The government is accelerating the transfer of wartime operational control, or O...
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Rushing Opcon transfer while scaling back joint drillsAs Seoul accelerates wartime control transfer while cutting joint drills, questions are growing over military readiness and trust within the Korea-U. S. alliance.
The government is accelerating the transfer of wartime operational control, or Opcon, while scaling back the joint Korea-U. S. exercises that should underpin it.
During this year's Ulchi Freedom Shield, the allies will conduct 14 battalion-level or larger field training exercises, down from 17 last year. Nor will the exercise include a Korean four-star general serving as commander of the future Combined Forces Command. Reducing key drills intended to test combined readiness and improve combat capabilities is contradictory.
More troubling is the gap between Seoul and Washington over the full operational capability, or FOC, assessment of the future Combined Forces Command, a key step toward the Opcon transfer. Korea reportedly sought to include language on conducting the FOC assessment in the allies' joint UFS statement, but the United States objected because specific assessment items were absent.
The government hopes to complete FOC verification at this year's Security Consultative Meeting and even set a target year for the transfer. Yet the statement merely reaffirmed continued preparations for a conditions-based transition. This suggests Washington is not readily embracing Seoul's effort to establish a deadline. The difference is significant because the transfer has long been explicitly tied to conditions rather than a political timetable.
The Opcon transfer should come after military capabilities and necessary conditions are met, not according to a predetermined date. For Korea to lead the future Combined Forces Command, its ability to command and control U. S. forces must be thoroughly verified and practical experience accumulated. That process must build sufficient trust between the two militaries and ultimately between the two governments as well.
Against this backdrop, recent polling is concerning. A JoongAng Ilbo-East Asia Institute survey found distrust of the United States, at 46.4 percent, surpassing trust, at 45.4 percent, for the first time. Fatigue over tariffs and defense-cost pressure from the Trump administration was cited as a major factor.
Yet 62.3 percent said the Korea-U. S. alliance should be maintained or strengthened, while 66.2 percent supported trilateral security cooperation among Korea, the United States and Japan. Emotional trust in Washington may have weakened, but the public's pragmatic recognition that the alliance remains essential to national survival is firm.
The government must not misread this sentiment. It should neither weaken the alliance because of changes in Washington nor simply yield to U. S. demands. Instead, it must devote itself to strengthening the Korea-U. S. alliance on a steady footing. Solid mutual trust within the alliance is the essential first step toward a successful Opcon transfer.(END)