The crisis of collective purposes

The world today finds itself in a long phase of profound accelerated transformation, shaped by a series of structural factors that suggest the second quarter of the century will be very different from the first. The main vectors of this metamorphosis are the frenetic evolution of technology, with AI as its symbol; the effects of climate change; the abrupt demographic shift, with lower birth rates and greater longevity; the collapse of the old rules-based international order and the predominance of autocratic leaderships; and the reshaping of global capitalism, more concentrated and less Westernized. Humanity is being redefined by the tensions arising from a chaotic interweaving of economic, political, social, and technological factors. In this context, Argentina is also going through its own stage of reconfiguration, which stems from global phenomena but has its own components. Javier Milei broke the political board that had been taking shape around two coalitions, and that system has not yet been rebuilt. It wanders between a return to a new polarization, the slow emergence of new figures, or fragmentation. The irresolution of this dilemma is a gain for the Government, which is going through difficult months without anyone managing to capitalize on that vacancy. President Javier Milei during the campaign tour in CórdobaLLAThe arrival of libertarian power also brought an abrupt replacement of the economic logic, which shifted from a decadent statism to an unrestricted free-market approach. The effects on the new productive matrix are what keep all indicators under strain today, with sectors linked to global chains very dynamic (the RIGI-beneficiaries), and others more dependent on the domestic market in declining trend (the depressed industrialists). On the economic front, unlike what happens in the political arena, irresolution is a disadvantage for the Government. That is why it suffers through this long valley with the entrenched feeling that the economy is not performing according to expectations. The debate within the political table about whether or not to accelerate the political agreement that Luis Caputo demands reflects this. Arrival of the ministers at the Casa Rosada. Luis CaputoFabián MarelliBut beneath these visible movements, a series of social transformations has been taking place, which began in past decades but took on a new dimension after the pandemic. Broadly speaking, the three historical trends show that Argentina has tended to become structurally poorer, older, and more urban. A redefinition of the country's social composition has been incubating, exhibiting traits different from those of decades ago, when the institutions and organizations that emerged as organizers of community life were configured. In other words, the gap is becoming increasingly palpable between an institutional architecture conceived for twentieth-century logics and the mutations redesigning a society in twenty-first-century mode. This mismatch generates natural tensions because there is a pronounced crisis of representation at every level. In part, this deficit was exploited by the original Milei to plant his flag against the political and economic system. But his role as a catalyst of that disenchantment shows limitations. For example, the sector most dissatisfied with the Government is the middle class, because it is the one that suffered the greatest burden from the elimination of subsidies and the increases in services and rates, private health insurance, schools; it is the one that lost savings capacity and went into debt in larger amounts. It is the one that cut back its expectations the most. The middle class is the one that feels its expectations most deferredHernan Zenteno - LA NACIONThat middle class is the main victim of the socioeconomic transformation of recent decades, having gone from being a symbol of upward mobility and a characteristic trait of Argentina compared to other countries in the region, to suffering a marked narrowing in numbers and capacities, giving way to the new class that defines social dynamics: the lower-middle class. If Argentina in the second half of the twentieth century was defined by its middle class, it is now defined by its lower-middle class. In the latest measurement by Management & Fit, the middle class gave the worst assessment of the situation, even harsher than the lower class. For example, when asked "how do you evaluate the country's economic situation?", 42.1% of middle sectors rated it as "very bad" compared to 31.6% of the lowest sectors. It is not that they are worse off than the poorest; they feel worse. A similar process seems to be occurring with older adults. While young people are the protagonists of the era, adults are progressively becoming more numerous. And in that shift there is also a mismatch, because the expectation of improvement is lower and the perception of new frustration increases. A recent survey by the consultancy Mide reflects a much higher disenchantment among those over 46, compared to younger age groups. For example, between 64% and 68% of that segment believes the country is heading in the wrong direction (compared to 45% among the under-25s and 51% among the under-35s); and between 60% and 61% believe Argentina "is in a deep crisis" (compared to 34% of the under-25s and 47% of the under-35s). According to Gonzalo de Janin, who led the study, "there are different explanations for this mature disenchantment. Those over 60 are affected by the cut in pensions. And those below that line are the most affected by the rise in rents, building fees, school costs, private health insurance. They are also the most critical of Milei's manner." At bottom, it is a broad sector that does not quite feel itself to be part of the libertarian project, which has more messages for young people than for adults. This imbalance is also seen in relation to the extreme urbanization of the population, which makes Argentina one of the countries in the world with the highest proportion of people living in cities, with around 90% of the total population. That process of generational accumulation over decades now faces productive stress, because the economic model promoted by the Government tends to favor the Andean, Patagonian, and Pampas regions, through the expansion of mining, hydrocarbons, and agriculture. But the belts of the great cities, dedicated to industries and some kind of services, emerge with far