Taiwan, a partner for safeguarding peace and strengthening resilience against risks coming from China

Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te during a press conference on the "Taiwan-U.S. Economic Prosperity Partnership," in Taipei, on February 3, 2026. (Taiwan Presidential Office via AP) The recent meeting in Washington between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping once again attracted great international attention. The negotiations the two sides are holding on economic, trade, technological, and security matters—including measures such as the two-month extension of the trade truce—demonstrate that, even as the United States and China seek to achieve "constructive strategic stability," structural competition and profound divergences persist between them. After the meeting between Trump and Xi held in May of this year, Xi Jinping proposed "constructive strategic stability" as a new framework for China-U.S. relations, emphasizing cooperation, moderate competition, and the management of differences. At the second Trump-Xi meeting, held in September, both sides maintained high-level dialogue and cooperation; however, the statements of both leaders made clear that different interpretations still exist as to how this "stability" should be realized. From another perspective, the Trump-Xi meetings themselves constitute a form of risk management. The United States and China need to maintain dialogue to prevent miscalculations from triggering escalation; they need to preserve economic and trade exchanges, but also reduce vulnerabilities stemming from technological dependence and critical supply chains; and they need to address common problems while protecting their respective security interests. "Managing risks while maintaining engagement" has therefore become one of the main challenges facing the international community today amid China's rise. The concept of "de-risking," which in recent years has gained consensus in the international community, is a concrete manifestation of this approach. From the European Union's review of its economic dependence on China to the G7's sustained emphasis on economic security and supply chain resilience, countries are not seeking a total decoupling from China, but rather reducing excessive dependence in critical sectors, diversifying risks, and strengthening their own resilience. The report on security and defense partnerships approved by the European Parliament in February of this year also expressly points to the need to deepen cooperation with Taiwan on security and defense matters, as well as to strengthen the European Union's economic resilience through de-risking. The same is true in the security sphere. On the eve of the Trump-Xi meeting, representatives of Australia, France, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Poland, South Korea, and the United Kingdom jointly reaffirmed, during the United Nations General Assembly, their opposition to any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, and highlighted that the security, peace, and prosperity of Europe and the Indo-Pacific are increasingly closely linked. These developments deserve to be analyzed calmly by Taiwanese society. Whenever high-level interactions between the United States and China attract international attention, voices arise in Taiwan questioning the reliability of the United States or raising the possibility that Washington might abandon Taiwan. However, the international community's management of the risks arising from China does not mean it seeks total confrontation with that country. Likewise, states developing their China policies does not imply that they must sacrifice their relations with Taiwan. In practice, a China policy and a Taiwan policy can coexist without contradiction. Taiwanese society must calmly analyze developments in the Pacific (REUTERS/Ann Wang) For Taiwan, this also means that we must participate more actively in international risk management. Faced with China's continued expansion and the risks it generates in the areas of security, the economy, and institutions, Taiwan needs—and is already doing so—to maintain close diplomatic cooperation with countries that share our values, in order to jointly reduce the risks of miscalculation and conflict, and to strengthen regional peace and resilience. Take the recent Trump-Xi meeting as an example. Before the meeting, our government maintained fluid communication with the Trump administration and with various sectors in the United States, continuously exchanging views on important issues related to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and Taiwan-U.S. relations. The channels of communication have remained stable and smooth. After the meeting, the U.S. Ambassador to China, David Perdue, stated in an interview that "U.S. policy toward Taiwan has not changed." This once again demonstrates that continuous and stable communication, as well as mutual trust between Taiwan and its key partners, constitute fundamental elements for preserving stability in the Taiwan Strait. This is also an aspect that deserves particular attention in recent debates over the "one-China policy." Each country's policy toward China responds to its own historical and diplomatic circumstances and its national interests. This does not mean that Beijing's "one-China principle" is equivalent to the policies adopted by each country, much less that China can unilaterally decide what Taiwan's space in the international community should be. As Luke de Pulford, executive director of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC), recently pointed out, the international community can maintain its current "one-China policies," but at the same time it should consider a "One-Taiwan Policy" that responds more clearly to the reality of Taiwan's 23 million people and their right to participate in the international community. In fact, since the mid-1980s, Taiwan carried out a transformation of its political system through internal processes of liberalization and democratization. Through the comprehensive renewal of the Parliament and the direct election of the president, a state structure and a basis of political legitimacy for the Republic of China (Taiwan), centered on Taiwan, were consolidated. The government of the Republic of China, as the sole legitimate government exercising effective governance over Taiwan and representing it abroad, has given rise to a status quo in which the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the People's Republic of China exist on an equal footing and neither is subordinate to the other. Taiwan has its own democratic system, its own economy and society, and assumes its own international responsibilities. Taiwan and China are two distinct political entities. Therefore, countries can, naturally, develop—in addition to their current China policies or "one-China policies"—a policy toward Taiwan, or a "One-Taiwan Policy," in accordance with their own interests. Trump and Xi Jinping held a new meeting at the White House (REUTERS/Kylie Cooper) The United States is a concrete example. Its policy toward China is framed within the three joint communiqués, while its relationship with Taiwan has an institutional foundation consisting of the Taiwan Relations Act, the Six Assurances, and various laws passed over the years by the U.S. Congress. These instruments have different legal and political foundations and are not incompatible with one another. Moreover, U.S. policy toward Taiwan has maintained continuity across successive presidencies and administrations. Recently, legislators from both parties in the U.S. Congress have once again reaffirmed the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances, supporting the strengthening of Taiwan's self-defense capabilities and rejecting Beijing's narrative regarding its "one-China principle." As for Taiwan-U.S. relations, in the security sphere, the U.S. government continues to conduct arms sales to Taiwan, while Taiwan strives to strengthen its self-defense capabilities and whole-of-society resilience. It has also raised its defense budget to more than 3 percent of GDP, moving toward greater "burden sharing." In the economic sphere, the bilateral relationship has evolved from trade and reciprocal investment toward cooperation in semiconductors, artificial intelligence supply chains, and industrial ecosystems. Through mechanisms such as the Economic Prosperity Partnership Dialogue (EPPD) and the "Pax Silica" initiative, both sides seek to strengthen economic resilience and supply chain security. Taiwan and the United States are progressively building a "symbiotic partnership" encompassing security, the economy, technology, and industry. The same trend can be observed in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. The European Union's strategic environment assessment report published in September of this year notes that China's increasingly assertive actions in the Taiwan Strait, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea have increasingly profound implications for the security of Europe and the Indo-Pacific, and stresses that any attempt to alter the status quo in the Taiwan Strait would affect global security. Likewise, during the recent United Nations General Assembly, the European Union once again pointed out that the text of General Assembly Resolution 2758 does not mention Taiwan and that, provided the relevant rules or practices of each organization are met, Taiwan's participation in the international system should be permitted, "especially when Taiwan's technical expertise and capabilities can add value." The EU also reiterated the strategic importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait for regional and global security. Taiwan is a defender of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait These changes also demonstrate that Taiwan has no reason to underestimate its own role. In the era when China joined the WTO and globalization was expanding rapidly, Taiwan repeatedly faced reductions in its international space. Today, by contrast, the international community has a greater awareness of the economic, security, and institutional risks associated with China and attaches growing importance to Taiwan's role in areas such as democracy, technology, supply chains, and regional security. In particular, in the face of China's continued attempts to distort UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 and link it to its "one-China principle," the international community is paying increasing attention to the need to distinguish between the text of the resolution and subsequent political interpretations. Resolution 2758 addresses the question of China's representation at the United Nations; its text does not mention Taiwan nor authorize the People's Republic of China to represent Taiwan within the United Nations system. Faced with China's rise and the various challenges it poses, the international community needs pragmatic risk management. Taiwan is a defender of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait and a contributor to regional peace. As the international community jointly reflects on how to manage risks related to China, Taiwan must also actively cooperate with countries that share our values to reduce risks, preserve peace, and strengthen resilience. Taiwan should not be regarded as a problem to be solved, but as a partner with whom to work to jointly preserve peace, resilience, and prosperity.