Urban warfare in unfamiliar territory: the challenges facing the Salvadoran contingent against Haitian militias

A Salvadoran soldier in an armored vehicle in Tabarre, a neighborhood of Port-au-Prince, Haiti, on October 30, 2026. (AP photo/Odelyn Joseph) El Salvador's president, Nayib Bukele, sent more than 2,000 troops to Haiti after the disappearance of four Salvadorans in an ambush that took place on October 18, during an operation against armed groups that dominate large areas of Port-au-Prince and its surroundings. The contingent faces the challenge of operating in an unfamiliar territory, with a still-uncertain chain of command, and against criminal organizations capable of sustaining urban combat. Romain Le Cour Grandmaison, director of the Haiti Observatory at the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, explained to BBC Mundo that the Salvadoran deployment is not equivalent to the scheme applied by Bukele within his own country, and spoke about the difference between the gangs of El Salvador and those of Haiti. The Salvadoran model was based on mass incarcerations, whereas in Haiti a military operation is being carried out on foreign territory. The Haitian organizations share with Mara Salvatrucha and Barrio 18 territorial control, extortion, and violence against civilians, but their structure and resources are different. The country's most powerful groups, about 20, function as armed militias that administer extensive zones, collect informal taxes, and regulate traffic along roads and port infrastructure, the director told BBC Mundo. These groups control nearly 90% of Port-au-Prince, according to the United Nations, in addition to provincial areas where public forces have not entered for five years. Their growth was linked to political, economic, and security actors who turned to them to defend particular interests. Mara Salvatrucha and Barrio 18 emerged in Los Angeles and arrived in El Salvador through the deportations that followed the civil war of the 1990s. In Haiti, by contrast, several gangs were born or strengthened through direct ties with local power sectors. Romain Le Cour Grandmaison, director of the Haiti Observatory at the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, explained that the model applied by Bukele in his country was one of mass incarcerations, not military operations on foreign territory. (Image taken from BBC Mundo) Estimates place their total number between 15,000 and 20,000 members, although the figure changes according to alliances and ruptures among the various organizations. In five years, they went from light weapons and hunting rifles to 5.56-millimeter semiautomatic rifles and, increasingly often, 7.62-millimeter ones. Part of the weaponry arrives from the United States through purchases following illegal trafficking into Haiti. Another portion comes from the diversion of arsenals of the Haitian National Police, the Haitian Armed Forces, and security forces of the Dominican Republic, with corruption networks active on both sides of the border. The gangs' advantage over a formal military force lies in their knowledge of the terrain. They have built trenches, barricades, walls, and traps, and can withdraw into areas controlled by allies before returning when the pressure eases. Le Cour Grandmaison compared that capability to urban guerrilla warfare, a form of combat that is especially complex in densely populated neighborhoods where the civilian population is trapped. The groups' capacity to withstand prolonged pressure remains untested, because they have almost never faced intense, coordinated operations sustained over several weeks. The ambush against the Salvadorans occurred in Santo, within Croix-des-Bouquets, an area controlled by Chen Mechan with the participation of 400 Mawozo. Both rank among the country's most influential groups, although 400 Mawozo has consolidated a particularly wide territorial expansion in recent years. Grandmaison also spoke about its leader, Wilson Joseph, known as Lanmò San Jou, who extended his influence from the outskirts of Port-au-Prince to the access points and the road axis toward the Dominican Republic. That position allows the organization to collect extortion from those traveling along the route and to operate as an intermediary in arms trafficking, both to supply itself and to sell equipment to other gangs. A child watches armored vehicles of the Army of El Salvador operating separately from the Gang Suppression Force (GSF), authorized by the UN, following the deployment of additional troops after an ambush on October 18 in which four Salvadoran members of the GSF disappeared, in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, on November 3, 2026. REUTERS/Patrice Noel Haiti has a fragmented structure of armed actors: the Haitian National Police, the Armed Forces of Haiti, the Gang Suppression Force, a special force with private contractors from Vectus Global, and the Salvadoran contingent. Parapublic organizations and self-defense groups in urban neighborhoods and rural areas are also involved. Coordination among these forces is limited. Each operates with its own mandate, chain of command, and rules of engagement, without joint planning that defines shared objectives or establishes how to hold recovered territories. Grandmaison also said that the main obstacle for the Salvadoran military is their unfamiliarity with the local context. They do not speak Haitian Creole, they lack their own intelligence networks, and they will have to distinguish combatants from civilians in areas where the gangs know every street, alliance, and rivalry. The Viv Ansanm coalition, whose name means "Living together" in Haitian Creole, was announced in February 2024 as a non-aggression pact among rival groups. Each group kept its territory, its income, and its autonomy, but could move through allied areas, share information, and coordinate offensives, Grandmaison told BBC Mundo. That alliance has fragmented over the last six or seven months, with clashes among gangs and leaders announcing their departure. The pressure of the operations may deepen those divisions or, on the contrary, reunite the organizations in the face of a common enemy. According to the expert Le Cour Grandmaison, that gesture by Haiti's most influential criminal boss reveals that the pressure of the military operations is affecting him, but it is also an attempt to reduce his exposure. (Photo EFE/Jonet St. Élois) Lanmò San Jou recently wrote to the secretary general of the United Nations to request dialogue and mediation, while attributing the attack to Chen Mechan. For Le Cour Grandmaison, that gesture reveals that the pressure is affecting the criminal bosses, but it also represents an attempt to reduce their exposure and seek political recognition. Dialogue with gang leaders should not imply impunity or amnesty, the expert argued. Contacts exist on a daily basis to resolve logistical matters, but a solution would require justice, leadership by the Haitian authorities, and mechanisms for those who want to leave the groups, including recruited children. The National Commission for Disarmament, Dismantling, and Reintegration exists, although there is no mechanism installed in the neighborhoods where thousands of soldiers are exerting pressure on criminal strongholds. The lack of a demobilization strategy could leave civilians exposed to lynchings, revenge, and accusations of collaboration with the gangs when the neighborhoods are partially reopened. If the deployment achieves results that the Haitian government itself considers positive, it could be presented as a regional model. However, the experience of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti showed that territorial recoveries did not prevent the return of the crisis when there was no justice or action against the political and economic networks that sustain the armed groups.