less projection. Nor did the previous economic model work, because it was extremely AMBA-centric and uncompetitive, but it was endured by a more invisible interior and an economy that required anabolic steroids that distorted the macro. Looks toward the future - MoiguerIn a recent study, the consultancy Moiguer portrayed these contrasts by asking about expectations for the country over the next twelve months. In the Patagonian axis, 45% said they had favorable expectations; in the Andean axis, 41%; and in the Pampas axis, 38%. However, in the AMBA that same response reached only 29%, the lowest nationwide. It is a projection of how each region sees itself in the near future. In the greater Buenos Aires suburbs, the horizon does not light up a dawn. Liquid identitiesThese indicators allow us to observe a triple mismatch for socioeconomic, age-related, and geographic reasons. Long-standing transformations that reshape the face of Argentina and that are once again in a state of stress. Not because what came before provided answers, but because constant mutations keep redefining them. But beneath these movements, another process is consolidating, far more subtle but profound, which also impacts the way politics is understood: the growing social tendency toward individualization and disaffiliation. The displacement of collective representations and the retreat into community identities; where the State, political parties, and organizations symbolize nothing more than an inexpressive bureaucracy, while a streamer, a Thai cooking influencer, or a pet owners' group can provoke far firmer allegiances. We have moved from an era of ideological adherence to one of personal identification. Luis Alberto Quevedo and Ignacio RamírezIn the book just published by sociologists Ignacio Ramírez and Luis Alberto Quevedo, titled "The Great Transformation of Argentine Political Culture," they devote a chapter to the subject and analyze its impact in that sphere. There they write that "collective life lost part of its democratic thickness" in Argentina, that "in the post-pandemic period it shows a disintegrating tendency: a sustained erosion of social capital, visible in the increase of distrust, the fragmentation of community networks, and the weakening of the sense of collective belonging." It is clearly a global phenomenon, but in our country it found a predominant channel in the libertarian project. That is why the authors themselves emphasize that "Javier Milei's victory, beyond its most disruptive aspects, cannot be read as an anomaly, but rather as a 'normal' emergent of this social implosion. Milei does not call for organization nor promise a shared horizon; he does not address a people, but the solitary subject, the precarious individual who has lost faith in others. He offers no community, but revenge." This process of individualization is the heir of the failure of the last project based on the ideas of the present State and social justice, and its definitive collapse with the pandemic. Its significance is very deep, because it marks a break in the collective project, and entry into a phase of self-preservation. That is what Milei represents, and hence the resonance he achieved with that spineless society, connected through social networks. At the same time, it is a philosophical challenge for classic Peronism, builder of the community paradigm, owner of the street as a space of popular expression. There is a dislocated formula there. Máximo Kirchner, Sergio Massa and Axel KicillofTelamOutside the hard-line militancy, Milei's voters bet on an instrumental relationship: he is the one who removes the obstacles to personal fulfillment. No deeper political bond appears, not even a shared "we." He is the one who comes to break the chains so that each person can develop their own path based on their merits. That is why social tolerance of Milei's austerity has for a long time been a measure of how far people had invested their expectation and effort in his promise of redemption. That kind of bond matches the idea of disaffiliation, the crisis of bonds that repels processes of very deep identification. As Gala Díaz Langou, Director of the International Panel on Social Progress, explains: "Disaffiliation is an identity crisis deeper than lack of trust, which is something more transactional. It speaks of a more ontological sense of belonging. And today the three basic institutions of socialization are in crisis: the family, the school, and work, but also organizations in general. In the political sphere it is even clearer, starting with the drop in electoral participation." A datum to watch is the rate of AI queries about political matters. It is likely that in a climate of identity disaffection, many will end up directly asking Artificial Intelligence whom to vote for. A technification of the democratic process that entails a dose of ideological depersonalization. It will be interesting to discern who will be prompting those searches. The economist Alberto AdesMAURO ALFIERIThe economist Alberto Ades, in addition to stirring up a flurry of rumors with his meeting with Milei and his presentation to the cabinet with observations on the program, is presenting a book called "What Fades Away." Among other changes of era, he revisits the philosopher Zygmunt Bauman to speak of "liquid identities." He posits there that what matters is that identities have ceased to be static and moved into a dynamic phase, and that "what is lost, in any case, is not the identities themselves, but their claim to immutability." In short, the liquefaction of belongings goes hand in hand with a metamorphosis of identities. Very complex. This is the society to which politics will have to speak ahead of the elections. Milei found in 2023 a discourse through which he tuned into the frequency of those transformations. Today he is in a friction zone with a reality that is also slipping away from him. He no longer represents the same thing, and people have also followed their own changes. Hence the mismatches. But far more troubling is the picture for all those who challenge him, from potential Peronist candidates to apprentice outsiders. They intuit that they do not connect with the disenchanted, but they fail to interpret their demands. There is an elusive empathy that stems from thinking about a society that has already transformed, that distrusts intermediaries, and that is reluctant to think of itself again as part of a collective purpose.