How Venezuela has – and hasn't – changed since Maduro took power.

Four months have passed since US forces captured Venezuela’s sitting president, Nicolás Maduro, and ousted him from power. Maduro’s vice-president, Delcy Rodriguez, quickly moved into the top job and has, under US tutelage, begun a process of reversing her country’s experiment with socialism. Venezuela’s pivot towards socialism began under the leadership of Hugo Chavez. After entering office in 1999, he initiated a program of sweeping nationalizations, state-led oil wealth redistribution, and increased social spending. Chávez called this process the Bolivarian revolution. Maduro replaced Chavez as president after his death in 2013. And from there, his administration oversaw one of the most severe economic declines in modern history while simultaneously dismantling democratic checks and balances. Ideological revision is a perilous moment for revolutionary regimes. Major policy pivots require cautious steering, and without credible and calibrated leadership, they risk overwhelming insular, authoritarian states. The Soviet Union is perhaps the most illustrative example of this. It collapsed in 1991 under the weight of popular economic grievances mobilized under newfound freedoms of speech and assembly. Keen to avoid a similar fate, the Chinese Communist party studied the Soviet Union’s downfall over the next decade. It concluded that the Soviet miscalculation was simultaneous economic and political opening, and has thus limited regime liberalization to the economy. In Venezuela, Rodriguez appears to be following China’s approach. She has maintained tight control of political conditions inside the country, while prioritizing economic liberalization. Under the acknowledged guidance of US officials, Rodriguez has unraveled some elements of Maduro’s regime. Thirteen of 32 ministerial positions have been reshuffled in an administration that has long been dominated by military figures and interests. However, a number of the key power brokers from the Venezuelan armed forces who maintained the Maduro regime remain in government. This includes the interior minister, Diosdado Cabello, and Vladimir Padrino Lopez, who was dismissed from his role as defence minister in March and appointed as agriculture minister instead. These people have moved into line behind Rodriguez. Successive US presidents have issued sanctions, bounties, and arrest warrants against them, as they have against Rodríguez. Hers have now been rescinded, and other prominent Maduro loyalists will be hoping their compliance brings them the same. The entire machinery of state and government remains in the hands of the ruling United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV). This includes the national assembly, supreme court, national electoral administration, police, and military. PSUV governors are in place in 23 of the country’s 24 states. And despite demands from Venezuelan opposition figures for presidential elections, the Trump administration and Rodríguez have thus far avoided committing to a vote. Progress on granting amnesty to Maduro-era political prisoners has also slowed. While more than 2,200 people were released from prison or had other legal restrictions withdrawn after the passing of an amnesty law in February, the release of political prisoners has reduced to a trickle. Over 400 of these people remain incarcerated, and the amnesty law has been quietly parked for revision. Economic liberalization On the economic front, Rodriguez has implemented reforms at a greater pace. New laws and regulations reversing Chavez’s nationalization drive are reopening key sectors of the economy to private investment. This includes hydrocarbons and mining. A recently unveiled Commission for the Evaluation of Public Assets will audit state ownership in other economic areas such as agriculture, manufacturing, and infrastructure. A fire sale to the private sector is expected. The discipline and political dominance of the PSUV machine have been put to good use here, waving through favorable terms and other confidence-building measures for investors. These include providing legal guarantees in what has long been a notoriously unpredictable economic environment and offering incentives to attract foreign investment. Julia Buxton is professor in the School of Law and Justice Studies, Liverpool John Moores University. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.