How Far Can Russia Probe NATO’s Collective Defense?

For many in Latvia, the Baltic nation of just over 1.8 million people, the dangers of Russia’s war in Ukraine are increasingly real. In the sky, the country has had to cope with Ukrainian drones pushed off course by Russian electronic warfare. After two such drones struck Latvia in May, the country’s prime minister resigned. In June, Ukraine agreed to send anti-drone specialists to Latvia to help with drone defense, but in the meantime, Latvia must rely on rushing jets into the sky to shoot the errant drones down. Russia, meanwhile, is showing a rising appetite for sabotage targeting Ukraine’s backers—a risk for Latvia, which along with other Baltic nations has been a strong supporter of Kyiv. Although Moscow has yet to take any action openly, Russia has been linked to a failed drone attack at Germany’s Leipzig airport and arson in Estonia, both in August. In September, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk warned that Russia intended to strike NATO member nations with drones or missiles in a provocative attack aimed at testing the alliance’s commitment to mutual defense. Latvian President Edgars Rinkevics knows the risks better than most—thanks to both his current role and his long tenure as foreign minister from 2011 to 2023. In an interview with Foreign Policy on Sept. 18, Rinkevics assessed Latvia’s level of support for Ukraine despite drone incursions, the risk of calling for allied support under NATO’s collective defense clause, and what role Europe should play in negotiating with Russia over Ukraine. This interview has been edited for clarity and length. Foreign Policy: Latvia is working with Kyiv on bringing in Ukrainian drone specialists to deal with Russian drones and also Ukrainian drones that may accidentally fly through your territory. Do you feel as if that program is successful? Edgars Rinkevics: It’s still very early. But if we look at the number of drones [in Poland and the Baltics], we have seen that the only efficient way to shoot them down was with planes, which use rather expensive missiles. Ukrainians are better because their systems are based also on anti-drone warfighting. We signed an agreement with Ukraine in June. We are working on technical issues and also establishing command and control systems, and I do hope that we will see some results rather soon. FP: Is this something you think other border European countries could use as well? ER: Yes, we should learn from Ukraine. We see that no country in the world—including Ukraine and Russia, by the way—no country is able to fight drones 100 percent. They can establish the best drone defense, but unfortunately, technologies are getting better and better. FP: What is your sense of the public appetite to continue supporting Ukraine, given these drone incursions into Latvian airspace? ER: If we compare those first alerts in the spring, the situation has changed. I’ve been spending a lot of time in the eastern part of Latvia because the most eastern part of Latvia is affected. At the beginning, people were angry at some level. They were angry that we were not able to shoot down some drones. They were angry that in the morning, you just get an alert that something is flying. Now, the situation has changed thanks to the allies, and we have adapted some of our systems. Does it affect the general support for Ukraine? No. I think, of course, that after four and a half years, people to some extent are used to the war. There is still a lot of support ongoing. NGOs are very active. They are able to collect money and other things to support Ukraine. But of course, you have four and a half years [of war], and you also have high energy prices, and you have other issues, and then you also have this need that we have enshrined in the law to spend 5 percent on defense. People still want Ukraine to win, but they also see the war as an ongoing effort. Then you also sometimes have those splashes of emotion when something happens, like a particularly brutal bombing by Russia, and then people get angry. And then other things happen, and people again turn attention [away]. But Ukraine is always in the news every day. FP: What concerns do you have for your country’s Oct. 3 parliamentary elections in terms of Russian hybrid warfare? ER: Well, cyberattacks. We are testing all our systems aggressively, but cybersecurity would be number one. Also, some kind of provocations with “accidental” drones flying in just to create chaos. But definitely we have not noted a huge level of interference from Russia. But still we have two weeks to go. FP: On the hybrid warfare topic, let’s say someone actually dies in a Russian sabotage attack. On the one hand, triggering Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which treats an attack on one as an attack on all, would be a very strong response. On the other hand, you risk having the United States potentially not respond. What are your thoughts on what the threshold is for Article 5? ER: This is precisely the question that everyone is asking. It’s not only experts and journalists—also decision-makers, military, and politicians. You know, at the NATO level, we have defined that an act of sabotage, some kind of activity that leads to casualties, may lead to Article 5. So, that’s already in NATO doctrine. But I think that this is precisely what everyone is worried about—that you have this kind of test. And it’s not only about, as you said, the United States. It may be about other allies. First, you need to prove [Russia’s involvement]. And there is always this problem that you can’t investigate in 24 hours or so. Before Article 5, we have Article 4. Definitely, [sabotage] would go through Article 4 consultations. That process has been invoked already a couple of times. I would say that it has produced some good NATO responses. This will require us to do as much as we can to convince our colleagues that the response needs to be strong. But it seems that, to some extent, [Russia’s] appetite for risk is increasing. FP: Do you date that from the Russian sabotage attempt at Leipzig airport in August? Or even before that? ER: Leipzig was the first thing. But you know, we were talking about casualties. We have had cases where people were killed, in Spain, in Germany. Some of those killers have been arrested. And in the modern era, you can use social media to recruit someone. You offer some pay. It’s not a well-trained guy, but he still tries to do his best. Sometimes he or she succeeds. Sometimes they fail—and that’s again an issue of proof. But those are the concerns that everyone has, from Prime Minister Tusk to the Baltic leaders—that you can land in that territory that you have great suspicion it’s Russia [but] you don’t have proof, and other countries would require proof. From this perspective, the whole debate, even if it makes many people in the region nervous, this kind of discussion about this issue is helpful. FP: Why have we seen Russian sabotage increase over the last six months? ER: Number one, they are not as successful on the battlefield. The economic situation in Russia is also rather difficult. I think they believe that there is a window of opportunity because there are major countries undergoing elections. The United States’ midterms, French elections next spring. Next year, we also have some other European countries going through elections, like Italy, Poland, and so on. And I think that they still believe also that they can win this war, if not by occupying the whole of Ukraine, then at least to take Donbas. And I think also they believe that in order to be successful, in order to stop some kind of assistance to Ukraine, you need to target European and NATO countries in a way that creates some uncertainty. FP: At this point, it’s mostly the EU that is providing the vast amount of direct support to Ukraine in terms of military and financial. But it’s still U. S. dignitaries who are going to Russia and not representatives from Europe. Are you comfortable with that situation? ER: That has been a little bit a policy of choice of the European Union, and we have debates about this. Frankly, I don’t see that Russia is willing to have a real peace process. It’s more about, you know, doing some nice decoy operation, trying to show that they are ready to discuss, but they are not moving at all when it comes to terms. So, if it would be a meaningful political process, I think that you can’t negotiate without Ukraine and also without Europe being present. When it comes to European-Russian contacts, I wouldn’t mind if we do something, provided that we agree, as 27 EU member states, on the mandate. Sometimes in Europe, you want at least a couple of negotiators, and nobody wants to give the upper hand to someone else. So then it has to be one negotiator that also comes back and reports—not five or six with different channels. And that’s what Russia really hates. They don’t want to have unified European negotiators. And then of course we also need to be aware of the fact that so far Russia has been using some of those high-level contacts simply for some public relations campaign, showing great pictures but not moving at all, and sometimes using this by showing to their own public and to the international public. But I see that there is no willingness on Russia’s part for the peace negotiations, and frankly, there is no willingness to talk with Europe.