La risky gamble of La Moneda with its communication design

It became evident early on that President José Antonio Kast's government had serious communication problems, which of course were not only the result of the mistake of initially appointing as spokesperson someone who lacked the experience for the role — incurring successive missteps that diminished the weight and credibility of La Moneda — but also the product of a design that the President himself has allowed, whereby ministers are permitted to manage their own communication agendas that may even contradict one another or the guidelines set at the central level, which clearly translates into disorder and the absence of a clear narrative. The cabinet reshuffle that took place in May was in part an attempt to remedy these difficulties, for which a design was forged based on empowering Interior Minister Claudio Alvarado, so that in addition to his duties as chief of staff he would also assume the leadership of the Secretaría General de Gobierno (Segegob) and with it the spokesperson role, while keeping the undersecretariat of that ministry in place. With this move the President sought not only to advance the line of consolidating ministries — with a view toward a policy of state rationalization — but also proceeded from the premise that the spokesperson role would be strengthened by being held by Alvarado, further reducing the risk of communication errors. The new design, however, was not long in foundering, for it became evident that the infrequent appearances of the Interior Minister as spokesperson — most of his time has had to be devoted to negotiating reforms in Congress — created an evident communication vacuum, and Alvarado himself saw his authority weakened when it went so far that a group of ministers did not inform him that they would turn to the Constitutional Court to challenge a provision that the opposition had included in the Reconstruction bill, which was an embarrassment. Under this design, the risks of exposing the chief of staff to the vicissitudes of political communication were not calculated, nor the limitations he faced in going out to directly confront the opposition — one of the most relevant roles a spokesperson must perform — since in parallel he must negotiate with that very sector. President Kast has decided to launch a third communication design this week, appointing former UDI deputy Gonzalo Arenas — very close to Alvarado and to Kast himself — as undersecretary of the Segegob, to serve as the new government spokesperson. Naturally, the first thing that stands out is that this position will be held by someone who does not have the rank of minister — something unprecedented since that office was elevated to ministerial rank in the mid-1970s — beyond the fact that Arenas has probably been told that in practice he would enjoy ministerial status. While it is still too early to evaluate his skills as spokesperson — his debut, in any case, was particularly complicated, given the delicate position in which the Justice Minister and the government itself have been placed as a result of the sentence reductions granted to offenders convicted of abuse or rape of minors — it is easy to anticipate that this new design contains a series of weaknesses that risk prolonging the communication problems, damaging La Moneda. First of all, it is hard to understand the President's decision to insist that the spokesperson not be a cabinet minister, which means the position starts out automatically weakened. Beyond the fact that Arenas has an entire career in politics, the fact that hierarchically he holds the rank of undersecretary places him in a position of power inferior to that of any minister. Given the drive toward excessive self-promotion of some secretaries of state, if it was already difficult for Minister Alvarado to keep them in check, it is even less feasible for an undersecretary, exposing him to the possibility that if for some circumstance he finds himself needing to overrule a minister, the latter can easily disregard him. His incorporation into the political committee, which will give him access to the heart of the decisions made at La Moneda — and which, according to reports, was one of his conditions for accepting this appointment — is likewise no guarantee that he will be able to impose a communication line, not to mention how anomalous it is that this body — attended by only a handful of secretaries of state — should include an official who does not hold the rank of minister. Nor is it clear whether the spokesperson's lack of ministerial status could affect the dealings that the Segegob must carry out with Congress, particularly on bills such as the modernization of TVN and other matters under its purview, which will probably require that Alvarado remain in charge, making delegation difficult. The appointment of Arenas may remedy the deficit of having an inexperienced spokesperson and ease the burden on the dual-role Minister Alvarado, but the new design has overlooked the unwritten rule that government spokespersons with true authority are those who hold real power, and while being a minister is no guarantee that such leadership can be exercised — as has been demonstrated by the problems Alvarado has had disciplining his own ranks — the basic requirement is that whoever holds this role have at least the powers of a cabinet minister, that is, be a peer within the cabinet. In light of the enormous difficulties the government has had in finding a communication tone and improving political coordination, what would have been expected is a design aimed at strengthening the role of the Segegob and trying to correct the problems detected, but the President's stubbornness in doing without a minister — which, moreover, only saves one position, since the rest of that ministry's structure remains in place, so it is not a real saving — has once again led him into a high-risk gamble for his government.