The British Royal Navy suspended the connectivity of a group of maritime drones after detecting that one of their components, manufactured in China, was periodically sending signals to its manufacturer. The discovery raised alarms about the security of Western military systems and brought back into focus an increasingly difficult problem to solve: dependence on foreign components in equipment intended for strategic tasks.
The episode was analyzed by Andrei Serbin Pont during his column on Infobae al Mediodía. It involves 20 K3 Scout units, manufactured by the British company Kraken Technology Group and purchased for about 12 million pounds for surveillance and monitoring of maritime and river waters.
The anomaly was detected during a routine review of the vessels' communications. The operators discovered that a Chinese-origin component periodically established a connection with its manufacturer. As a preventive measure, the Royal Navy interrupted the equipment's connectivity while investigating what information that communication could transmit and its range.
“They detected a particular component that had or emitted signals, which is sometimes called a kind of brief return that gave data to the original manufacturer. And that specific original manufacturer of that component was a Chinese manufacturer,” Serbin Pont explained.
The type of signal detected can c…
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The Royal Navy disconnected 20 K3 Scout drones after detecting that a Chinese-made component was periodically sending signals to its manufacturer. The British Royal Navy suspended the connectivity of a group of maritime drones after discovering that one of its components, manufactured in China, was periodically sending signals to its manufacturer. The finding raised alarms about the security of Western military systems and brought back into focus an increasingly difficult problem to solve: dependence on foreign components in equipment intended for strategic tasks. The episode was analyzed by Andrei Serbin Pont during his column on Infobae al Mediodía. It concerns 20 K3 Scout units, manufactured by the British company Kraken Technology Group and purchased for about 12 million pounds for surveillance and monitoring of maritime and river waters. The anomaly was detected during a routine review of the vessels' communications. The operators discovered that a Chinese-origin component periodically established a connection with its manufacturer. As a precaution, the Royal Navy interrupted the equipment's connectivity while investigating what information that communication could transmit and its range. The British Royal Navy bought the K3 Scout drones for about 12 million pounds for surveillance and monitoring of maritime and river waters (REUTERS).
“They detected a particular component that had or emitted signals, which is sometimes called a kind of brief return that gave data to the original manufacturer. And that specific manufacturer of that component was a Chinese manufacturer,” explained Serbin Pont. The type of signal detected could correspond to a heartbeat, a communication used by various devices to inform that they are still active. Its existence does not by itself demonstrate that sensitive information has been leaked. The concern lies in determining what data the component transmits, where it sends it, and what access a third party might have to the system. In a military device, an unexpected external connection can pose a risk even if it does not directly allow access to classified information. Depending on its capabilities, it can reveal that a device is operational, transmit data about its functioning, or become a gateway to other systems. The anomaly in the maritime drones was detected during a routine communications review and prompted an investigation into the transmitted data (REUTERS/Hamad I Mohammed).
The case reignited the discussion about the concept of backdoors, hidden or unauthorized access points that can allow a third party to interact with a device or system. These vulnerabilities can be found in software, firmware—the code that directly controls hardware—or even in physical components incorporated into the equipment.
“You can have a firmware backdoor, which is much more complicated because that is the software already installed inside the hardware, and perhaps it’s not something you installed but came from the factory with it,” explained Serbin Pont. In a military system, the risk is not limited to the device containing the vulnerability. A connected piece can become an entry point to other elements of a network, especially when the equipment is part of a broader infrastructure. The problem becomes even more complex due to how current technological systems are manufactured. A device can be designed and assembled in a Western country but incorporate components produced by numerous international suppliers. Controlling the final product does not necessarily mean understanding in depth the behavior of each of its parts.
The case of the Royal Navy revived the risk of backdoors in military technology, both in software, firmware, and physical components (John Harris/U. S. Navy/Handout via REUTERS).
In the case of China, Serbin Pont also pointed out the current legal framework in that country. The National Intelligence Law of 2017 establishes cooperation obligations with state intelligence agencies for Chinese organizations and citizens, an aspect that Western governments have pointed out for years as a risk factor when companies from that country participate in strategic sectors. Added to this is China's role in global electronic component manufacturing. Modern defense industry uses many commercial parts produced by suppliers from different countries, making it especially difficult to guarantee a fully controlled supply chain.
The concern about Chinese technology in strategic systems did not start with the British drones. For over a decade, the United States and other Western countries imposed restrictions on Chinese companies and suppliers considered potentially risky for national security. In 2012, a U.S. House Intelligence Committee warned about the risks associated with Huawei and ZTE and recommended limiting their participation in critical infrastructure. In 2018, section 889 of the U.S. National Defense Authorization Act imposed restrictions on acquiring certain equipment and services from companies like Huawei, ZTE, Hikvision, and Dahua.
The Royal Navy also later restricted Huawei's participation in its 5G networks. The concern extended to other strategic infrastructure sectors, such as port cranes manufactured by the Chinese company ZPMC, used in terminals in various countries and increasingly scrutinized for their connectivity capabilities.
For Serbin Pont, these cases show the difficulty of controlling an increasingly extensive technological supply chain.
“Supposedly, you have standards that prevent Chinese companies from having a presence, but since they dominate the market so much, somehow they end up having some component,” he said.
Therefore, the problem is not only identifying who manufactured a device. It also involves knowing the origin of its components, the software it uses, and the communications it can establish once part of a critical system.
The same discussion applies to Latin America, where governments, companies, and public agencies depend on international suppliers for much of their technological infrastructure.
The anomaly in the maritime drones was detected during a routine communications review and prompted an investigation into the transmitted data (Saudi Royal Navy/Handout via REUTERS).
“Probably most of our computers here have Chinese components,” said Serbin Pont.
This statement does not mean that every component made in China is a tool for espionage, but it highlights the difficulty of fully knowing and controlling the supply chains of the technology used.
The challenge is even greater when it comes to defense, telecommunications, energy, transportation, or critical infrastructure. In these fields, security does not only depend on protecting networks or encrypting information: it also requires knowing what components each system contains, who manufactured them, and what communications they can establish.
The episode with the K3 Scout precisely exposes this problem. The Royal Navy incorporated drones to expand its surveillance capacity and ended up investigating a communication generated by one of its own components.
Beyond what the British investigation determines, the case raises once again a question that goes beyond these drones: the security of a technological system also depends on what happens inside each of its parts.
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