What the markets want to believe.

There's a lot of anticipation surrounding the meeting between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping this week. It's not just the meeting itself, but because it will be the first of a series of planned meetings for this year. Much of the global economy hopes this signals the beginning of a new period of stability between the United States and China. This is understandable. After nearly a year and a half of the Trump administration, there are still over two years remaining, and no one wants to spend that time interpreting every threat as a potential crisis. However, there's little reason to expect anything more than modest results. The meeting might improve the tone and offer some relief. But it's unlikely to fundamentally change the nature of the rivalry between the world's two major powers. That's a crucial distinction to keep in mind. It's one thing for the United States and China to talk; it's quite another for them to be able to stabilize their relationship. The former is likely; the latter is far less so. The rivalry between Washington and Beijing isn't just a trade dispute. If it were, it could be resolved through tariff negotiations or purchase agreements. But the current dispute is deeper. It's about which country will have the greater ability to influence the global economy. That's why the current expectations have a touch of wishful thinking: the markets want to believe that a series of meetings can produce the stability that the bilateral relationship currently lacks, as if repeated diplomacy could fundamentally change the underlying problem. This wishful thinking doesn't appear out of nowhere. Trump has made uncertainty a part of his method. He threatens, disrupts, and then turns any partial restraint into a victory. Markets, craving stability, often react with relief. The danger is announced, but the blow doesn't land as hard as expected, leading to the belief that the system is working again. But the avoidance of a catastrophe doesn't mean there's stability; it simply means the worst-case scenario has been avoided for now. The behavior of oil prices illustrates this logic. Despite risks that could have driven prices much higher, the market has reacted strongly but hasn't solidified the most extreme scenarios. There are material reasons for this, of course. But there's also a political explanation: there's a strong desire to believe that disorder will be contained before it reaches a breaking point. Markets not only discount information; they also discount hope. The meeting between Trump and Xi fits into this pattern. Many want to see it as the beginning of normalization. However, it's more likely to be simply a way to manage the damage. It's not insignificant, but it's not what the markets want to believe. A truce is not a solution, and a conversation is not stability. For Chile, this distinction is crucial. The country cannot base its foreign policy on the wishful thinking of the markets. It cannot assume that the rivalry between the United States and China will be resolved from above, nor that every scare will end in a reassuring meeting. This rivalry is here to stay. The question isn't whether Chile can avoid it; it can't. The question is whether it will be able to manage it. For decades, international openness has been one of Chile's greatest strengths. It allowed the country to expand markets and build connections with the world. But this openness becomes more complex when major powers use interdependence as leverage. Being connected to everyone is an advantage in times of stable globalization. In times of strategic rivalry, it can also be a vulnerability. Chile can have a strategy towards China and another towards the United States. But that's not enough. What it needs is a strategy to manage the rivalry between the two. This distinction matters. It's not just about maintaining bilateral relationships. It's about knowing where the country is vulnerable and where it has room to maneuver before it has to improvise. Chile's main leverage lies in critical minerals. Not because copper or lithium turn Chile into a major power—that would be another form of wishful thinking. But because they provide something valuable in a context of asymmetry: strategic relevance. Chile must use this position to negotiate better investment, technology, and long-term agreements. It's not enough to export strategic resources as if they were simple commodities. Managing the rivalry means thinking of critical minerals as foreign policy. It means coordinating government and the private sector. It means understanding that autonomy doesn't mean perfect distance from everyone, but rather the real ability to avoid being caught by the decisions of others. By Juan Pablo Sims, Center for International Relations Studies, UDD.