other spaces and with the governors. There lies one of the main challenges for the Casa Rosada: transforming a political predisposition on the part of some provincial governors into concrete votes on the floor. Bullrich in the Senate The convening of the Constitutional Affairs Committee for Tuesday, November 17 constitutes a first institutional step. But securing a committee report does not equal guaranteeing approval in the Senate. The Government needs the governors. It needs the provincial senators. It needs agreements with leaders who have their own interests and who do not necessarily share the entire electoral strategy of the Casa Rosada. Martín Menem's public pressure on Bullrich, then, has two readings. On the one hand, it expresses the Government's urgency to advance a reform it considers strategic for its electoral prospects. On the other, it exposes a political tension that the ruling coalition has still not managed to resolve: the President needs his bloc leader to secure the votes to change the electoral rules, but those very rules could become the tool she needs to contest her political future within the space. The PASO have ceased to be a discussion about the electoral calendar or public spending. They have become a dispute over the political architecture of 2027. Milei wants to arrive at that election with a fragmented peronism and without a tool that facilitates its reunification. Bullrich, meanwhile, has incentives to preserve a mechanism that could allow her to contest the libertarian leadership without leaving the space or bearing the cost of a rupture. There is, then, a paradox running through this entire discussion: Milei wants to take away from peronism a tool for ordering its internal affairs, while Patricia Bullrich may need exactly that same tool to contest power within La Libertad Avanza without breaking with the President. The PASO are, thus, much more than an electoral law. They are a central piece of Milei's strategy for 2027, an opportunity for the governors to negotiate with the Casa Rosada and, for Bullrich, possibly the only path to compete for the libertarian leadership without being exposed as the one responsible for a possible defeat of the political project she is part of today.